Defendant was indicted after defendant was driving a commercial vehicle weighing over 10,001 pounds and did not possess a medical certificate or a logbook at the time of inspection, in violation of 49 C.F.R. 391.41(a) and 395.8(a)(1). In addition, Defendant could not produce a commercial driver’s license the OH Public Utilities Commission determined that the Ohio Office of commercial drivers could not prove by a preponderance of evidence that Defendant did not
provide a commercial driver’s license or that he was unable to provide a medical certificate because h was driving the commercial vehicle through the use of an easement.
Defendant was arrested in Portage County, Ohio for operating his personal vehicle under the influence in a private parking lot. The administrative license suspension/CDL disqualification form, completed by the officer and admitted at the hearing, states that defendant failed the field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a chemical test for alcohol and/or controlled substances. Defendant’s commercial driver’s license was seized at the time of the arrest. Because of the arrest, Defendant’s commercial Driver’s license was suspended for one year which Defendant then appealed. The 11th District of Ohio Court of Appeals held that commercial license suspension due to OVI under R.C. 4506.17 includes operating personal motor vehicles. Therefore, the Court upheld Defendant’s license suspension.
Plaintiff-appellant appeals an order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas affirming the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) Registrar’s disqualification of Plaintiff’s commercial driver’s license. On January 4, 2019, Plaintiff was sent a notice of disqualification of his commercial driver’s license after Plaintiff was cited with two CDL violations over three years: texting and driving, and improper lane changes. The 8th District of Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s suspension of Plaintiff’s Commercial Driver’s License because although both offences resulted in civil fines, the civil fines still constituted convictions under 49 C.F.R. 383.5 and therefore Plaintiff’s suspension was proper.
The trucking company requested non-redacted copies of the driving records of its employees from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) at cost. The BMV refused to provide non-redacted copies at cost, but instead, following the BMV rule, required the company to specify the basis for its entitlement to a non-redacted copy on a BMV form and to pay a set fee for a certified copy. The company claimed that it did not need a certified copy and that it should have been able to receive a non-redacted copy at cost under the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. The court found that the company was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because disclosure of the records was prohibited by the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C.S. § 2721 et seq., unless a requester demonstrated a permissible use, by complying with the procedure outlined in Ohio Admin. Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2). The rule created a procedure for requesting DPPA-governed materials, which included filling out and submitting the BMV form and paying the fee. The specific provisions of R.C. 4501.27 and Ohio Admin. Code 4501:1-12-02(D)(2) prevailed over the general provisions of R.C. 149.43.
Defendant-appellant appeals his convictions and sentences after a bench trial in the Muskingum County Court convicted defendant of operating a commercial vehicle while having a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol or of a controlled substance in his blood, breath, or urine. The 5th District of Ohio Court of Appeals held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for operating a truck while “under the influence” in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 4506.15(A)(6).
Defendant was pulled over and arrested for driving under the influence while he was not driving a commercial vehicle. The Defendant in the course of his arrest was compelled to take a breath test. Defendant at trial moved to suppress the breath test due to not being warned of the consequences of submitting to a test to his commercial driver’s license which was granted. The 10th District of Ohio Court of Appeals ultimately held that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress the breath test results because the officer was not required to advise defendant of non-compliance consequences to his commercial driver’s license since he was not charged with a violation of the commercial driver’s license OVI statute.
Plaintiff-Appellant was driving a commercial vehicle when a one-ton landscaping type truck struck Appellant from behind which caused appellant to strike the vehicle in front of him. The landscaping truck failed to stop and exited the highway at the closest exit. Appellant decided to exit and follow the landscaping truck in an effort to obtain a license plate number but failed. When Appellant returned to the scene of the accident, he was unable to locate the car he struck.
Plaintiff-appellant Walter Reed appeals an order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas affirming the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) Registrar’s disqualification of Reed’s commercial driver’s license (“CDL”).
After driver was found not guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence, driver sought to reverse administrative license suspension. The Willoughby Municipal Court, No. 09 TRC 00211, terminated the suspension. City appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lake County, held that driver was not informed of the consequences of refusing breath test, and was entitled to termination of administrative license suspension. Affirmed.
Juvenile court abused its discretion by imposing a 90-year suspension on the ability of a juvenile, adjudicated delinquent for committing acts consisting of the offense of aggravated vehicular homicide, to apply for a driver’s license. While the aggravated vehicular homicide statute contained a provision for license suspensions to include a lifetime suspension, the juvenile code provided no indication that the limited jurisdiction of the juvenile court was extended for the purpose of imposing a lifetime suspension. R.C. 2152.01(C)(6).
Appellant appealed from his conviction in the Parma Municipal Court for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”). He argued that the trial court impermissibly applied provisions of the law that had changed from the time of his criminal conduct to the time of his sentence. He also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and law, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction and sentence.
A police officer’s failure to notarize an administrative license suspension (ALS) form as required by state law did not render the suspension invalid. The police officer pulled over a defendant, administered a series of field sobriety tests, and administered a chemical test. After the test revealed that the defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was .204%, the police officer advised her that her license was suspended and gave the defendant an unsworn copy of the ALS form. The police officer failed to notarize the ALS form before submitting it to the Registrar and trial court. However the form and the state law on which it was based specifically stated that if found to be at or over the prohibited amount of alcohol a person’s driving privileges would be suspended immediately, indicating that the defendant’s driving privileges were suspended the moment the chemical test revealed a BAC of .204%. R.C. 4511.197(C).
After his motion to suppress was denied, defendant-appellant Ulema Arrazzaq pleaded no contest to trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, carrying a concealed weapon, and having a weapon while under a disability. Both drug offenses carried firearm specifications. In one assignment of error, he claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. While the Court of Appeals disagreed with Arrazzaq’s position on the motion to suppress, an error in his sentence required them to vacate his sentence in part and remand the case for correction of the sentencing error.
Akie H. Benjamin appealed the trial court’s denial of his Motion to Vacate Void Sentence Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(4). Benjamin contended that his sentence was void because the trial court failed to impose a statutorily mandated driver’s license suspension, and thus, he was entitled to a resentencing hearing. Because the trial court failed to impose a statutorily mandated driver’s license suspension, Benjamin’s sentence is void, and the trial court must resentence Benjamin. However, the Court of Appeals limited Benjamin’s resentencing hearing to the proper imposition of the statutorily mandated driver’s license suspension.
Defendant-appellant Timothy Boafor appealed from the judgment of Mahoning County Court No. 4, which imposed a ninety-day license suspension after accepting a no contest plea to speeding at a rate of 77 mph in a 65 mph zone. First, appellant argued that a license suspension could not be imposed under R.C 4510.15 because this speeding charge could not be categorized as “relating to reckless operation.” Second, appellant contended that he could only be convicted of a minor misdemeanor because the traffic ticket did not charge a third degree misdemeanor or mention predicate offenses. For the following reasons, the Court of Appeals concluded that both arguments had merit. Appellant’s license suspension was vacated and his speeding conviction was to be modified to reflect only a minor misdemeanor.
Trial court did not err in denying a driver’s appeal from an administrative license suspension for refusing a requested chemical breath test subsequent to his arrest for operating a vehicle under the influence. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crash, despite the driver’s claim that he consumed alcohol after the crash. The abundant inconsistencies in the driver’s story, coupled with the arresting officer’s training and experience, provided the officer, who made the arrest at the driver’s home after the driver left the scene, with reasonable grounds to believe the driver had violated the statute prohibiting driving under the influence. R.C. §§ 4511.19, 4511.197(A).
A defendant’s refusal to take a chemical test following his arrest on suspicion of operating a vehicle while intoxicated was not involuntary. Defendant, who was driving a commercial vehicle at the time of his arrest, was asked to submit to a chemical test and informed in a recorded conversation that if he refused to submit, his license would be automatically suspended. The officer informed defendant that the legal limit for commercial drivers was .02 when it was actually .04, but still informed defendant as to the consequences of his refusal. The officer specifically informed the defendant of regulations applicable to commercial drivers, and asked defendant to follow along. The officer informed defendant that he could not help him make the decision, and that the defendant would have to decide on his own. R.C. § 4506.15(A)(2).
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Maumee Municipal Court, which found appellant guilty of reckless operation. Appellant was clocked on radar by the Ohio State Highway Patrol traveling at 94 m.p.h. in a 70 m.p.h. zone on the Ohio Turnpike in Lucas County, Ohio. At sentencing, the trial court suspended appellant’s driver’s license for a period of sixty days, and imposed a fine and court costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.
Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from the Warren County Court of Common Pleas decision terminating the driver’s license suspension of defendant-appellee, Tyrone Haralson, following Haralson’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana. Reversed and remanded.
Defendant was convicted in the Bowling Green Municipal Court, No. 09TRC04543, of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content. He appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] police officer’s failure to retain slip from instrument check on breath testing machine did not warrant suppression of blood-alcohol test results from machine; [2] arresting officer’s failure to warn defendant of the consequences of refusing an alcohol test or of an unlawful result upon defendant’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) did not warrant suppression of test results; and [3] results of blood-alcohol test performed using portable breath testing machine were admissible. Affirmed.
Defendant-appellant, Mark R. Hutchings, appealed from the trial court’s journal entry of sentencing, which included the suspension of his Michigan driver’s license. Affirmed and remanded.
A police officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a defendant was driving under a suspended license and was not within his limited driving privileges to conduct a traffic stop. Therefore the defendant was not entitled to suppress evidence related to the traffic stop. The officer observed the defendant speeding and was subsequently informed by dispatch that the defendant had limited driving privileges and was driving away from his home. OH Const. Art. 1, § 14; R.C. 4510.11.
Defendant was convicted in the Marietta Municipal Court of operating a motor vehicle while impaired, failure to control, and failure to stop after an accident involving the property of others. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] evidence was sufficient to support conviction for failure to stop; [2] the trial court was not authorized to suspend defendant’s driver’s license as part of his failure to stop conviction; and [3] counsel’s failure to make additional arguments in support of acquittal of the failure to stop charge did not prejudice defendant. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Trial court abused its discretion when it suspended driver’s driver’s license after driver pled guilty to a violation under a statute that did not give the court the authority to suspend a driver’s license. Driver was driving along a wet roadway when she failed to stop at a stop sign at the intersection and “clipped” a street sign, damaging it.
Motorist was charged with driving under influence (OVI), making improper turn, and failing to reinstate license. The Municipal Court, No. 09TRC-21296A, entered guilty verdict on traffic offenses, and not guilty verdict on OVI charge, and terminated administrative license suspension that was imposed following motorist’s refusal to submit to chemical test. City appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hamilton County, held that not guilty verdict on charge for OVI did not permit termination of automatic administrative suspension of motorist’s driver’s license for having refused to submit to chemical test. Reversed and remanded.
Motorist whose driver’s license was subject to lifetime suspension filed motion for limited driving privileges. The Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, No. CR-435289, granted the motion, and state appealed. The Court of Appeals, 2012 WL 6061380, affirmed. State filed discretionary appeal. The Supreme Court held that: [1] granting of limited driving privileges was not a “modification” of the suspension, but [2] trial court was required to specify a purpose and place for the driving privileges. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Defendant-appellant, Brad McPhillamy, appeals the July 5, 2011 judgment of the Erie County Municipal Court which denied his request for an administrative license suspension hearing. The Court of Appeals found that the request was untimely. Affirmed.
Defendant’s sentence of eight years in prison and suspended driving privileges for ten years starting after the prison term ended for his conviction of aggravated vehicular homicide was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Although defendant’s punishment would span eighteen years and the maximum prison term was eight years, the court was also required to impose a suspension of defendant’s driver’s license from anywhere from three years to life. Moreover, nothing in the Sentencing Guidelines prohibited the court from requiring the suspension to be served consecutive to the prison term. R.C. §§ 2929.14(A)(2), 2903.06(B)(3).
Defendant appealed from his conviction of operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol (“OVI”) and failure to stop after an accident, both first-degree misdemeanors, claiming that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, that the court erred in “changing its ALS [administrative license suspension] appeal ruling,” and that his sentences were excessive and constituted a punishment for exercising his right to a jury trial. Affirmed.
Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). The Municipal Court, Portage County, Ravenna Division, No. R2011 TRC 16356, granted defendant’s motion to suppress results of urine test that had been conducted at scene of fatal accident involving defendant’s commercial vehicle. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Portage County, held that: [1] police officers conducted test in violation of implied consent law; but [2] statutory violation did not require suppression of test results; and [3] trial court was required to determine whether defendant voluntarily consented to test. Reversed and remanded.
Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). The Municipal Court, Portage County, Ravenna Division, No. R2011 TRC 16356, granted defendant’s motion to suppress results of urine test that had been conducted at scene of fatal accident involving defendant’s commercial vehicle. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Portage County, held that: [1] police officers conducted test in violation of implied consent law; but [2] statutory violation did not require suppression of test results; and [3] trial court was required to determine whether defendant voluntarily consented to test. Reversed and remanded.
Trial court did not improperly sentence defendant convicted of driving while intoxicated when it suspended her operator’s license for 365 days and ordered to display restricted yellow license plates and have an ignition interlock device installed on her vehicle as a condition of obtaining limited driving privileges during the term of her suspension. Defendant argued that she was a school teacher with no previous alcohol-related offenses, or any other traffic violations, and no criminal record. She argued that it was unfair to add penalties to her sentence for not submitting to a blood alcohol test. But defendant’s sentence was within statutorily prescribed limits, and the record did not include a transcript of defendant’s sentencing hearing. R.C. §§ 4511.19(A)(1)(a), 4510.02(A) (5), 4510.021(A), 4510.021(C).
Trial court erred in finding that a driver’s refusal to take an alcohol test triggered an administrative license suspension when a police officer had no reasonable articulable suspension to pull the driver’s car over. Police officer claimed that he pulled driver over for weaving in his lane. However, review of video from the police officer’s dashboard camera revealed that the defendant was not weaving and the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to pull the driver over. Because the trial court concluded that the stop was unlawful, the request that the driver submit to chemical testing and the suspension of his driver’s license for refusal to do so was likewise unlawful.
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