Licensee petitioned to rescind the summary suspension of her driving privileges in connection with her arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Circuit Court, Lake County, Joseph R. Waldeck, J., granted request. City appealed. The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, J., held that: [1] trial court’s finding that an inoperative rear license plate light was not a valid basis for stop was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, but [2] officer had a valid basis for stop based on licensee’s failure to signal a turn. Reversed.
Two motorists appealed decisions of the Secretary of State denying their petitions to rescind the suspension of their driver’s licenses based on blood alcohol tests conducted after they were involved in motor vehicle accidents. The Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Joe Harrison and Terry H. Gamber, JJ., affirmed the decisions of the Secretary. Motorists appealed, and the appeals were consolidated for oral argument and decision. The Appellate Court, Welch, J., held that Secretary’s decisions that the mere fact that an injured party was carried from the scene established a type A injury triggering blood alcohol testing were clearly erroneous. Reversed.
Defendant was charged with driving under influence (DUI). The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Liam C. Brennan, J., granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, and People appealed. The Appellate Court, McLaren, J., held that: [1] doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply to require trial court to give preclusive effect to determination in summary suspension proceedings that police officer had probable cause to arrest for DUI, and [2] officer had probable cause to arrest for DUI. Reversed and remanded.
In prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI), speeding and improper lane usage, defendant petitioned to rescind statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges. The Circuit Court of Du Page County, Robert G. Kleeman, J., granted the motion, and State appealed. The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, P.J., held that evidence was sufficient to establish that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol, given defendant’s testimony and unavailability of video tape of defendant’s traffic stop. Affirmed.
Motorist filed motion to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license. The Circuit Court, Will County, Robert Livas, J., granted motion. State appealed. The Appellate Court, McDade, J., held that rescission of motorist’s statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license was against manifest weight of the evidence. Reversed and remanded.
In separate cases, defendants were convicted of underage consumption of alcohol. The Circuit Court, Clinton County, William J. Becker, J., granted the defendants’ motions alleging that a statute requiring suspension of driver’s license for defendants placed on court supervision violated due process as applied. The Secretary of State appealed. The Supreme Court, Kilbride, J., held that: [1] mandatory suspension of driver’s license for defendants who received court supervision for underage consumption of alcohol did not violate due process as applied to defendants whose offenses did not involve use of automobile; [2] mandatory suspension of driver’s license if defendant received court supervision for underage consumption of alcohol was not arbitrary; and [3] mandatory suspension of driver’s license, in conjunction with criminal penalties, did not implicate Proportionate Penalties Clause. Reversed and remanded.
After driver was arrested at checkpoint for driving under the influence, and issued a notice of statutory summary suspension, he petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension and later moved to suppress evidence. The Circuit Court, 14th Judicial Circuit, Whiteside County, William S. McNeal, J., granted the petition and the motion. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Wright, J., held that: [1] there was no investigatory stop of driver’s vehicle, and, thus, no seizure, but [2] even if there was a stop, driver’s unsafe speed made the stop and seizure reasonable. Reversed and remanded.
Motorist who was arrested twice in 30 days for driving under the influence (DUI), each of which triggered the summary suspension of her driver’s license, filed a motion in the second case for issuance of a monitoring device driving permit (MDDP). The Circuit Court granted the motion, but the Secretary of State refused to issue the MDDP on the ground that the motorist was not a “first offender.” The Circuit Court, De Kalb County, Melissa S. Barnhart, J., issued a rule to show cause and, when the Secretary continued to refuse to issue the MDDP, held Secretary in indirect civil contempt of court. Secretary appealed. The Appellate Court, Birkett, J., held that motorist was not a “first offender” on the date of her second DUI arrest. Reversed.
Motorist filed petition to rescind statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges, which had been suspended after state charged motorist with driving under the influence (DUI). The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Cary B. Pierce, J., denied the petition, and motorist appealed. The Appellate Court, Hutchinson, J., held that: [1] motorist could request hearing on petition to rescind only after being served with notice of suspension; [2] notice of suspension was not defective; [3] results of test of motorist’s urine were admissible; and [4] police officer had probable cause to arrest motorist for DUI. Affirmed.
State appealed from orders of the Circuit Court, Stephenson County, James M. Hauser, J., granting defendant’s motion to quash his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and suppress evidence, granting defendant’s motion for leave to file an untimely petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license, and granting the petition to rescind the summary suspension. The appeals were consolidated. The Appellate Court, Birkett, J., held that: [1] sheriff’s deputy who pulled his squad car behind defendant’s stopped vehicle was pursuing an aim other than the detection, prevention, or investigation of crime; [2] checking on defendant’s stopped vehicle was a reasonable public safety endeavor for deputy; and [3] trial court could not rescind the summary suspension based on its conclusion that deputy lacked reasonable grounds to believe defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Reversed and remanded.
Defendant, who had been charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI), filed motion to suppress evidence of a breath test result administered four-and-a-half hours after his arrest. The Circuit Court, Will County, Amy Bertani–Tomczak, J., granted motion. State appealed.The Appellate Court, Schmidt, J., held that definition of “alcohol concentration” in Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act (UCDLA) as that which results from a breath test administered within two hours of a driver being stopped or detained did not apply to defendant’s case. Reversed and remanded.
While judicial review of summary suspension of defendant’s driver’s license was pending, defendant was arrested for and charged with driving while license suspended. The summary suspension was subsequently set aside, and defendant filed motion to dismiss criminal charge for driving while license suspended. The Circuit Court, Perry County, James W. Campanella, J., denied motion, and following bench trial, entered judgment of conviction. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court, 365 Ill.Dec. 487, 978 N.E.2d 742, reversed and vacated conviction. People appealed. The Supreme Court, Thomas, J., held that rescission of summary suspension of driver’s license after defendant was arrested for driving while license suspended did not render charge invalid. Appellate court Judgment reversed. Circuit court judgment affirmed.
Defendant in driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) case sought rescission of a statutory summary suspension of her driver’s license and moved to suppress evidence resulting from a blood alcohol test taken without her consent by use of force. At hearing, arresting officer sought to amend his sworn report to state that defendant had refused to consent to test, rather than submit to it. The Circuit Court for Kankakee County, Kenneth A. Leshen, and Susan Tungate, JJ., granted defendant’s petition to rescind, and motion to suppress, while denying the officer’s motion to amend. The state appealed. The Appellate Court, Holdridge, J., held that: [1] arresting officer had no statutory right to use force to extract blood sample when the defendant refused; [2] trial court correctly denied arresting officer’s motion to amend his complaint at the hearing for statutory summary suspension; and [3] trial court correctly granted the defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory suspension of her driver’s license. Affirmed.
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), reckless driving, and improper lane usage. The Circuit Court, Will County, Joseph C. Polito, J., granted defendant’s petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension and motion to suppress evidence, determining that police officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Carter, J., held that officer had reasonable suspicion to support traffic stop. Reversed and remanded.
After his driving privileges were suspended following an arrest for driving under the influence (DUI), defendant petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges, and State sought to amend officer report to indicate that notice of suspension was served on defendant by mail. The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Robert G. Kleeman, J., granted defendant’s petition to rescind. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Burke, J., held that failure by officer to specify manner by which defendant was given notice of his suspension did not warrant rescission. Reversed and remanded.
Defendant charged with driving under the influence (DUI) filed petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license and motion to “quash arrest,” alleging that police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop. The Circuit Court, Jersey County, Eric S. Pistorius, J., granted the petition and motion, and state appealed. The Appellate Court, Steigmann, J., held that officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop. Reversed and remanded.
Driver charged with driving under the influence (DUI) filed petition to rescind statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license. The 12th Judicial Circuit Court, Will County, James E. Egan, J., granted petition. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Carter, P.J., held that driver’s signing hospital consent form after refusing police request for chemical testing did not constitute consent to testing within meaning of implied consent law. Reversed.
Defendant was convicted following stipulated bench trial in the Circuit Court, Winnebago County, Richard A. Lucas, J., of aggravated driving while license revoked (DWLR). Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court, Hutchinson, J., held that applicable license revocation was for a controlled substance offense, not DUI, so that fifteenth or subsequent conviction for DWLR was not aggravated DWLR. Affirmed as modified; cause remanded.
Defendant who was charged with improper lane usage, following too closely, and driving under the influence (DUI) filed motion to rescind the statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges. The Circuit Court, St. Clair County, Zina R. Cruse, J., rescinded the suspension. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Welch, J., held that arresting officer’s failure to observe defendant for 20 minutes did not preclude suspension based on refusal to submit to a breath alcohol test. Reversed.
Driver petitioned to rescind the summary suspension of his driving privileges following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Circuit Court of Du Page County, No.11-–DT-–3971; the Hon. Cary B. Pierce, Judge, presiding, denied petition. Driver appealed. The Appellate Court, Schostok, J., held that an improper length of suspension of driving privileges imposed by the Secretary of the State was not grounds for rescission of summary suspension. Affirmed.
After defendant’s driving license was suspended for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), the Circuit Court, Du Page County, Cary B. Pierce, J., granted defendant’s petition to rescind suspension due to defendant not having been afforded hearing within 30 days after he filed petition to rescind. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Burke, J., held that defendant was entitled to rescission of statutory suspension of driving privileges. Affirmed.
Driver who held commercial driver’s license (CDL) filed petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges following driving under the influence (DUI) arrest, on allegation of procedural violations. The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Cary B. Pierce, J., granted the petition. State’s motion to reconsider was denied. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Schostok, J., held that: [1] sworn report was defective that had incorrect date for when driver was notified of summary suspension, warranting rescission, and [2] the trial court acted within its discretion by denying motion to reconsider after state’s untimely attempt to amend sworn report. Affirmed.
Motorist petitioned to rescind summary suspension of his driving privileges, which was instituted based on complaint against motorist charging motorist with driving under the influence (DUI). The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Liam C. Brennan, J., granted petition. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Burke, J., held that complaint against motorist adequately indicated that defendant had been arrested for DUI, as required to support suspension of driving privileges. Reversed.
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