Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), following trial in the Municipal Court, City of Phoenix, Carol Berry, J. Defendant appealed. The Superior Court, No. LC2008-000551-001DT, affirmed. Defendant sought special action relief. The Court of Appeals, 222 Ariz. 356, 214 P.3d 444, vacated judgment. City appealed. The Supreme Court, Bales, J., held that implied consent statute generally does not authorize law enforcement officers to administer test to determine alcohol concentration without warrant unless arrestee expressly agrees to test.
Employer complied with the federal mandate under 49 C.F.R. § 391.93 to randomly conduct drug tests. The employee tested positive for cocaine seven hours into his workday. The employer discharged the employee from his position as a truck driver because he was no longer qualified to operate a motor vehicle, and federal regulations prohibited the employer from using the employee as a driver because he tested positive for cocaine. Employee applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Appeals Board ultimately held that the employee qualified for unemployment insurance benefits. The employee’s actions were connected with his work under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-619.01 (Supp. 1993) because they adversely affected the employer’s interests. The discharge for intoxication was disqualifying, and the employee should not have been awarded unemployment insurance benefits.
Substantial evidence supported an ALJ’s decision to suspend a driver’s license. The officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired. The driver admitted to the officer that he had been drinking earlier that evening, and the officer concluded that the driver had returned home shortly before the officer had arrived. Upon arriving home, the driver had driven his truck into another vehicle with enough force to move that vehicle four feet. Additionally, the officer did not see any evidence that the driver had consumed any alcohol after his arrival. The fact that the driver provided a different explanation of the night’s events at his administrative hearing did not preclude the ALJ’s finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver had driven under the influence of alcohol. A.R.S. § 28-1385.
The state filed a petition for special-action relief after the Superior Court, Pima County, Jane A. Butler, Commissioner Pro Tem, granted juvenile’s motion to suppress evidence of a warrantless blood draw that was conducted after his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The Court of Appeals, 231 Ariz. 42, 290 P.3d 435, reversed. The Supreme Court granted review. Holdings: As matters of first impression, the Supreme Court, Bales, V.C.J., held that:  independent of the implied-consent statute, the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee’s consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw;  if the arrestee is a juvenile, the juvenile’s age and a parent’s presence are relevant, though not necessarily determinative, factors that courts should consider in assessing the voluntariness of consent to a warrantless blood draw; and  trial court acted within its discretion in ruling that juvenile’s consent was involuntary.
Defendant’s arrest for driving under the influence was supported by probable cause. A department of public safety officer testified that when he transported defendant to the police station, he knew that she had been the driver in a singlevehicle rollover accident. When the officer first made contact with defendant, he observed signs of impairment and chose not to administer field sobriety tests because he could see she was unsteady on her feet. Further, the officer excluded other potential causes for the accident. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Defendant was convicted by jury in the Superior Court, Pima County, No. CR20080258, Richard S. Fields, J., of manslaughter, aggravated assault of a minor under 15 years of age, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) while impaired to the slightest degree, driving with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, and driving while under the extreme influence of intoxicating liquor with an alcohol concentration of .15 or more. Defendant appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Vásquez, P.J., held that:  defendant’s blood draw was taken in violation of her right to counsel, but  there was no nexus between the violation and the evidence obtained so as to require suppression.
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