State v. Gomez, NCCOA 882 – NC: Court of Appeals (2022)

Defendant, a commercial driver’s license (CDL) holder, was stopped for lane violations while transporting freight. After a K-9 alert and search revealed over 20 kilograms of cocaine in the commercial vehicle, he was charged with trafficking and moved to suppress the evidence. He argued the stop was unconstitutional and the prolonged detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] the trooper had reasonable suspicion based on traffic violations; and [2] the continued detention and K-9 search were lawful given indicators of criminal activity. Motion to suppress denied; conviction affirmed.

Sanders v. APEX TRANSIT LLC (2021)

Plaintiff Chris Sanders (“Sanders”) was employed by Defendant Apex Transit LLC (“Apex”) as a commercial truck driver.

State v. McKenzie, 750 S.E.2d 521 (2013)

Defendant truck driver, who had been subject to one-year commercial driver’s license suspension following driving while impaired (DWI) arrest, filed a motion to dismiss DWI charge, alleging due process violations; double jeopardy violations; and equal protection violations. The District Court, Duplin County, granted the motion, based on due process and double jeopardy violations. State appealed, and the Superior Court, Duplin County, reversed, reinstated the DWI charge, and remanded. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, — N.C.App. —-, 736 S.E.2d 591, reversed, and further review was sought. The Supreme Court held that revocation of defendant’s commercial driver’s license constituted a civil sanction, and thus, the criminal prosecution of defendant for driving while impaired (DWI), in addition to revoking his commercial driver’s license, did not subject him to double jeopardy. Reversed and remanded.

State v. Kerrin, 209 N.C.App. 72 (2011)

Defendant appealed from order of the Superior Court, New Hanover County, revoking her probation and requiring forfeiture of her driver’s license. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] trial court was not required to announce license forfeiture in open court; [2] trial court failed to specifically find that defendant had failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with terms of probation; [3] remand was required; and [4] trial court could not require that defendant forfeit her driver’s license for 24-month period beginning on date of probation revocation. Reversed and remanded.

Guzman v. Gore, 206 N.C.App. 330 (2010) UNPUBLISHED

Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s order affirming the revocation of his driver’s license for willful refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test. Court of Appeals affirmed.

Hartman v. Robertson, 208 N.C.App. 692 (2010)

Driver appealed the Division of Motor Vehicle’s revocation of his driver’s license for refusal to submit to a chemical analysis following his arrest for driving while impaired (DWI). The Superior Court, Iredell County affirmed the revocation. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence supported conclusion that police officers had reasonable grounds to believe that driver had committed an implied consent offense. Affirmed.

Lee v. Gore, 206 N.C.App. 374 (2010)

Motorist appealed decision of Division of Motor Vehicles revoking his driving privileges for refusing to submit to blood-alcohol testing. The Superior Court, Wilkes County, affirmed, and motorist appealed. On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals held that absence of a “properly executed affidavit” precluded license revocation. Vacated and remanded.

Barnard v. N.C. Department of Transp., 671 S.E.2d 70 (Table) (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) UNPUBLISHED

Even where a violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-37.12(a) constitutes negligence per se, a driver’s violation of the statute (commercial driver’s license required) cannot be a basis for liability where the record contains no evidence, and the Commission made no finding, that driver’s violation of the statute was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.

State v. Reid, 559 S.E.2d 561 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)

Revocation of defendant’s commercial driver’s license for thirty days, accompanied by a disqualification for a limited commercial driver’s license, which occurred prior to trial for offense of impaired driving, was not akin to criminal punishment, and thus, defendant’s later conviction for impaired driving did not constitute double jeopardy.