Watson v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 838 N.W.2d 680 (2013)

Motorist appealed decision of the Department of Transportation (IDOT) suspending his commercial driving license (CDL) for operating a commercial motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .04 or more. The District Court, Polk County, affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 2012 WL 4900475. The Supreme Court granted motorist’s request for further review. The Supreme Court held that: [1] Supreme Court was not required to defer to IDOT’s interpretation of CDL revocation statute and could review the issue de novo, and [2] margin of error adjustment requirement for breath test results in the non-CDL context did not apply to cases involving CDL revocations. Affirmed.

State v. Carey, 820 N.W.2d 159 (2012)

IMPLIED CONSENT Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for operating while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2011), asserting the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his refusal to submit to chemical testing. He claims the implied consent advisory he was read failed to comply with the statutory requirements, and as a result, he claims he was denied substantive due process rights. Affirmed.

State v. Overbay, 810 N.W.2d 871 (2012)

IMPLIED CONSENT After defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI), second offense, the District Court, Polk County, granted defendant’s motion to suppress blood test results. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, 2011 WL 3689151, affirmed. State sought further review, which was granted. The Supreme Court held that inaccurate information concerning refusal consequences did not render defendant’s consent to chemical testing involuntary. Reversed, vacated, and remanded.

Williamson v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 822 N.W.2d 122 (2012)

Petitioner appealed the district court decision affirming the ruling of the Iowa Department of Transportation revoking his driver’s license. He claimed the revocation was invalid because the arresting officer failed to fill out all parts of the “Request and Notice Under Iowa Code Chapter 321J/Section 321.208” form before giving it to him. Affirmed.

State v. Barrans, 798 N.W.2d 736 (2011)

IMPLIED CONSENT A defendant was given the opportunity to call, consult, and see a member of the defendant’s family or an attorney, as required under Iowa law. After the defendant was arrested for operating while intoxicated and brought to a state trooper’s patrol station, the defendant was allowed to make four phone calls, two to friends, and two to attorneys. Although the defendant was unable to reach any of the four people he contacted, the defendant indicated that he did not know anyone else he wanted to contact. It was only after the defendant said he no longer wanted to contact anyone that the trooper asked the defendant whether he wanted to consent to chemical testing. Further, the trooper had advised the defendant that the purpose of the calls was that they related to the test. I.C.A. § 804.20.

State v. Calvert, 800 N.W.2d 755 (2011)

IMPLIED CONSENT Police officer was not required, as a condition precedent to implied consent, to provide defendant with the results of her preliminary breath screening test (PBT) upon defendant’s request. Defendant was convicted of operation while intoxicated after officer stopped her upon suspicion of driving while intoxicated, noted several signs of intoxication, administered several field sobriety tests which defendant failed, and conducted a PBT which revealed that defendant was driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of almost twice the legal limit. State law only required medical personnel to disclose the results of an evidentiary chemical test to an individual at his or her request. I.C.A. §§ 321J.11, 321J.2.§

State v. Grose, 797 N.W.2d 622 (2011)

IMPLIED CONSENT Defendant-appellant appealed from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and his subsequent conviction of and sentence for operating while intoxicated, second offense. He contends he was denied substantive due process when given an improper and misleading implied consent advisory, thus rendering his consent involuntary and uninformed. He further contends the district court erred in concluding he was not denied his rights under Iowa Code section 804.20 (2007). Affirmed.

State v. Hutton, 796 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 2011)

The Iowa Supreme Court considered a claim that a driver’s consent to a chemical breath test was involuntary because the advisory “inaccurately represented the consequences of his decision to submit to the test or not.” Additional language in the advisory incorrectly overstated the potential adverse consequences of taking the chemical test. Specifically, it warned the driver that his commercial driver’s license (CDL) would be revoked for one year if he took the chemical test and failed it. Despite this language, the driver agreed to take the test anyway-and registered a .205 blood alcohol concentration. The Court held that the driver had no basis for arguing his consent to the test was involuntary.

State v. Rieks, 808 N.W.2d 756 (2011)

IMPLIED CONSENT Defendant appealed his conviction for operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2009). He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the chemical test result as the implied consent advisory read to him was improper under Iowa Code section 321J.8 rendering his consent involuntary. He also claims the district court should have granted his motion to suppress because the arresting officer violated his rights under Iowa Code section 804.20. Affirmed.

State v. Sharp, 797 N.W.2d 623 (2011)

IMPLIED CONSENT Defendant appealed OWI conviction, arguing he was denied substantive due process and his statutory right to be given the proper implied consent advisory under sections 321.208(2) and 321 J.8(1) (c)(2). He asserts he could not have given informed and voluntary consent to chemical testing because the implied consent advisory he received was misleading and not in compliance with the Iowa Code. Affirmed.

Dickerson v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 786 N.W.2d 874 (2010)

The Iowa Department of Transportation was not entitled to revoke the commercial driver’s license or the ordinary driver’s license of a driver who refused chemical testing without being advised as to the consequences of the refusal on his licenses. The officer who stopped the driver had a statutory obligation to advise the driver of the consequences of his refusal, and the officer’s failure to provide the required information rendered the driver’s refusal involuntary and invalidated subsequent proceedings under the statute. I.C.A. §§ 321.208, 321J.8. Affirmed on appeal.

Lewis v. Civil Service Com’n of City of Ames, 776 N.W.2d 859 (2010)

Former civil service employee sought trial de novo following decision by city civil service commission to terminate his employment. The District Court, Story County, reversed the decision of commission, and city appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court held that city employee’s failure to maintain driver’s license due to suspension of license following arrest for driving under influence (DUI) warranted employee’s termination. Judgment of Court of Appeals vacated; District Court judgment reversed.

State v. Helble, 784 N.W.2d 201 (2010)

IMPLIED CONSENT A defendant was not prejudiced by any failure of his trial counsel to object to the admission of two incriminating videotapes. Even if counsel had successfully objected to the admission of the videotapes, there was testimony from the arresting officer that the strong odor of alcohol was on the defendant’s breath and his balance appeared poor. Further, the videotape of the defendant’s arrest would have been admitted for impeachment purposes due to the defendant testifying at trial that he was not intoxicated when he was arrested in contrast to the videotape where he told the officer repeatedly that he had had too much to drink. I.C.A. § 321J.2. Affirmed.

Wiebenga v. Iowa DOT, 530 N.W. 2d. 732 (Iowa 1995)

Blood alcohol test results that are inadmissible in criminal proceeding may be used as basis to disqualify driver from holding commercial driver’s license, even though such results may not be used to revoke regular driver’s license because a statute providing for rescission of revocation refers to statutory provisions governing revocation of regular licenses, but does not refer to provisions governing disqualification of commercial licenses. Persons who possess commercial license are held to higher standards than persons holding regular license.