Pennsylvania

Payano v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 2022 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 471 (Commw. Ct. Nov. 3, 2022)

Licensee was convicted a second time of driving a commercial vehicle while his operating privilege was suspended and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation notified Licensee that his commercial driving privilege was disqualified for life pursuant to Section 1611(c) of the UCDLA, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1611(c), due to that conviction. Licensee asserts that the Trial Court erred in concluding that he was not entitled to appeal nunc pro tunc because the evidence at the hearing established that his late appeal was caused by a breakdown in the administrative process.

Marvin v. Commonwealth, 263 A.3d 49 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021)

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation appeals the trial court order sustaining the statutory appeals of the suspensions of the official safety inspector certificate of a Mechanic. Mechanic performed an inspection on a propane tank truck. As part of the inspection, Mechanic was required to perform a road test under 67 Pa. Code § 175.110(e). Mechanic did not have the necessary endorsements on his CDL to operate the truck on the road. In December 2017, the Department notified both Station and Mechanic that they were each to have their certificates of appointment suspended for four months for “inspection by uncertified mechanic.” The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the successful appeal of both the Station and the Mechanic because Pennsylvania law does not require a certified inspection mechanic to hold endorsements specific to the type of vehicle inspected.

James v. Commonwealth, 243 A.3d 273 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2020)

Licensee appealed a downgrading of his CDL to a non-commercial class C license after refusing to retake his CDL skills assessment once abnormalities were found in his original test. The Trial court held that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation could not reasonably know if Licensee passed the skills test therefore a downgrade was not just allowed, but obligatory. The Commonwealth Court affirmed and held that Licensee was provided notice and due process to retake the skills test and the downgrading of his license for failure to comply was proper.

Ciotola v. STAR TRANSPORTATION & TRUCKING, LLC, Dist. Court, MD Pennsylvania 2020

Pending before the court is defendant Quarterback Transportation USA, Inc.’s (“Quarterback”) motion for summary judgment against all other parties, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, (Doc. 69), arguing that the plaintiff’s state law clams against it in his second amended complaint (“SAC”), (Doc. 25), should be dismissed since they are preempted under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1). Quarterback contends that plaintiff’s SAC for damages against it for personal injuries and negligence claims are preempted under FAAAA, since they relate to its core services of brokering the shipment of goods in interstate commerce.

Shoul v. Cmmw., Dept. of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 173 A.3d 669 (Pa. 2017)

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) notified holder of commercial driver’s license (CDL) of lifetime disqualification from holding CDL following conviction for felony manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver controlled substance. Holder appealed. The Court of Common Pleas held that lifetime disqualification from holding CDL license based on conviction for controlled substance offense violated due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. PennDOT appealed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the lifetime ban of CDL’s for drug trafficking offenses is rationally related to the government’s legitimate interest in deterring drug activity and therefore does not violate Holder’s substantive due process rights. Additionally, the court held that the lifetime disqualification was considered a punishment rather than a civil penalty so the case was remanded to determine whether Holder’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated.

Williams v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 124 A.3d 426 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015)

Williams appealed the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s one-year suspension of his personal driver’s license and lifelong disqualification of his commercial driving license pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S. §1547(b)(1)(i)2 after he refused a chemical breathalyzer test, contending that the police did not have reasonable grounds to request that he submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol content. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the Trial Court correctly found that the police had reasonable grounds to believe that Williams was driving under the influence of Alcohol and therefore upheld the Department’s lifetime disqualification of his Commercial Driver’s License.

Kozieniak v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 100 A.3d 326 (Pa. Cmmw. 2014)

Defendant had his Commercial driver’s license suspended for a period of one year due to his acceptance into Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition. Kozieniak challenged the suspension, arguing that his constitutional rights had been violated and that the suspension was not supported by the evidence. the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania ultimately upheld the suspension because acceptance into the ARD program in lieu of a DUI conviction still counts as a conviction for purposes of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1603. Additionally, a one year suspension of a defendant’s CDL is considered a civil penalty and therefore a de novo hearing was sufficient due process before suspending his CDL.

Dietrich v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 82 A.3d 1087 (2013)

Motorist sought review of an order of the Department of Transportation (DOT), Bureau of Driver Licensing, imposing a one year suspension of his operating privileges based on his conviction for failing to stop and remain at scene of an accident involving death or personal injury, and a lifetime disqualification of his commercial driving privileges. The Court of Common Pleas, Berks County, No. 2012–23860, sustained motorist’s appeal from the one-year suspension of his operating privileges and reduced lifetime disqualification of commercial driving privilege to a five-year disqualification. DOT appealed. The Commonwealth Court, No. 200 C.D. 2013, held that: [1] motorist failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that he had been convicted of failing to stop and remain at the scene of an accident, and thus, trial court erred in overturning mandatory one-year suspension of operating privileges based on such conviction, and [2] trial court lacked authority to reduce mandatory lifetime disqualification of motorist’s commercial driving privileges to five-year disqualification. Reversed.

Sondergaard v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 65 A.3d 994 (2013)

Commercial driver appealed the lifetime revocation of his commercial driver’s license (CDL) by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, based on driver’s two convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (DUI). The Court of Common Pleas, Monroe County, No. 8004 CIVIL 2011, Cheslock, Senior Judge, reversed. Commonwealth appealed. [Holding:] The Commonwealth Court, No. 224 C.D. 2012, James Gardner Colins, Senior Judge, held that lifetime CDL ban applied to driver, regardless of whether vehicle operated at time of his DUI offenses was commercial or personal. Reversed.

Yonce v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, Not Reported in A.3d (2013)

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Bureau) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County which sustained the appeal of Licensee from the 60-day disqualification of his Commercial Driver’s License (CDL). Commonwealth Court reversed.

Chatfield v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Not Reported in A.3d (2011)

The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from the March 29, 2010, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) that sustained the statutory appeals filed by Lawrence A. Chatfield (Licensee) from the thirty-day suspension of his personal driving privilege and the one-year disqualification of his commercial driving privilege that were imposed by DOT pursuant to sections 1611(a) and 3807(d) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § § 1611(a), 3807(d). Reversed.

Ronk v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, Not Reported in A.3d (2011)

The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), Bureau of Driver Licensing appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County sustaining the appeal of Licensee from a one-year disqualification of his commercial driver’s license. PennDOT issued the suspension under authority of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1611, after Licensee was convicted in New York State for operating a vehicle without a license. Chapter 16, also known as the Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act, authorizes PennDOT to suspend a Pennsylvania commercial license where the licensee is convicted in another state of a violation that would authorize a commercial license suspension under Pennsylvania law. Discerning no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Licensee’s New York conviction was not for an offense that would result in the loss of a commercial license in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth Court affirmed.

Twoey v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, Not Reported in A.3d (2011)

The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County that sustained Licensee’s appeal from DOT’s suspension of her commercial driver’s license (CDL) for refusing to consent to chemical testing after an automobile accident. At issue is whether Licensee needed to provide competent medical testimony to establish that her injuries and the interaction of drugs with alcohol prevented her from knowingly refusing to submit to chemical testing. The Commonwealth Court applied its recent decision in Kollar v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 7 A.3d 336 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010), and concluded Licensee needed to provide competent medical testimony to support her claim. Accordingly, Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s order.

Cummings v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, Not Reported in A.3d…

The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing appeals from the April 21, 2010 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County sustaining the appeal of Licensee’s commercial driver’s license suspension. The issue before the Commonwealth Court is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it sustained Licensee’s appeal thereby allowing Licensee to “mask” his Driving Under the Influence offense in violation of federal and state law. Affirmed.

Shewack v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 993 A.2d 916 (2010)

After licensee’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) was suspended for one-year, he appealed. The Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County, No. 18239 of 2008, reversed the suspension. The Department of Transportation (DOT) appealed. The Commonwealth Court, No. 1417 C.D. 2009, held that offense on which licensee was convicted in Maryland was not sufficiently similar to a Pennsylvania offense so as to justify the DOT’s disqualification of licensee’s CDL. Affirmed.

Vanker v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, Not Reported in A.3d (2010)

Petitioner appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, which granted the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing’s (DOT) motion to quash Petitioner’s appeal from a one-year suspension of his operating privilege pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code (Code), 75 Pa.C.S. § § 1547(b)(1). In the same proceeding, Petitioner sought to appeal the one-year disqualification of his commercial driver’s license which arose from the same refusal to submit to chemical testing. Commonwealth Court affirmed.

Hollabaugh v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver…, Not Reported in A.2d…

Licensee appeals from the July 13, 2009, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County (trial court), which affirmed a decision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) to disqualify Licensee from driving a commercial motor vehicle for one year pursuant to section 1611(a) of the Vehicle Code. Commonwealth Court affirmed.

Kolva v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 977 A.2d 1248 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)

Following motorist’s voluntary withdrawal from Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program, Department of Transportation could no longer enforce automatic one-year suspension of motorist’s commercial driver’s license.

Poborski v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 964 A.2d 66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)

After the licensee was charged with DUI, he accepted an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”) of the DUI charge. After he was notified of the suspension and disqualification, he filed a petition to be removed from the ARD program and to remand his case to the magistrate. The trial court granted the petition, after which the licensee argued that his voluntary withdrawal from the ARD program should trigger a nullification of the suspension and disqualification. The court stated that a licensee’s mere acceptance into the ARD program was sufficient to trigger a license suspension. A licensee’s acceptance of the ARD program, however, constituted a conscious choice of an alternative to prosecution and a knowing waiver of his rights to prove his innocence or risk conviction. It followed, then, that the trial court’s grant of the licensee’s petition to withdraw from the ARD program had to be read as a nullification of that knowing waiver. Therefore, while the DOT’s suspension and disqualification were valid at the time they were made, the trial court’s subsequent nullification of that acceptance had to be read to also nullify DOT’s authority to continue any enforcement of its suspension and disqualification.

Commonwealth of Penn. v. Dugan, 769 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)

Defendant was convicted of driving commercial motor vehicle without commercial driver’s license, and he appealed. The Superior Court held that: (1) defendant who was driving pickup truck towing horse trailer was driving a commercial motor vehicle for which Class A license was required, and since defendant did not have Class A license, he was in violation of statute prohibiting driving commercial motor vehicle without commercial driver’s license; and (2) the phrase “commercial motor vehicle” includes the concept of combination of motorized vehicles and towed vehicles for purposes of statute requiring the driver of a commercial motor vehicle to have a commercial driver’s license.

Aten v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 649 A.2d 732 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)
For purposes of disqualification of commercial driver’s license based on West Virginia conviction for driving commercial motor vehicle without holding a commercial driver’s license, fact that comparable Pennsylvania statute provides exception from conviction for driving without license if driver produces license within 15 days, while West Virginia law does not, did not prevent the offenses from being essentially similar where the driver lacked a valid commercial driver’s license at the time of the offense and was unable to produce one within 15 days to avoid disqualification, and did not demonstrate that he would not have been convicted had the offense been committed in Pennsylvania.

Walck v. Com. Dept. of Transp. Bureau of Driver Licensing, 625 A.2d 1276 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)

Cancelling commercial driver’s license was justified where abstract of driver record history indicated that operator’s New Jersey license was on suspended status for driving under the influence conviction when Pennsylvania license was issued.

Com. v. Williams, 624 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)

Tractor trailer cab was “commercial vehicle,” for purposes of convicting driver of operating commercial vehicle while under influence of alcohol, even though cab was not hooked to trailer and driver was using cab for personal transportation when he was stopped; cab alone was still monstrous vehicle with potential to cause severe damage if part of an accident and, thus, was within class of vehicles for which legislature intended to more severely limit permissible blood alcohol content of drivers.