Bianco v. Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Div., 257 Or.App. 446 (2013)

IMPLIED CONSENT Motorist sought review of decision of administrative law judge (ALJ), on behalf of Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV), suspending his driving privileges under implied-consent law. The Circuit Court, Clackamas County, Deanne L. Darling, J., set aside administrative order, and DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schuman, P.J., held that: [1] administrative rule which requires the DMV to reschedule as soon as practicable an implied-consent hearing if a subpoenaed police officer is unable to appear does not require that the rescheduled hearing also be held as soon as practicable, and [2] rescheduling order was required to offer some explanation for second set-over of implied-consent hearing.

Burdette v. Miller, 243 Or.App. 423 (2011)

Driver whose vehicle was struck by a dump truck brought a personal-injury action against truck driver and trucking company. After repeated, unsuccessful efforts to depose truck driver, plaintiff driver filed a motion for sanctions. The Circuit Court, Multnomah County, Jerry B. Hodson, J., held a hearing, granted the motion, and entered an order striking truck driver’s defenses and adjudging him liable for plaintiff driver’s injuries as a matter of law. Eventually, plaintiff driver dismissed his claims against trucking company, and judgment was entered against truck driver after a jury trial on damages. Truck driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Haselton, P.J., held that: [1] record supported a finding that truck driver’s failures to appear at his noticed depositions were willful, and [2] trial court could strike truck driver’s defenses as a sanction.

Owens v. Motor Vehicles Div., 319 Or. 259, 875 P.2d 463 (Or. 1994)

With respect to whether the accuracy of the result of a chemical breath test administered to determine the blood alcohol content of a driver, who has been arrested for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), may be challenged (impeached) if the person who administers the test is qualified to administer the test under ORS 813.160 and if the methods, procedures, and equipment used in the test comply with the requirements of ORS 813.160, the Court held that it may not.

Richardson v. Oregon Dept. of Transp., Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 253 Or.App. 456 (2012)

Motorist brought action seeking review of orders of Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) of the Oregon Department of Transportation, suspending motorist’s driving privileges based on motorist’s failure to pay 17 traffic fines incurred between 1996 and 1997. The Circuit Court, Clackamas County, Susie L. Norby, J., reversed. DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hadlock, J., held that: [1] DMV was not precluded from considering motorist’s defense that his driving privileges could not be suspended twice for failure to pay same fines, and [2] motorist’s driving privileges could not be suspended twice for failure to pay same fines.

State v. Moore, — P.3d —- (2013)

IMPLIED CONSENT Defendant who was charged with criminally negligent homicide moved to suppress results of warrantless testing of his blood and urine following the fatal car accident. The Circuit Court, Tillamook County, Mari Garric Trevino, J., granted motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 247 Or.App. 39, 269 P.3d 72. State’s petition for review was granted. The Supreme Court, Balmer, C.J., held that implied consent advisory warning defendant that evidence of the refusal or failure to submit to blood alcohol testing may be offered against defendant did not constitute coercion of the sort that rendered defendant’s consent to the search and seizure involuntary; abrogating State v. Machuca, 231 Or.App. 232, 218 P.3d 145.

Walker v. Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Div., 254 Or.App. 543 (2013)

Motorist sought review of an order of the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) suspending motorist’s driving privileges. The Circuit Court, Washington County, Marco Hernandez, J., set aside DMV’s order, and DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Armstrong, P.J., held that arresting officer’s extreme exhaustion was an “illness” allowing DMV to reschedule license suspension hearing under statutory exception.