Jordan D. Klug appealed a district court’s order affirming the lifetime revocation by the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) of his commercial driver’s license (CDL). The revocation was based on a Kansas administrative license proceeding and a South Dakota criminal conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. On January 19, 2010, Klug was administratively adjudicated to have committed the offense of “Driving Under Influence–1st” in the State of Kansas. On September 27, the DMV revoked Klug’s CDL for life pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60–4,168 (Cum.Supp.2012). Klug appealed the DMV’s revocation to the district court pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60–4,105 (Reissue 2010). He contended that the Kansas and South Dakota offenses were not “included” in § 60–4,168 and therefore did not provide a *237 basis for the DMV to revoke his CDL. The issue was whether out-of-state convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol are included in the provisions of § 60–4,168 pertaining to the revocation of CDL’s. This Court concluded that an interpretation of § 60–4,168(1) that applies only the portion of subsection (a) pertaining to controlled substances but excludes convictions in other states for driving under the influence of alcohol would not be sensible given the broader policies behind the statute. As a result, this Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Karry R. Neisius appealed from his conviction and sentence, upon stipulated facts, for driving a commercial motor vehicle without obtaining a commercial driver’s license (CDL). The issue was whether the power unit and hay grinder that he was driving was a commercial motor vehicle. The State filed a complaint in the county court for Dixon County charging Neisius with operating a commercial motor vehicle without obtaining a CDL in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60–4,141(1)(a) (Reissue 2010). The county court found Neisius guilty. The court concluded that the subject vehicle was a commercial motor vehicle defined within the Act. Neisius appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the conviction and sentence. This Court concluded that the power unit and hay grinder operated by Neisius was a commercial motor vehicle under the Act. Moreover, this Court found that because Neisius did not possess a CDL, his conviction for operating a commercial motor vehicle without obtaining a CDL conforms to the law and was supported by competent evidence. As a result, this Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, which affirmed Neisius’ conviction and sentence.
James L. Moody was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, and he filed a plea in bar which was overruled by the county court for Scotts Bluff County. He appealed to the district court for Scotts Bluff County which affirmed the county court’s ruling. He argued on appeal that recent changes to the Nebraska Revised Statutes tie the administrative license revocation (ALR) procedure more closely to the criminal procedure, altering the nature of the sanctions from civil and nonpunitive to criminal sanctions which are intended to be punitive. This Court found that Section 60-498.01(9) is a procedural mechanism for regulating discovery and does not have any bearing on the determination regarding the civil or criminal nature of the sanction. Moreover, this Court held that the fact that the Legislature has provided a mechanism by which some individuals whose licenses have been revoked may obtain limited driving privileges in the event they choose not to contest the ALR does not change the essential character of the revocation, which is nonpunitive. As a result, this Court affirmed the district court’s judgment which affirmed the judgment of the county court overruling Moody’s plea in bar.
Joel D. Woodward asked the director of the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to reinstate his commercial driver’s license (CDL). The director refused, and Woodward filed an appeal pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-4, 105 (Reissue 2010). The district court dismissed the appeal on several grounds, including that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appeal was not from a “final decision or order.” In 2010, Woodward was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and sentenced to probation. He was convicted of DUI a second time in 2013, and again was sentenced to probation. After Woodward’s second DUI, the DMV issued an order revoking his CDL for life. The lifetime revocation was imposed pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-4, 168(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2012) and 60-4, 169 (Reissue 2010). This Court found that the DMV’s April 10, 2015, letter to Woodward was not a “final decision or order” for purposes of § 60-4,105. The letter did not affect or change the status of Woodward’s operator’s license, but instead merely explained the DMV’s position that the applicable laws did not permit it to either remove Woodward’s lifetime CDL disqualification or permit reinstatement of his CDL. Rather, the April 10 letter pertained to the reinstatement of a lifetime revocation or disqualification, and that is not one of the decisions from which the Legislature has authorized an appeal under § 60-4,105. This Court held that the district court correctly concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Woodward’s appeal under § 60-4,105 and dismissed the appeal, reasoning that when a lower court does not have jurisdiction over the case before it, an appellate court also lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the claim. As a result, this Court agreed with the district court and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Jose Urbina, Sr., appealed from a decision of the District Court for Scotts Bluff County, affirming his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) by the Scotts Bluff County Court. Urbina challenged the district court’s finding that the admission of his driving abstract into evidence, which included a prior DUI conviction, was harmless error. Urbina argued that the admission of the driving abstract, which included reference to a prior DUI conviction, was prejudicial error of other bad acts in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(2). However, this Court found that Urbina’s prior conviction for DUI was never mentioned at trial, as the driving abstract was offered only to show that Urbina had a commercial driver’s license, and therefore could understand English. Thus, this Court found that the State did not present the driving abstract as propensity evidence. Therefore, this Court found that the district court did not err in finding the erroneous admission harmless and affirming the county court’s judgment, and thus, affirmed Urbina’s conviction and sentence.
Oscar Cajiao appealed the order of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court, which rejected his claim that he was an employee of Arga Transport, Inc. (Arga), determining instead that he was an independent contractor and therefore not entitled to any workers’ compensation benefits. This Court found that a commercial driver’s license is required to perform the work that Cajiao did, and he worked as a semi-tractor driver for at least 15 years prior to the accident. Thus, the compensation court concluded that it took special skill to drive a semi-tractor, a factual finding that this Court held was not clearly wrong and supported a finding that Cajiao was an independent contractor. Consequently, this Court found no error by the compensation court, and thus, affirmed its decision.
Motorist’s driver’s license was revoked by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) following his arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Motorist appealed revocation. The District Court, Sarpy County, William B. Zastera, J., reversed. DMV appealed. The Supreme Court, Gerrard, J., held that sworn report submitted to director of DMV was insufficient to confer authority on him to revoke motorist’s license administratively, as report was not prepared by the “arresting officer,” pursuant to statutory requirement. Affirmed.
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 75-302(11) (Reissue 2003) defines “intrastate commerce” as “commerce between any place in this state and any other place in this state and not in part through any other state.” “Motor carrier” is defined as “any person other than a regulated motor carrier who or which owns, controls, manages, operates, or causes to be operated any motor vehicle used to transport passengers or property over any public highway in this state.” § 75-302(12).
Motorist sought judicial review of order of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), which revoked his driving privileges. The District Court, Douglas County, Sandra L. Dougherty, J., affirmed DMV’s decision, and motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carlson, J., held that: (1) officer who questioned motorist and administered field sobriety tests was the “arresting officer,” for purposes of regulation requiring arresting officer to testify at revocation hearing, and (2) motorist’s due process rights were not violated by field training officer’s failure to appear at hearing. Affirmed.
Motorist appealed revocation of his driver’s license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The District Court, Buffalo County, John P. Icenogle, J., entered judgment reversing the DMV. The DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Moore, J., held that arresting officer’s sworn report was not timely submitted to director of DMV as required to confer jurisdiction on DMV to revoke motorist’s driver’s license. Affirmed.
Motorist appealed from administrative decision revoking his driver’s license. The District Court, Box Butte County, Leo Dobrovolny, J., affirmed, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Cassel, J., held that: [1] motorist was given reasonable time and opportunity to present evidence in driver’s license revocation proceeding, and [2] it was not a violation of motorist’s due process rights for the hearing officer not to ask for a continuance on her own motion. Affirmed.
Officer’s sworn report contained sufficient facts to establish, in license revocation proceeding, that motorist was operating or in physical control of vehicle. District court found that officer’s report which stated, “stopped vehicle for speeding,” was insufficient to establish that motorist was operating the vehicle. The notion that one’s vehicle could be speeding without such person driving or operating the vehicle was illogical. Therefore, the sworn report was sufficient to establish that motorist was in control of the vehicle when it was stopped for speeding. Neb.Rev.St. § 60–498.01(3). Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Max Kelch, Judge. Motion for rehearing sustained. Original memorandum opinion withdrawn. Reversed and remanded with direction.
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked licensee’s driving privileges for one year after licensee was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and refused a chemical test. Licensee appealed. The District Court, Douglas County, J. Michael Coffey, J., reversed and vacated the order. DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Inbody, C.J., held that omission of second arresting officer’s signature on sworn report as to licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical test was technical deficiency that did not deprive DMV of jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Motorist appealed revocation of his driver’s license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The District Court, Scotts Bluff County, Randall L. Lippstreu, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, 17 Neb.App. 900, 773 N.W.2d 394, affirmed. Motorist filed petition for further review. The Supreme Court, Gerrard, J., held that: [1] Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) was authorized in administrative license revocation (ALR) proceeding to return the original sworn report to arresting officer for the purpose of soliciting a sworn addendum including information necessary to cure a jurisdictional deficiency, and [2] DMV’s soliciting addendum to cure jurisdictional defect did not demonstrate that it was insufficiently impartial to fairly adjudicate charges. Affirmed.
Motorist appealed from a decision of the District Court, Douglas County, Richard J. Spethman, J., that affirmed the revocation of motorist’s driver’s license by the state Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The Court of Appeals, Carlson, J., held that: [1] there was no proper revocation of motorist’s driver’s license from which motorist could appeal to District Court, and [2] order of administrative license revocation was not sufficient rendition of judgment to create revocation decision reviewable by District Court. Appeal dismissed, and cause remanded with directions.
Driver sought judicial review of administrative revocation of her driver’s license. The District Court, Lancaster County, Steven D. Burns, J., vacated and remanded administrative determination. Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed. The Court of Appeals, Moore, J., held that: [1] arresting officer’s appearance in administrative license revocation (ALR) hearing by telephone was authorized by statute, and [2] allowing arresting officer to be sworn and to testify by telephone at ALR hearing did not violate driver’s due process rights. Reversed and remanded with directions.
The power to design a pretrial diversion program is a legislative function and that therefore, in enacting code sections that address the same, the Legislature did not run afoul of the separation of powers clause.
The Department of Motor Vehicles (the Department) appeals the judgment of the district court for Madison County, which reversed the decision of the Department to revoke the driver’s license of Kriss L. Sanderson for 1 year.
Motorist sought judicial review of a decision by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoking his driver’s license. The District Court, Douglas County, Gregory M. Schatz, J., affirmed, and motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sievers, J., held that: [1] request for continuance on basis of arresting officer’s unavailability failed to state facts sufficient to make a reasoned decision, but [2] denial of continuance would have resulted in substantial injustice. Affirmed.
Defendants charged with driving under the influence (DUI) filed pleas in bar based on the disqualification of their commercial driver’s licenses for one year. The County Court, Adams County, Jack R. Ott, J., overruled the pleas in bar. Defendants appealed. The District Court, Adams County, Stephen R. Illingworth, J., reversed. State appealed. The Supreme Court, Wright, J., held that: [1] prosecution for DUI, following disqualification of defendants’ commercial driver’s licenses, did not violate double jeopardy; [2] Legislature intended commercial license disqualification for DUI to be a civil sanction; and [3] commercial license disqualification for DUI was not so punitive in its purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature’s intent to create a civil sanction. Judgments of District Court reversed, and causes remanded with directions.
Commercial driver’s license was administratively revoked by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Licensee appealed. The District Court, Scotts Bluff County, Randall L. Lippstreu, J., sustained the administrative revocation. Licensee appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Licensee filed petition for further review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court, Miller-Lerman, J., held that: [1] licensee’s forfeiture of bond in lieu of appearance in Wyoming on charge of driving under the influence constituted “conviction” under Driver License Compact, and [2] licensee’s conduct in Wyoming could be used to revoke his commercial driver’s license in Nebraska. Affirmed.
Licensee sought review of Department of Motor Vehicles’ revocation of her driver’s license. The District Court, Dawson County, James E. Doyle IV, J., reversed. Department appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carlson, J., held that licensee was sufficiently identified in arresting officer’s report as driver of vehicle so as to confer jurisdiction on Department to revoke driver’s license. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Motorist applied for driver’s license. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) denied application. Motorist appealed. The District Court, Douglas County, J. Michael Coffey, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, McCormack, J., held that motorist was not eligible for a driver’s license until his fiveyear period of ineligibility to drive in another state had ended. Affirmed.
Commercial truck driver appealed the revocation of his commercial driver’s license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The District Court, Stanton County, Robert B. Ensz, J., affirmed the revocation, and driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sievers, J., held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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