Green v. Secretary of State, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2013)

The Secretary of State appeals as of right the trial court’s order restoring full driving privileges to Christopher Thomas Green. Affirmed.

People v. Hammoud, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2012)

Defendant Kazem Hammoud appeals by leave granted the circuit court’s order affirming his bench-trial conviction of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license (DWLS) pursuant to a Dearborn City Ordinance that is substantively identical to MCL 257.904(1). The district court sentenced defendant to 24 months of probation with the first 30 days to be served in jail. Reversed and remanded for entry of an acquittal.

People v. Nunley, 491 Mich. 686 (2012)

In prosecution for second-offense driving while license suspended (DWLS), the 15th District Court denied the prosecution’s motion in limine to admit a certificate of mailing, as generated by Department of State (DOS), as proof that defendant received notice that his license was suspended. Interlocutory appeal was granted. The Circuit Court, Washtenaw County, affirmed district court’s ruling that admission of certificate without testimony would violate Confrontation Clause. Prosecution’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal was granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that certificate of mailing was not “testimonial” under Confrontation Clause, such that admission of certificate did not require accompanying witness testimony. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed; case remanded to district court.

Taylor v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich.App. 333, 548 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)

Statutes requiring applicants for group vehicle designations to have not suffered suspension or revocation of their driving privileges within 36 months preceding application and providing that circuit courts lacked jurisdiction to review denials of applications based on such ground constituted exercise of state’s power to enhance safety, and concomitant life, health and welfare of public, in use of state’s road system, and therefore retroactive application of such statutes did not violate constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.