What appears at first blush as a simple conviction for operating a commercial motor vehicle without the required state-issued license in fact involves a more complicated (and as far as we can determine, unaddressed) question lying at the intersection of state and federal licensing requirements.
Motorist requested a refusal hearing after he refused to take a chemical test following his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). The Circuit Court, Walworth County, dismissed the state’s case, concluding that motorist’s refusal was lawful. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, 337 Wis.2d 57, 805 N.W.2d 722, affirmed. State petitioned for review. The Supreme Court held that:  trial court may entertain argument at refusal hearing that motorist’s arrest was unlawful because traffic stop that preceded it was not justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and  officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop of motorist’s vehicle. Reversed and remanded.
Defendant was charged with refusal to submit to testing of his blood-alcohol level at time of his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). After defendant was acquitted of the underlying OWI and PAC charges, he moved to dismiss the refusal charge. The Circuit Court, Columbia County, granted the motion, and state appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for Circuit Court to exercise its discretion as to whether to dismiss the refusal charge. State petitioned for review. The Supreme Court held that trial court lacked discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charge. Affirmed as modified and remanded. Reversed and remanded.
Appellant does not dispute that he failed to request a refusal hearing within the ten-day time limit set by statute. As a result of his failure to meet the statutory deadline, the circuit court lost competency to proceed. Accordingly, the court properly dismissed the motion to re-open the refusal revocation proceedings. On grounds of competency rather than jurisdiction, appeal dismissed.
Nackers appealed an order finding his refusal to submit to chemical testing unreasonable. His contention was that the officer violated Wisconsin’s implied consent law by failing to inform him that as a holder of a commercial driver’s license he would be placed out-of-service for refusing to submit to testing and then later failing to issue an out of service order. Because the officer properly read Nackers the Informing the Accused form in its entirety, including the portion detailing the possibility of the issuance of an out-of-service order the order was affirmed. Further, whether the officer was required to issue an out-of-service order was not an issue for the refusal hearing.
State failed to establish, as basis for enhancing sentence in prosecution for operating while under the influence (OWI), that two “zero tolerance” suspensions in another state resulted from a refusal to submit to chemical testing; driving record from other state did not state whether the suspensions arose from a refusal to submit to testing or from a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00. “Conviction,” as used in statute relating to counting of out-of-state convictions for sentence enhancement purposes in prosecution for OWI, refers to an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal.
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Walworth County, of drunk driving as a fifth offense. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that:  evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant had two previous convictions in other jurisdictions for driving under the influence for purposes of enhancing her penalty, and  proceedings in California and Arizona in regards to defendant’s convictions for driving while intoxicated were not constitutionally flawed. Affirmed.
Defendant was convicted, in the Circuit Court, Eau Claire County, of fifth offense drunk driving. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant’s petition for review was granted. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of first impression, probable cause existed for police officer to request a preliminary breath test (PBT) from defendant non-commercial driver for driving or operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), where defendant was known by officer to be subject to a .02 PAC standard based on defendant’s prior convictions for drunk driving, and officer smelled alcohol on defendant. Affirmed.
Driver appealed the judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, fourth offense, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). He contended there was no probable cause to administer the preliminary breath screening test (PBT), and the circuit court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Court of Appeals concluded there was probable cause. Affirmed.
Driver appealed his conviction for third-offense operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI). Hill argued that as he was operating a utility terrain vehicle (UTV) at the time of the offense, he was charged under the wrong drunk-driving statute and the court improperly denied his motion to dismiss. Court of Appeals agreed that as driver was operating a UTV, he should be charged with intoxicated operation of a UTV under WIS. STAT. § 23.33(4c). Reversed.
Following judgment of conviction and sentence for seventh-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI), defendant moved for postconviction relief, challenging condition of extended supervision that prohibited him from operating a motor vehicle. The Circuit court, Outagamie County, entered order denying motion. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that trial court had no statutory authority to impose condition that defendant not operate a vehicle during nine-year period of extended supervision. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part; order reversed; and cause remanded with directions.
Dairy farm operator was found guilty in the Circuit Court, Pepin County, of violating statutory vehicle width and weight restrictions with respect to a manure spreader. Farm operator appealed, arguing that the manure spreader was an implement of husbandry exempt from the width and weight restrictions. The Court of Appeals held that:  primary purpose of manure spreader was to transport large quantities of manure;  manure was “property”; and  manure spreader was a commercial motor vehicle operated on a highway, excluding it from the definition of an implement of husbandry. Affirmed.
The State appealed from a judgment of the circuit court dismissing a third operating while intoxicated (OWI) charge against defendant. Driver did not have any alcohol in her system at the time she crashed her vehicle, but she had “huffed” the substance 1, 1–Difluoroethane (DFE), which is commonly found in air spray cans. The circuit court dismissed the charge after concluding that DFE is not an “intoxicant” within the meaning of the OWI statute. Court of Appeals agreed. Affirmed.
Motorist, who had been arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and apparently refused a chemical test to ascertain his blood alcohol concentration, filed a request to extend time period within which he was required by implied consent law to request a refusal hearing. The Circuit Court, Waukesha County, denied request for an extension of time and dismissed request for a refusal hearing. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court held that circuit court lacked competency to hear motorist’s request to extend ten-day time period within which he was required to request a refusal hearing based on excusable neglect. Affirmed.
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Ozaukee County, of first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI), and was ordered to install an ignition interlock device in his motor vehicle. He appealed. The Court of Appeals held that trial court was required to order installation of the ignition interlock device on defendant’s vehicle even though his prior OWI conviction occurred more than ten years before the latest offense and defendant could not be convicted as a repeat offender. Affirmed.
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