CDL applicant challenged Nevada DMV’s denial of his commercial driver’s license due to a long-standing Utah license revocation for DUI. The district court ruled in his favor, finding an equal protection violation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that: (1) denying a CDL did not violate equal protection because driving is a privilege and socioeconomic status is not a protected class; (2) DMV properly applied NAC 483.825(3) and lacked authority under NAC 483.480 to overturn Utah’s revocation; and (3) under NRS 483.920 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, DMV was required to honor Utah’s revocation. Judgment reversed and remanded.
This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenges a district court order denying a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which petitioner contended that the probable cause determination was insufficient due to an evidentiary error during the preliminary hearing. In particular, petitioner argues that the affidavit of the forensic specialist who tested petitioner’s blood alcohol content was deficient because the forensic specialist was not qualified as an expert under NRS 50.320 and therefore the affidavit was inadmissible at the preliminary hearing. We disagree.
This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial review in a Department of Motor Vehicles driver’s license revocation action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Doug Smith, Judge.
In Case Number 53248, motorist petitioned for judicial review from decision by Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke his driver’s license based on his arrest for driving under influence (DUI). The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, David Wall, J., affirmed revocation and motorist appealed. In Case Number 53380, motorist petitioned for judicial review following revocation of her driver’s license following her arrest for DUI. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Mark R. Denton, J., ordered her driver’s license reinstated, and Department appealed. Holdings: On consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court, Hardesty, J., held that: [1] hearing officer lacked discretion to admit expert affidavit of forensic scientist who had not been qualified as expert by district court, and [2] stipulation in unrelated criminal case as to expert’s qualification to testify in that case did not comply with requirement on motorist’s administrative appeal that expert affidavit be submitted by expert who had been qualified by district court. Judgment in Case Number 53248 reversed and remanded with instructions; judgment in Case Number 53380 affirmed.
Driver petitioned for review of revocation by Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) of his driving privileges. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Mark R. Denton, J., denied petition. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court held that ALJ did not improperly act as prosecutor. Affirmed.
Licensee sought review of decision of administrative law judge (ALJ) affirming decision of Department of Motor Vehicles revoking her driver’s license following a single test to determine the concentration of alcohol in licensee’s breath. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Michelle Leavitt, J., reversed. State appealed. The Supreme Court, Douglas, J., held that revocation statute only required a single breath test to be over the legal limit in order to revoke license. District Court reversed.
Motorist requested an administrative hearing to review a three-year revocation of his driver’s license after he was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) for the third time in seven years. An administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the three-year revocation. Motorist petitioned for judicial review. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, James M. Bixler, J., granted the petition and reversed the ALJ’s decision. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed. The Supreme Court held that DMV was required to revoke motorist’s driving privileges for 90 days, not for three years. Affirmed.
Motorist, who had a prior driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) conviction on his record, and was convicted a second time of DUI as first time offender, sought reduction in revocation of his drivers license from one year to 90 days. The Ninth Judicial District Court, Douglas County, Michael P. Gibbons, J., vacated the administrative decision. State appealed. The Supreme Court, held that revocation of motorist’s license was limited to period of 90 days, rather than one year. Affirmed.
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a petition for judicial review in a driver’s license revocation proceeding. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kenneth C. Cory, Judge.
Motorist sought judicial review of administrative decision revoking his driving privileges. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Kenneth C. Cory, J., reversed the administrative order, and the Department of Motor Vehicles appealed. The Supreme Court held that: [1] trooper’s hearsay statements should have been excluded, and [2] without the hearsay statements, substantial evidence did not support DUI adjudicator’s decision to revoke motorist’s license. Affirmed.
Motorist petitioned for judicial review of Department of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV) administrative revocation of his driver’s license, based on result of blood alcohol test. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Ronald D. Parraguirre, J., denied the petition. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court held that: [1] officer who ordered blood alcohol test had reasonable grounds to believe motorist had been driving or in actual physical control of vehicle while intoxicated; [2] administrative law judge did not improperly shift burden of proof to motorist by allegedly requiring him to prove that he had not consumed alcohol before driving his vehicle; and [3] procedural due process requires that in administrative driver’s license revocation proceedings, motorists must be permitted to submit evidence that they consumed alcohol only after driving. Affirmed.
IMPLIED CONSENT Motorist petitioned for judicial review of Department of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV) revocation of his license to drive. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, David Wall, J., denied the petition. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court held that: [1] factors for requesting evidentiary test for blood alcohol concentration, under implied consent law, are not limited to an officer smelling alcohol on the motorist’s breath and the officer observing that the motorist has bloodshot eyes; [2] officer had reasonable grounds for requesting evidentiary test; and [3] officer’s certification of cause for revocation was sufficient. Affirmed.
The Department hereby adopts by reference the provisions of 49 C.F.R. Parts 383 and 384 as they existed on October 1, 2004, and any subsequent amendments. Each amendment shall be deemed approved by the Department unless it disapproves the amendment within 60 days after the United States Department of Transportation has adopted such an amendment.
Defendant was convicted in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Mark W. Gibbons, J., of six counts of driving with a prohibited substance in the blood or urine, one count of use of a controlled substance, and one count of possession of a controlled substance. She appealed. The Supreme Court, Leavitt, J., held that: (1) prohibited substance statute is constitutional; (2) conviction under prohibited substance theory did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause; (3) trial court properly instructed jury on proximate cause; and (4) independent laboratory’s failure to refrigerate defendant’s blood sample did not violate her due process rights. Affirmed.
