Jimmy L. Stuart’s driver’s license was suspended on December 12, 2009, for refusing to submit to or complete a breath test for driving under the influence (DUI). The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) affirmed the suspension of his license. Stuart alleged the arresting officer, Trooper J.A. Kellerman, provided implied consent advisory notices that failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements. He appealed the administrative ruling, and the district court initially remanded it to the administrative law judge (ALJ) to determine the extent of Stuart’s suspension. Subsequently, Stuart again appealed the suspension of his license. At a bench trial based on agreed facts, the trial court affirmed the administrative ruling. Stuart appealed. This Court found that Trooper Kellerman’s notice substantially complied with the statute and did not prejudice Stuart. Therefore, this Court held that the Kansas Department of Revenue appropriately suspended Stuart’s license. As a result, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Jarad A. Jones appealed the district court’s decision denying his motion to suppress his breath alcohol test (BAT) result of. 111. The district court subsequently convicted Jones of DUI on stipulated facts. On appeal, Jones claimed that the investigating officers misled him with incorrect information about the impact of a BAT failure or refusal on his commercial driver’s license (CDL), vitiating his subsequent consent to take the test and requiring suppression of the result. This Court found that Jones failed to designate a record that affirmatively shows that the district court erroneously accepted the City’s proof and admitted the breath test. As a result, this Court disagreed with Jones’ stance and affirmed the district court’s decision.
This is an appeal by Erin Espinoza of the district court’s ruling affirming an order by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) disqualifying Espinoza for life from holding a commercial driver’s license (CDL). The disqualification was predicated on K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-2,142(c) which provides, in relevant part, that a person shall be disqualified for life from operating a commercial motor vehicle upon the second or subsequent occurrence of a refusal or failure of a test for alcohol consumption while operating a noncommercial motor vehicle arising from two or more separate incidents. The district court noted there were specific exceptions to this statute listed in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-259(a), which limited the time period for filing to 14 days, but none of the exceptions related to the lifetime disqualification of a commercial driver’s license. This Court found that Espinoza did not raise a procedural due process violation in the district court, and he did not argue for an exception to the general rule before this court. As a result, this Court held that the district court did not err in affirming Kansas Department of Revenue’s lifetime disqualification of Espinoza’s CDL privileges.
Rodney Edward Bullard was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). He was processed under the Kansas Implied Consent Law and his driving privileges were suspended. Bullard requested an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension; a hearing was conducted, and a Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) hearing officer affirmed the administrative action. Bullard next filed a petition for judicial review of the administrative action in district court. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court affirmed the administrative action and denied Bullard’s petition. On appeal, Bullard raised three arguments: (1) The district court erred in finding that the issue of articulable suspicion to support the traffic stop was not a basis for relief in an administrative appeal; (2) the district court erred in barring expert opinion testimony regarding the accuracy of the certified test device; and (3) K.S.A.2012 Supp. 8–1014(b)(2)(A) and K.S.A.2012 Supp. 8–2,142(a)(2)(B) violate the Equal Protection Clause by imposing harsher DUI penalties on the holders of class A commercial driver’s licenses (CDLs) than on the holders of regular class C driver’s licenses. Ultimately, this Court found that the district court did not err and affirmed the decision of the district court.
Nicholas Ford appealed several convictions related to operating a truck towing a fifth wheel recreational vehicle (RV) without a commercial driver’s license (CDL). Ford raised several arguments on appeal. First, he asserted that the district court miscalculated the weight of his vehicles for the purposes of determining whether he was subject to the CDL requirements. Alternatively, he argued that the CDL requirements did not apply to him because he was engaged in private noncommercial use of the RV and because an exemption for new RVs applied to him. Lastly, Ford claimed that if the new RV exemption does not apply to him, the exemption violates his equal protection rights as a used RV seller. Ultimately, this Court found no error and affirmed the district court’s judgment that Ford operated a vehicle without the required CDL.
Jose Robles appealed the suspension of his commercial driver’s license. Robles argued that the district court erred when it found the information in the Certification and Notice of Suspension Form, which notified Robles of his suspension, more persuasive than Robles’ testimony at trial. This Court noted that appellate courts do not reweigh conflicting evidence or second-guess credibility assessments. This Court found that the district court was not required to believe Robles’ testimony, and it apparently did not do so. Moreover, this Court found that the DC-27 form (and its contents) sufficiently supported the administrative suspension of Robles’ commercial driver’s license. As a result, this Court held that the district court did not err when it upheld that suspension.
Erin Darrow petitioned this Court for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Darrow, No. 109,397, 2014 WL 1887629 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion), affirming her driving under the influence (DUI) conviction, third offense. The district court found Darrow guilty on stipulated facts. Darrow argued that the stipulated facts were insufficient to prove she operated or attempted to operate a vehicle. Ultimately, this Court disagreed with Darrow, finding that the stipulated facts presented by the parties, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, are sufficient to support the conviction. Therefore, this Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Randall Lee Gilliland appealed his convictions of possession of methamphetamine, possession of paraphernalia, and failure to use a turn signal. He claimed that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him, so the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during his search incident to arrest. Gilliland also claimed that the district court erred by requiring drug tests as a condition of his pretrial bond. Officers testified that they stopped Gilliland because they saw him fail to use his turn signal when turning left in a four-way intersection, and because they believed his license was expired and revoked. The district court credited the officers’ testimony. Failure to use a turn signal violates K.S.A. 8-1548, and observation of a traffic violation provides an officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Therefore, this Court found no error and affirmed the district court’s denial of Gilliland’s motion to suppress and dismissed as moot Gilliland’s challenge to the conditions of his pretrial bond.
Jerome Reilly challenged the district court’s decision affirming the administrative suspension of his driving privileges by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) after his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. On appeal, Reilly contended that the implied consent advisories on the DC-70 form read and provided to him were unconstitutionally coercive. He also stated that the DC-70 form did not substantially comply with Kansas law. In addition, Reilly contended that the failure of the implied consent advisories to inform him of the consequence of driving with an ignition interlock device violates due process. Finally, Reilly contended that the nonrefundable $50 application fee imposed under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1020(d)(2) is unconstitutional. This Court, in following precedent established by the Kansas Supreme Court, vacated the $50 application fee imposed on Reilly and remanded to the KDOR with directions to refund this amount to him. However, this Court affirmed the district court’s decision to uphold the administrative suspension in all other respects.
Josue Robles appealed the jury verdict and judgment from the Ford County District Court finding Robles and CW Welding, LLC (CW Welding) equally at fault for a motor vehicle collision. Robles contended that the district court committed reversible error by not providing the jury with his requested jury instruction setting forth the rules of the road for passing another vehicle on the right. Although the instruction was legally appropriate, this Court held that the evidence in a light most favorable to Robles did not provide a factual basis for giving the jury the instruction. Moreover, Robles reprised his jury instruction argument while arguing that the district court erroneously denied his motion to alter or amend the judgment. However, Robles did not show the district court’s decision was unreasonable or based on an error of law or fact. As a result, this Court found that he is not entitled to a new trial, and thus, this Court affirmed the judgment.
Samuel Lee Wood appealed his convictions which resulted from a traffic stop where incriminating evidence was seized. Wood raised three issues. First, he claims the district court erred in suppressing drug evidence discovered at the scene of the vehicle stop. Second, Wood complained that his consent to an evidentiary blood test to determine whether he had ingested drugs or alcohol was coerced and, therefore, invalid. Third, Wood contended the district court never found him guilty of possession of methamphetamine at the conclusion of the bench trial and, as a result, his conviction should be reversed, and the sentence should be vacated. However, upon this Court’s review, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Wood’s motion to suppress evidence, including the incriminating blood test results. Nevertheless, this Court reversed the conviction for possession of methamphetamine and vacated the sentence.
Donald A. Becker appeals from a judgment of the trial court affirming the suspension of his driving privileges. Becker contends that his substantive due process rights were violated when he was not provided the implied consent advisories relating to commercial driver’s licenses, even though he was not driving a commercial vehicle when he was arrested. We disagree and affirm.
Holder of commercial and noncommercial driver’s licenses sought review of a decision from the Kansas Department of Revenue to impose an administrative suspension of his driver’s license and a lifetime suspension of his commercial driver’s license (CDL). The District Court, Norton County, William B. Elliott, J., upheld the Department’s decision. License holder appealed. The Court of Appeals, Pierron, J., held that the license holder was not prejudiced by gratuitous statements from police officer regarding the effect a failed breath test would have on his CDL. Affirmed.
Driver sought review of administrative license suspension based on his failing of a chemical breath test. The District Court, Johnson County, Kevin P. Moriarty, J., dismissed the suspension order. Department of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, 36 Kan.App.2d 561, 142 P.3d 735, reversed. Driver filed petition for review. The Supreme Court, Beier, J., held that: [1] statutory list of issues that may be decided in an administrative driver’s license suspension hearing did not authorize consideration of whether reasonable suspicion existed to support the traffic stop; [2] exclusion of search and seizure issues from agency decision did not violate procedural due process; [3] as a matter of first impression, traffic stop based on officer’s mistake of law was not supported by reasonable suspicion; but [4] exclusionary rule would not apply in administrative driver’s license suspension proceedings. Affirmed.
Owen McQuade appeals the decision of the district court which affirmed the decision of the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) suspending his driving privileges. The facts of this case are not in dispute. McQuade was arrested for DUI but refused to submit to testing. Eventually, McQuade was served with notice of suspension, a form DC–27, and he filed a timely request for an administrative hearing. After that hearing, the suspension of McQuade’s driving privileges was upheld. The suspension order contained notice to McQuade that action would be taken on his driving privileges unless he timely filed a petition for review with the district court.
Motorist sought judicial review of decision of Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) affirming the administrative suspension of his commercial driving privileges. On de novo review, the District Court, Lyon County, W. Lee Fowler, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Marquardt, P.J., held that: [1] trooper who stopped motorist, who was driving noncommercial vehicle, on suspicion of driving under the influence was not required, under implied consent law, to advise motorist that if he failed a sobriety test or if he refused testing, his commercial driver’s license could be administratively suspended for one year, in contrast to 30-day suspension of noncommercial driver’s license, and [2] motorist’s procedural due process rights were not violated. Affirmed.
Raymond Rother appeals the district court’s decision to uphold the Kansas Department of Revenue’s (KDR) suspension of his driving privileges. Rother argues that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for review on the ground that the petition raised issues that were not considered at the administrative hearing. Rother also argues that the administrative hearing officer abused his discretion and violated Rother’s due process rights by denying his request for a continuance of the hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Ellis County, Thomas L. Toepfer, J., of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Marquardt, P.J., held that implied consent notice that officer read to defendant prior to breath test did not violate his substantive due process rights. Affirmed.
Substantial compliance with the statutory requirement that driver arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) be given advisory notices before a blood alcohol test is administered is sufficient.
Warrantless stop and inspection of commercial truck that was authorized to transport property for hire did not violate either federal or state constitution, even though officer stopped truck solely to conduct inspection and lacked any suspicion that there was violation of any state law because commercial trucking occurred on 24-hour basis, governing statute was entirely reasonable in not limiting when commercial vehicle could be stopped. The fact that statute failed to specify frequency of permissible stops was not in and of itself constitutional error. Further, the statute limited inspection to determining whether driver and vehicle were in compliance with applicable motor carrier laws, rules, and regulations, and place of stops, i.e., state highways and trafficways, was sufficiently limited, given public interest in safety.
Justin L. Whiteman appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test he agreed to take after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). We affirm.
The limited issue raised by a driver in his petition for review of the administrative suspension of his commercial driver’s license for his failure to pass a chemical breath test, that the stop was not based on reasonable suspicion, was properly dismissed. Although the court found that the stop of the driver’s vehicle was not based upon reasonable suspicion, the exclusionary rule did not apply in administrative proceedings. Whether reasonable grounds existed to believe a driver was under the influence may be considered in an administrative license suspension proceeding, but not whether a traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion or other constitutional arguments.
A defendant was not entitled to suppress evidence of his breath test results. Before the defendant was given the breath test, he was provided with a form that contained statutorily required implied consent advisories for commercial driver’s licenses (CDL), and there was no requirement for the officer to read CDL advisories to an individual with a CDL when driving a noncommercial vehicle. Therefore the defendant had notice of the impact of a test refusal or test failure on his CDL.
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