Motorist sought review of decision by Department of Licensing that suspended his personal driver’s license for 90 days and disqualified his commercial driver’s license (CDL) for one year. The Superior Court, Snohomish County, Linda Krese, J., affirmed. Motorist sought further review. The Court of Appeals, Cox, J., held that implied consent warning given by arresting officer did not misleadingly imply that the CDL disqualification would be for same length of time as the suspension or revocation of personal license.
Department of Licensing revoked licenses of driver who offered unresponsive and unclear answers when asked if he wanted to speak to an attorney, and failed to follow instructions when taking a breath test, after being stopped for driving while intoxicated. Driver appealed. The Superior Court, Pierce County, Rosanne Buckner, J., reversed the revocation, and Department petitioned for discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Armstrong, J., held that driver refused to take the breath test, thus justifying revocation of his driving privilege.
Court of Appeals would decline to adopt “constructive voluntary quit” or “constructive voluntary leaving” doctrine so as to preclude commercial truck driver, who was terminated after he lost his commercial driver’s license following his commission of two serious traffic offenses, from obtaining unemployment benefits.
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, and he moved to suppress blood test results. The Kent Municipal Court granted motion. City petitioned for a writ of review. The Superior Court, King County, Leroy McCullough, J., denied writ. The Court of Appeals, 102 Wash.App. 269, 6 P.3d 1211, affirmed. After granting city’s petition for review, the Supreme Court, Sanders, J., held that defendant was not physically incapable of providing breath test of blood alcohol content, and thus, police officer did not have authority under implied consent statute to request blood test.
Defendant, who had been arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), challenged blood alcohol test administered to him pursuant to a search warrant, after defendant refused to take a voluntary blood alcohol test. The Municipal Court held that the test was invalid. Appeal was taken. The Superior Court, King County, Michael J. Fox, J., reversed. Defendant appealed. Court of Appeals certified case.
Drunk driving defendant, following the Municipal Court’s denial of his motion to suppress his refusal to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs), was convicted by a jury in the District Court, and he appealed. The Superior Court, King County, Ricardo Martinez, J., affirmed, and defendant sought discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Coleman, J., 91 Wash.App. 226, 957 P.2d 260, ruled that the refusal to perform FSTs should have been suppressed but concluded that the error was harmless and affirmed the conviction. On further review, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, Durham, J., held that: (1) a refusal to perform FSTs is not testimonial, and thus is not protected by the right against self-incrimination, and (2) admitting evidence at trial of such a refusal does not impermissibly compel self-incrimination.
School bus driver sought review of Department of Licensing’s (DOL) cancellation of her commercial driver’s license after she failed an audit retest. The Spokane Superior Court, Tari S. Eitzen, J., affirmed. Driver appealed to the Supreme Court. Holding: Upon transfer, the Court of Appeals, Korsmo, J., held that DOL lacked authority to cancel school bus driver’s commercial driver’s license after she failed a licensing retest that was done pursuant to an audit of a third-party tester.
Department of Licensing revoked two drivers’ licenses for refusal to submit to breathalyzer test after being arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Superior Court, King County, Warren Chan and Terrence A. Carroll, JJ., sustained the revocations, and drivers appealed. In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court, Andersen, J., held that: (1) although implied consent warnings stating that additional alcohol concentration tests could be obtained “at your own expense” were inaccurate as to indigent drivers and inclusion of such language in implied consent warning could therefore deny indigent driver opportunity to make knowing and intelligent decision, that language did not prejudice drivers who made no claim of indigency and thus would not serve as ground to invalidate revocations; (2) actual prejudice to driver would be required to invalidate revocation of driver’s license based on refusal to take breathalyzer test after arrest for driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor based on inaccuracy of implied consent warning, where the action was civil and the officer had given all of the implied consent warnings, although he had failed to do so in a 100% accurate manner; and (3) accurate form of implied consent warning is that refusal to take breathalyzer test “may” be used in criminal trial.
Two drivers sought judicial review of suspension of licenses. The Superior Court, Kittitas County, Michael Cooper, J., reversed, and the Department of Licensing appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that: (1) state patrol implied-consent warnings were not misleading, and (2) police officer’s observation plus use of laser speed gun provided probable cause to arrest.
State department of licensing revoked license of driver who refused to take breath test for alcohol. The Superior Court, Benton County, Sharon Brown, J. Pro Tem., reinstated driver’s driving privileges. Department appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that driver did not have right to an attorney prior to administration of breath test.
Implied consent warnings given to driver were not rendered inaccurate or misleading by inclusion of statement concerning potential commercial driver’s license (CDL) disqualification, notwithstanding driver’s claim that statement falsely implied that CDL disqualification would be for the same period as her personal driver’s license suspension or revocation, namely, 90 days if she failed the breath test and one year if she refused to take the test; CDL notification referred to CDL “disqualification” as opposed to personal driver’s license “suspension or revocation,” correctly implying that it was a separate consequence.
Driver sought review of Department of Licensing’s suspension of his personal driver’s license and disqualification of his commercial driver’s license. The Cowlitz Superior Court, James E. Warme, J., reversed. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lisa Worswick, C.J., held that: [1] implied consent warnings were not rendered inaccurate or misleading by inclusion of statement concerning potential CDL disqualification; [2] implied consent warnings that were neither inaccurate nor misleading did not result in prejudice to driver; [3] driver’s due process rights were not violated when hearing officer continued hearing after arresting officer failed to appear; and [4] statute requiring continuance did not violate equal protection.
Truck driver appealed the administrative suspension of his commercial driver’s license. The Superior Court, Adams County, Richard Miller, J., denied the appeal. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that: (1) deferred criminal prosecution did not divest Department of Licensing (DOL) of authority to suspend the commercial driver’s license, and (2) statutes entitling private drivers but not commercial drivers to an occupational permit after suspension did not violate equal protection.
Motorists on separate occasions were arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence, had their licenses suspended or revoked, and appealed results of administrative hearing. After their cases were consolidated, the King County Superior Court, Julia Garratt, Judge Pro Tem, found that implied consent warning form used by State Patrol misstated the law, and Department of Licensing requested discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Becker, C.J., held that implied consent warning form did not misstate the law or impair a motorist’s ability to make an informed decision about taking a breath test.
Driver appealed revocation of his driver’s license by Department of Licensing. The Superior Court sustained the revocation and driver obtained discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Kato, J., held that admission of driver’s refusal to submit to blood alcohol concentration (BAC) verifier test would work an injustice, so as to support bar under doctrine of collateral estoppel to admission of such evidence, which was excluded in underlying criminal evidentiary hearing following driver’s arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DWI).
Motorist challenged administrative revocation of permanent driver’s license for driving while under influence of intoxicants. The Superior Court, Clark County, Robert Harris, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seinfeld, P.J., held that proof of compliance with administrative provisions on periodic testing of breath test machine was not prerequisite to admission of test results.
Minor driver sought judicial review of revocation of driver’s license for driving while intoxicated. The Superior Court, Whatcom County, David Nichols, J., reversed. Department of Licensing appealed. The Court of Appeals, Webster, J., held that: (1) police report supported revocation, and (2) driver received adequate warnings under implied-consent statute.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Pierce County, Thomas J. Larkin, J., of vehicular homicide and failure to remain at the scene of an injury accident. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seinfeld, P.J., held that: (1) arrest necessary to trigger implied consent statute need not be for alcohol-related offense; but (2) implied consent statute did not apply as officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicants at time of his arrest for leaving scene of injury accident; and (3) defendant’s voluntary consent to blood test, as opposed to breath test, was proper.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Spokane County, Linda G. Tompkins, J., of driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schultheis, J., held that: (1) defendant did not waive his right to challenge statute and blood test admission, although he did not raise issue in pretrial suppression motion; (2) implied consent statute was constitutional; (3) defendant’s refusal to take blood test was admissible at trial; (4) court was not required to balance probative value of refusal to take the test with prejudicial value of that refusal; and (5) state trooper had statutory authority to request blood test.
State appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Spokane and King Counties, William J. Grant and Nancy A. Holman, JJ., which granted various defendants’ motions to suppress blood alcohol content test results. The Supreme Court accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and Callow, C.J., held that inclusion in implied consent warning of erroneous statement that defendants had right to have qualified person administer additional blood alcohol content test “at your own expense” required suppression of test results as to those defendants who could not afford additional test at time of arrest.
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial in the Superior Court, King County, Deborah Fleck, J., of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, driving under the influence (DUI), second degree assault, felony hit and run, and bail jumping. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lau, J., held that: [1] defendant who refused to submit to breath test could not challenge implied consent warning for its failure to address consequence applicable only to those who submit to test; [2] defendant waived for appellate review her challenge against implied consent warning for its failure to include language indicating that she would face a mandatory jail term for a DUI conviction after refusing a breath test; and [3] implied consent warning was not rendered insufficient for its failure to warn that defendant would face a mandatory jail term for a conviction for DUI after refusing a breath test.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court of driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Superior Court, Pierce County, Beverly Grant, J., reversed. State filed motion for discretionary review. On review, the Court of Appeals, Armstrong, P.J., held that: [1] arresting officer’s warning defendant to be cooperative did not improperly coerce him to submit to breath test, and [2] State toxicologist’s testimony about reliability of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, although admitted in violation of motion in limine, did not warrant new trial.
Defendant was convicted in bench trial in the Superior Court, King County, Douglass A. North, J., of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault in connection with head-on collision in which other driver died and passenger of defendant’s car was injured. She appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schindler, A.C.J., held that: [1] officer had authority to obtain blood sample without defendant’s consent; [2] result of blood alcohol test was admissible; and [3] evidence that passenger gave defendant date-rape drug was inadmissible.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Lewis County, Richard W. Buzzard, Judge Pro Tem., of hit and run, driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), and vehicular assault. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 154 Wash.App. 26, 225 P.3d 311, affirmed. Defendant filed a petition for review. Following grant of petition, the Supreme Court, Wiggins, J., held that: [1] state failed to prove that defendant who was subject to mandatory blood test due to vehicular assault charge was actually read required warning of his right to have additional tests administered by any qualified person of his choosing, and, thus, results of defendant’s blood test were inadmissible; [2] trial court’s error in admitting results of defendant’s mandatory blood test did not prejudice him with regard to hit and run charge; [3] trial court’s error in admitting results of defendant’s mandatory blood test prejudiced him with respect to charges of DUI and vehicular assault by means of DUI; and [4] trial court’s error in admitting results of defendant’s mandatory blood test prejudiced him with respect to charge of vehicular assault by reckless driving.
On review of consolidated cases involving trial courts’ decisions on motions to suppress breath test evidence in prosecutions for driving under the influence (DUI), based on officers’ failure to properly advise defendants of the right to counsel, the Court of Appeals, 107 Wash.App. 141, 27 P.3d 222, affirmed suppression of evidence. On separate review of other consolidated cases involving the same issue, the Court of Appeals, 108 Wash.App. 490, 28 P.3d 789, concluded that failure to properly advise defendants was harmless and did not warrant suppression of evidence. Review was granted and defendants’ appeals were consolidated. The Supreme Court, Ireland, J., held that: (1) defendants’ challenge did not implicate right to counsel under Fifth or Sixth Amendments; (2) Supreme Court was authorized to promulgate rule providing for the advisement of the right to counsel as soon as feasible after arrest; (3) police advisement of rights forms failed to inform defendants of their right to consult counsel before taking breath test; but (4) insufficiency of advisement of rights forms was harmless given that defendants did not allege that, if warned, they would have requested counsel before submitting to the breath tests.
Commercial driver appealed disqualification of his commercial license by Department of Licensing. The Superior Court, Clark County, Barbara Johnson, J., sustained the disqualification. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, 91 Wash.App. 887, 960 P.2d 475, affirmed, and driver sought review. The Supreme Court, Talmadge, J., held that: (1) overruling State v. Frederick, 100 Wash.2d 550, 674 P.2d 136 (1983) and Franklin v. Klundt, 50 Wash.App. 10, 746 P.2d 1228 (1987), suppression of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test results in prior criminal proceeding presented collateral estoppel bar to admission of that evidence, and (2) resolving an issue of first impression, the “knowing and intelligent decision” rule regarding a BAC test applies in commercial driver’s license disqualification hearings.
A motorist charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor moved to suppress evidence of his breath test on grounds that the implied consent warning he received was inadequate. The Superior Court, King County, Faith Enyeart, J., granted the suppression motion, and the town appealed. The Court of Appeals, Agid, J., held that: (1) language of the warning given to motorist was adequate to indicate that motorist had the right to take additional tests, and (2) law enforcement officers were not required to use exact words of implied consent statute or to include statutory reference to implied consent provision.
Motorist appealed administrative hearing officer’s decision sustaining the revocation of motorist’s license to drive, based on refusal to submit to breath test. The Superior Court, King County, Donald Haley, J., affirmed. Discretionary review was granted. The Court of Appeals, Ellington, J., held that: (1) traffic stop for speeding occurred as result of fresh pursuit, so that county sheriff’s deputy was authorized to stop motorist after motorist crossed county line; (2) motorist lacked right to counsel before deciding whether to take a breath test; and (3) motorist’s indecision regarding whether to submit to breath test did not require state trooper to clarify motorist’s implied consent rights.
Motorist sought de novo review of the Licensing Department’s revocation of his driver’s license under the implied consent law after he refused to take a breath test. The Superior Court, King County, Marsha Pechman, J., set aside the revocation, and the Department appealed. The Court of Appeals held that any deficiency in the refusal report owing to the arresting officers’ use of an abbreviation was merely technical, and thus did not deprive the Department of jurisdiction to revoke the motorist’s license.
No additional resources for Washington at this time.
