Tirado v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds, 472 Mass. 333 – Mass: Supreme Judicial Court (2015)

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the Board of Appeal improperly reinstated Tirado’s driver’s license after a mandatory suspension for refusing a breathalyzer test. The court emphasized that the Board lacked discretion to override the automatic suspension required under state law (G.L. c. 90, § 24[1][f][1]) and clarified that hardship or mitigating circumstances cannot be considered in such administrative appeals. The decision reinforced the statutory mandate for license suspension upon refusal of a chemical test.

White v. DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE, Mass: Appeals Court (2013)

David W. White appeals from a judgment of the District Court that dismissed his complaint and affirmed the denial of his claim for unemployment benefits by the review board of the Division of Unemployment Assistance (DUA).[1] White argues that the review board incorrectly based the denial of benefits on G. L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), because he did not leave his employment voluntarily, and that had the review board applied the appropriate statutory provision, i.e., § 25(e)(2), the proof was insufficient to deny him benefits.

DiGregorio v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 775 (2011)

Motorist appealed decision of the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, upholding revocation of his driver’s license and declining to rule on his request for a hardship license. The Superior Court Department, Hampden County, affirmed the Board decision, and motorist appealed. The Appeals Court held that: [1] eight-year revocation period began to run on date of motorist’s third conviction for operating under the influence (OUI), but [2] motorist was not entitled to hardship license. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Bresten v. Board Of Appeal On Motor Vehicle Liability…, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 263… (2010)

Motorist appealed decision of the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, affirming suspension of his driver’s license by Registrar of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to interstate compact on motor vehicle violations, based on motorist’s conviction in Colorado for driving while ability impaired (DWAI). The Superior Court Department, Suffolk County, affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Appeals Court held that Colorado offense was substantially similar to offense of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (OUI). Affirmed.

Com. v. Ebrecht, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 1130 (2010)

Factual basis supported trial court’s conclusion that the state had established by a preponderance of the evidence that restoration of a driver’s license would likely endanger public safety, even though he had been acquitted by a jury on charge of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI). Trial court relied on and assessed the testimony from the driver’s criminal OUI trial and the driver’s driving record. Trial court was satisfied that driver operated his vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Trial court noted that driver had three prior convictions of OUI, one of which included a speeding violation, and two motor vehicle accidents.

Com. v. Leboeuf, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 45 (2010)

Defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license filed a motion to suppress on grounds that officer’s warrantless administrative inspection of commercial vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court Department, Middlesex County, reported case to the Appeals Court for resolution of an important question of law. The Appeals Court held that: [1] statute authorizing warrantless administrative safety inspections of commercial vehicles provided an adequate substitute for a warrant, and [2] random stop of commercial vehicle for the purpose of conducting administrative safety inspection was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Question answered; case remanded.

Com. v. McCormack, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 1117 (2010)

A judge did not err in denying a driver’s motion to restore his driver’s license which was revoked because he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. The State rebutted the statutory presumption that the driver’s license should be restored by establishing that restoration of the driver’s license would likely endanger the public safety. The driver had two prior convictions of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor and other convictions that involved alcohol which indicated that there was a likelihood of danger to the public from restoration of the driver’s license. M.G.L.A. c. 90, § 24(1)(f)(1).

Com. v. Murphy, 454 Mass. 318 (2009)

Driver who stopped at sobriety checkpoint was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, third offense. The District Court Department, Norfolk County, granted driver’s motion to suppress evidence resulting from his seizure at the roadblock. State’s request for leave to file interlocutory appeal was allowed by the Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County, and case was transmitted to Appeals Court. Direct appellate review was granted. The Supreme Judicial Court held that police discretion to direct driver to secondary screening at sobriety checkpoint was constitutionally permissible. Reversed and remanded.

Com. v. Swartz, 454 Mass. 330 (2009)

Defendant, who was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, third offense, filed a motion to suppress evidence. The District Court Department, Brockton Division, Suffolk County, granted the motion. The Commonwealth’s application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal was allowed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk. The Supreme Judicial Court held that: [1] state police general order, which set forth protocols and guidelines governing police sobriety checkpoints, was constitutionally permissible; and [2] police sobriety checkpoint did not constitute in impermissible general search for contraband or criminal activity. Reversed and remanded.

Luk v. Com., 421 Mass. 415 (1995)

Defendant was charged with operating motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI). The District Court Department, Suffolk County, denied motion to dismiss. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied defendant relief, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court held that: (1) license suspension and OUI prosecution resulting from same incident did not violate double jeopardy clause; (2) administrative license suspension for refusing to take breath alcohol test was not punitive for purposes of double jeopardy analysis; and (3) OUI and refusal to submit to chemical test were distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Affirmed.