Motorist applied for reinstatement of his driver’s license, which had been revoked for life after multiple driving under the influence (DUI) convictions. Hearing officer found that motorist had satisfied the statutory requirements for reinstatement. Afterwards, Department of Motor Vehicles issued a notice of revocation based on information that motorist had violated the condition of reinstatement. Hearing officer upheld the reissuance of motorist’s lifetime suspension, and motorist appealed. The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, upheld hearing officer’s decision, and motorist appealed. The Supreme Court held that the condition of reinstatement of motorist’s driver’s license, namely barring a return to alcohol consumption, was validly imposed by hearing officer. Affirmed.
In consolidated criminal and civil suspension proceedings, the District Court, Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit, entered judgment in favor of the State in the suspension case and suppressed the alcohol breath test results in the criminal driving under the influence(DUI) case. Defendant appealed and the State filed a cross appeal. The Supreme Court held that:[1] trooper had a reasonable suspicion of DUI at the time he ordered defendant to exit his vehicle;[2] the trial court abused its discretion when it suppressed defendant’s alcohol breath test results in criminal case; and[3] evidence supported the trial court’s civil suspension of defendant’s driver’s license. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Licensee, who was criminally charged withdriving under the influence (DUI) and civil license suspension, filed a motion to suppress and to dismiss both cases. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Criminal Division, denied the motion to suppress in the criminal case and entered judgment for the State in the civil suspension case. Licensee appealed. The Supreme Court held that:[1] evidence established an adequate foundation for the admission of alcohol breath test results;[2] police officer’s failure to follow the procedures set forth in police training manual after receiving a standard-out-of-range message from alcohol breath test machine implicated the reliability of the test, and not the admissibility of the test; and[3] licensee adequately rebutted the statutory presumption that licensee’s blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was 0.08%or more at the time of operating his vehicle. Civil suspension reversed and remanded; order denying the motion to suppress in criminal proceeding affirmed.
Defendant was convicted on his conditional guilty plea in the Superior Court, Essex Unit, Criminal Division, of criminal refusal of an evidentiary breath test, and his license was civilly suspended. Defendant appealed both his conviction and the civil license suspension. The Supreme Court held that:[1] statutory 42-day period within which requested final hearing for motorist’s civil license suspension had to be held was not subject to revival after motorist waived it, and[2] police officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Denial of motion to dismiss civil license suspension affirmed; reversed and remanded on motion to suppress.
State brought proceeding to suspend motorist’s driver’s license, asserting that motorist had prohibited blood alcohol concentration (BAC) while operating motor vehicle. The Superior Court, Essex Unit, Criminal Division, granted motorist’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. State appealed. The Supreme Court held that:[1] trial court’s determination of reliability of opinion of state’s expert as to motorist’s BAC at time of motorist’s operation of motor vehicle was question of fact, and[2] evidence supported trial court’s finding that expert’s opinion was not sufficiently reliable. Affirmed.
Defendant moved to dismiss charge of driving under the influence (DUI) and to dismiss civil suspension proceeding. The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division, dismissed information and suspension proceeding. State appealed. The Supreme Court held that boom lift that defendant moved while intoxicated across the street from a building site was a “motor vehicle” under definition applicable to DUI charge and to suspension proceeding. Reversed.
State filed civil driver’s license suspension complaint against motorist. The Superior Court, Orange Unit, Criminal Division, dismissed the complaint. State appealed. The Supreme Court held that:[1] trial court’s factual finding that second breath alcohol test administered to motorist was unreliable because it came after testing machine experienced a “fatal error” was not clearly erroneous, and[2] existence of a first, valid and reliable breath alcohol test was insufficient to support civil suspension of motorist’s driver’s license. Affirmed.
State appealed by permission granted from orders in two cases in which the Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, determined that applicable statutes barred dual use of prior driving under the influence (DUI) conviction as element of criminal refusal to submit to evidentiary blood-alcohol test and as penalty enhancement for that offense. Appeals were consolidated. The Supreme Court held that same prior DUI conviction can serve to both criminalize refusal to submit to breath-alcohol test and to enhance penalty for that offense. Reversed and remanded.
State sought civil suspension of driver’s license based upon refusal of reasonable request to provide an evidentiary breath test for suspicion that he was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The District Court, Lamoille Circuit, granted suspension, and driver appealed. The Supreme Court held that arresting officer was not required to testify or specify in his affidavit that his belief of defendant’s intoxication was based on his training and experience. Affirmed.
Motorist appealed order of the District Court, Unit No. 3, Franklin Circuit, civilly suspending his driver’s license based on finding that motorist had operated his vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). The Supreme Court held that road on which motorist had driven while intoxicated was a “public highway.” Affirmed.
Adoption of Federal Regulations
What Constitutes a CMV
Disqualification
Major Disqualifying Offenses (Including Alcohol)
Disqualification for Serious Traffic Offenses
Disqualification for Railroad Grade Crossings
Disqualification for Out of Service Violations
Identification of Conviction
Masking Convictions
10-Day Posting Requirement
Other CDL Provisions
No additional resources for Vermont at this time.
