Truck owner filed petition for replevin, naming towing company as a defendant. The Superior Court, Fresno County, No. 11CECG00005, Debra J. Kazanjian, J., sustained demurrer without leave to amend. Truck owner appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeal, Franson, J., held that: [1] driver’s license and automobile registration requirements do not violate federal constitutional right to travel; [2] towing and impounding truck upon arrest for license and registration violations did not violate Fourth Amendment; [3] truck owner was a “driver” covered by the Vehicle Code; and [4] truck was covered by the Vehicle Code even if it was not “used for commercial purposes.” Affirmed.
A person who held a commercial driver’s license at the time of violation of a traffic offense, but who surrendered the license, was barred from completing traffic school in lieu of adjudicating the traffic offense pursuant to Veh. Code, § 42005, subd. (c), notwithstanding that the section uses the present tense. Given that the “worst of the worst” would be the ones most likely or highly motivated to cheat, it would not further the federal legislative purpose to leave a loophole such as this in place.
Faced with criminal murder charges, a commercial driver could be found to have acted with malice. Malice can be implied so as to support a second degree murder indictment where a commercial license holder drove a truck that should have been put out of service for bad breaks, where he ignored warnings and suggestions that he was driving unsafely down a two lane highway that couldn’t accommodate the truck in rush hour and later caused fatal accident.
Driver was stopped for operating his tractor-trailer under the influence of alcohol. Breath tests showed a blood alcohol content of more than 0.04 but less than 0.08 percent. At the hearing, Driver relied on Veh. Code, § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), in arguing that his license suspension should be rescinded because his blood alcohol content was not 0.08 percent or more. The trial court concluded that the reference to 0.08 percent in the statute was a drafter’s oversight. The court held that § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), could not be read literally because it conflicted with, and could not be harmonized with, Veh. Code, § 13353.2, subd. (a)(3), providing for suspension based on a blood alcohol content of 0.04 percent or more. To avoid absurd results, the court construed § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), to allow the California DMV to sustain an order of suspension imposed under Veh. Code, § 13353.2, subd. (a)(3), on a person for driving a vehicle requiring a commercial driver’s license with a blood alcohol content of 0.04 percent or more where there was proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the person’s blood alcohol content was 0.04 percent or more.
With respect to a jury instruction on negligence, a federal regulation promulgated under Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which requires operators of commercial motor vehicles to use “extreme caution” when driving in inclement weather, imposes higher duty of care than “reasonable or prudent” standard in California’s basic speed law, and thus operators of commercial motor vehicles are required to comply with regulation. 49 U.S.C.A. § 31131; Cal.Vehicle Code § 22350; 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.2, 392.14.
Driver filed petition for writ of mandate challenging the suspension of his commercial driver’s license (CDL) after he was arrested for driving his pickup truck while having an elevated blood alcohol level. The Superior Court, Calaveras County, No. CV35599, John E. Martin, J., denied the petition, and driver appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeal, Scotland, Retired P.J. sitting by assignment, held that: [1] administrative per se proceeding did not violate due process, and [2] driver was not similarly situated to persons licensed by other states for equal protection purposes. Affirmed.
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