McCallie v. State ex rel., Dept. of Transp., — P.3d —- (2014)

Driver petitioned for judicial review of his disqualification by Department of Transportation (DOT) from driving commercial vehicles for one year. The District Court, Uinta County, Dennis L. Sanderson, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that: [1] trooper had probable cause to make warrantless arrest of driver, and [2] record contained substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner’s findings that driver was driving or in control of a commercial motor vehicle and had an alcohol concentration of 0.04% or more.

Regan v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 292 P.3d 849 (2012)

IMPLIED CONSENT In separate cases, motorists arrested for driving while under influence (DWUI) petitioned for judicial review of order of Office of Administrative Hearings affirming administrative suspension of their driver’s licenses. In separate proceedings, the District Court, Albany County, 2012 WL 3767695 and 2012 WL 3767696, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J., affirmed. Both motorists appealed. Although not consolidated, appeals were joined. The Supreme Court, Hill, J., held that: [1] implied consent advisement that included warning under municipal implied consent ordinance of criminal sanction for refusal to consent to chemical test was not impermissibly coercive, and [2] Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to consider constitutionality of municipal implied consent ordinance.

State, Dept. of Transp. v. Robbins, 246 P.3d 864 (Wyo. 2011)

The district court erred in finding that clear and convincing evidence, rather than a preponderance of the evidence, is required to uphold a commercial driver’s license disqualification in a contested case proceeding and in finding that Robbins’ constitutional right to due process was violated.

Vasco v. State, Dept. of Transp., 253 P.3d 515 (2011)

After licensee’s driver’s license was suspended for six months based on his refusal to submit to chemical testing following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, he sought a hearing. The Office of Administration (OAH) upheld the suspension. Licensee sought review. The District Court, Albany County, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J., affirmed. Licensee appealed. The Supreme Court, Kite, C.J., held that: [1] police officer had probable cause to arrest licensee for interference with a police officer, and [2] police officer had probable cause to arrest licensee for DUI.

Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. Potvin, 247 P.3d 54 (2011)

Motorist sought judicial review of decision by Department of Transportation to suspend motorist’s license based on refusal to submit breath or blood sample. The District Court, Teton County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J., reversed suspension, and Department appealed. The Supreme Court, Hill, J., held that substantial evidence supported finding that police officers had probable cause to contact motorist at his home following one-car accident and to request that motorist submit to chemical breath or blood test, as required for suspension due to refusal to submit blood or breath sample.

Bowen v. State, Dept. of Transp., 245 P.3d 827 (2011)

IMPLIED CONSENT Motorist petitioned for judicial review of administrative suspension of his driver’s license following contested case hearing, alleging that suspension was improper because the officer performing the breath test was not properly trained on the breath testing device. The District Court, Goshen County, Keith G. Kautz, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Voigt, J., held that as a matter of first impression, motorist was collaterally estopped from litigating the admissibility of his breath test results.

Elliott v. State, 247 P.3d 501 (2011)

Defendant was charged with driving while under influence (DWUI) of alcohol. The District Court, Converse County, John C. Brooks, J., certified question to the Supreme Court, Hill, J., which held that State was not collaterally estopped from pursuing criminal charge for DWUI after hearing officer in administrative proceeding to suspend license determined that police officer lacked probable cause to arrest.

Harvey v. State, Dept. of Transp., 250 P.3d 167 (2011)

Following the administrative suspension of motorist’s driver’s license by the Department of Transportation (DOT) due to motorist’s arrest for driving while under the influence, motorist filed petition for judicial review. The District Court, Carbon County, Wade E. Waldrip, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that police officer had probable cause to believe that motorist, who was driving a forklift, committed a traffic violation due to his failure to display a slow moving vehicle emblem on forklift.

Hwang v. State, Dept. of Transp., 247 P.3d 861 (2011)

Driver appealed an order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) suspending his driver’s license after driver’s arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI). The District Court, Albany County, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that: [1] substantial evidence supported hearing officer’s conclusion that police officer observed driver for the required 15 minutes prior to administering chemical breath test to driver, and [2] driver was not permitted to supplement the record on appeal.

Schouboe v. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 238 P.3d 1246 (2010)

IMPLIED CONSENT Licensee sought review of decision of the District Court, Teton County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J., upholding his implied consent suspension of his driver’s license. The Supreme Court, Hill, J., held that licensee was in actual physical control of vehicle when police found him.

In re Hittner, 189 P.3d 872 (2008)

IMPLIED CONSENT Motorist sought judicial review of Office of Administrative Hearing’s (OAH) order sustaining the implied consent suspension of his driver’s license as well as the disqualification of his commercial driver’s license. The District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Hill, J., held that: [1] substantial evidence supported finding that motorist was given complete implied consent advisements following his arrest for driving under the influence and most assuredly that he was not misled in any way about what his rights were, and [2] substantial evidence supported finding that motorist refused second breath test.

King v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 161 P.3d 1086 (2007)

Driver sought review of decision of the Department of Transportation, suspending his commercial driver’s license after he pled guilty to driving while under the influence. The District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J., dismissed. Defendant appealed. Defendant brought action against the Department seeking declaration that statute allowing the Department to suspend commercial licenses was unconstitutional. The District Court, Laramie County, Peter G. Arnold, J., dismissed. Defendant appealed. Cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that defendant failed to preserve for review issue of hearing examiner’s power to suspend his license because the issue should have been preserved in the administrative proceeding.

Escarcega v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dept. of Transp., 153 P.3d 264 (Wyo. 2007)

Motorist was not entitled to warning that his failure to submit to chemical test could result in the disqualification of his commercial driver’s license.

Bryant v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 55 P.3d 4 (2002)

IMPLIED CONSENT Motorist sought judicial review of Office of Administrative Hearing’s (OAH) order sustaining the implied consent suspension of his driver’s license as well as the disqualification of his commercial driver’s license. The District Court, Carbon County, Kenneth E. Stebner, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Lehman, J., held that: (1) motorist’s allegation that arresting officer lacked valid certification to conduct a chemical analysis of the motorist’s blood, breath, or urine was irrelevant, because motorist had refused chemical testing, and (2) arresting officer’s alleged failure to offer a chemical test that was “approved by the Department of Health (DOH)” was not a defense, under the circumstances.