Commercial Drivers Licensing Resources
For Judges


  • Jackson v. Allen (2021)

    Patrick Jackson appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Voncille Allen, as the personal representative of the estate of Valerie Allen (“the estate”), and Penn Tank Lines, Inc. (“PTL”).

  • Stiefel v. Malone (2021)

    This is a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Pending before the undersigned are two motions to strike and a motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendants Robert K. Malone (“Malone”) and Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., d/b/a R+L Carriers (“Greenwood”).

  • Claussen v. PowerSECURE (2019)

    This is a wrongful death case arising from a truck wreck. The matter comes to the Court on a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendant PowerSecure, Inc. (“Defendant”).

  • Alabama Department of Human Resources ex rel. Tammy Yancey v. Ronald Yancey, 54 So. 3d 415 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)

    A father was found in contempt for willful failure to pay child support and the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR) had suspended his commercial driver’s license, as authorized by Ala. Code § 30-3-171. The trial court noted that the father’s ability to earn income was much greater if he was driving a truck and ordered the DHR to reinstate the license. The court considered whether the trial court had the authority to order DHR to reinstate the father’s driver’s license. The procedure for the review of DHR’s decision to suspend or revoke the license of a person who has failed to pay child support was set forth in Ala. Code § 30-3-172. The Alabama Legislature affirmatively granted DHR the authority to make all decisions regarding whether to suspend or revoke an obligor’s driver’s license when he or she has failed to pay child support for at least six months.

  • Alabama Department of Public Safety v. Brian Alston, 39 So. 3d 1176 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)

    The DPS argued that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter based on the longstanding principles of sovereign immunity. It based its sovereign immunity argument on its contention that the appeal to the trial court was a lawsuit rather than an administrative appeal. The driver filed an administrative appeal to the trial court seeking review of the DPS’s decision. Next, the DPS argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it reversed its administrative ruling despite the provisions of the Ala. Admin. Code r. 760-x-1-.12, Ala. Admin. Code, Ala. Code § 32-6-49.7(b), and 49 C.F.R. § 383.51, which the DPS said required the mandatory disqualification of the driver’s CDL based on his having received the two citations. However, the DPS failed to provide any evidence of either citation to the trial court, leaving that court with no basis for upholding the disqualification of the driver’s CDL.

  • Burdine v. Arkansas Dept. of Finance & Admin., 2010 Ark. 455 (2010)

    After licensee was arrested in Missouri and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI), and licensee’s driving privileges were suspended, the Department of Finance and Administration’s Office of Driver Services’s (DFA) disqualified licensee’s commercial driver’s license (CDL). Licensee appealed. The Circuit Court, Benton County, No. CV–2009–1237–4, affirmed. Licensee appealed. The Supreme Court held that the suspension of licensee’s driver’s license in Missouri constituted a conviction for DWI, warranting disqualification of licensee’s CDL. Affirmed.

  • Cooley v. State Department of Public Safety, 827 So. 2d 124 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)

    A truck driver admitted to consuming alcohol in Tennessee and took a breathalyzer test, indicating a blood alcohol level of .05 percent. He pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. Alabama authorities notified him his commercial driver’s license was disqualified for one year, based on this conviction. The appellate court held the Alabama and Tennessee statutes were comparable regarding the blood alcohol level (.08 percent or greater) for convictions based on driving while intoxicated or impaired and driving under the influence, Ala. Code § 32-5A-191 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-418(c) (2001). The statutes of both states provided that a blood alcohol content of .04 percent or greater was considered driving under the influence for a commercial driver and was punishable by a disqualification of at least one year of the driver’s commercial driver’s license, Ala. Code § 32-6-49.12(c) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-405. Because the driver’s conduct in Tennessee, if committed in Alabama, would have been grounds for disqualification of his commercial driver’s license, appellee department was authorized to impose a one-year disqualification of that license. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed.

  • Dixon v. Hot Shot Exp., Inc., 44 So.3d 1082 (2010)

    Administratrix of deceased passenger’s estate brought wrongful-death action against tractor driver and driver’s employer. The Walker Circuit Court, No. CV-03-191, entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of defendants. Administratrix appealed. The Supreme Court held that Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act and federal regulation regarding operation of commercial vehicle in hazardous conditions did not preempt Alabama’s guest-passenger statute. Affirmed.

  • Miller v. Arkansas Dept. of Finance and Admin., 2012 Ark. 165 (2012)

    Driver appealed suspension of his license. Following hearing, the Circuit Court, Washington County, affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court held that statute that required driver to surrender license upon arrest for certain crimes was not unconstitutional as applied. Affirmed.

  • Robinette v. Department of Finance and Admin., Not Reported in S.W.3d (2011)

    Licensee sought review of decision of Department of Finance and Administration’s Office of Driver Services (DFA), suspending his driver’s license for two years. The Circuit Court, Pulaski County, affirmed. Licensee appealed. The Supreme Court held that: [1] denial of licensee’s motion for summary judgment was final and appealable, and [2] trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying licensee’s challenge to notice. Affirmed.



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