Plaintiff was a pedestrian walking on West 12th Street at its intersection with 5th when she was struck by a motor vehicle operated by defendant’s courier van, Plaintiff then filed suit against Defendant and Defendant’s courier company for negligence, and negligent hiring and training. While Defendant failed to provide a commercial driver’s license as a courier, plaintiff failed to demonstrate any past incidents involving defendant driver or any such propensity that defendant courier would have or should have known about. As such, the Supreme Court of New York for New York County dismissed Plaintiff’s claim.
Claimant was a commercial truck driver who owned his own tractor and carried a valid commercial driver’s license. He used his tractor to haul concrete for respondent trucking carrier (Carrier). After claimant’s relationship with Carrier ended in 2018, he applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board held that, under the Commercial Goods Transportation Industry Fair Play Act, Claimant was entitled to additional unemployment insurance benefits. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department, ultimately held that, although Claimant held his tractor and commercial driver’s license in an independent capacity, Claimant still showed that he was officially a commercial driver for Carrier and was thus entitled to additional unemployment benefits.
For over four years, Claimant held a full-time position as a heavy equipment operator for a municipal highway department. One of the conditions of his employment was that he maintain a valid commercial driver’s license (hereinafter CDL). Following a traffic stop, claimant refused to take a breathalyzer test and his CDL was automatically suspended as a result. His application for unemployment insurance benefits was initially denied. Following a hearing, however, an Administrative Law Judge ruled that claimant was allowed to receive benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board subsequently reversed this decision and concluded that Claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because he provoked his discharge. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed this decision because claimant voluntarily provoked the discharge of his commercial driver’s license by refusing to take a breathalyzer test.
Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to annul the determination revoking his driver’s license and commercial driver’s license based on his refusal to submit to a chemical test following his arrest for driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department ultimately affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision suspending Petitioner’s drivers license because Petitioner was properly warned of the consequences of refusing to submit a chemical test after a lawful traffic stop.
Petitioner held a commercial driver’s license while working as a new York city bus driver when he was involved in a collision which took the life of a pedestrian. Petitioner as convicted of a violation of New York Vehicle & Traffic Law (“VTL”) § 1146(c)(1), and as such and his commercial driver’s license suspended. Petitioner then filed for a renewal of his commercial driver’s license which was denied given the Petitioner’s prior driving history and conviction. petitioner now appeals his denial of renewal on the basis that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court of New York County ultimately affirmed the DMV’s decision. Based on Petitioner’s record which included multiple incidents and accidents in addition to the October 2016 fatal accident, DMV had a rational basis to determine that Petitioner is a “problem driver” as defined in 15 NYCRR § 136.1(b)(1) and thus not qualified for reissuance of his license. DMV’s determination not to reissue a license was therefore not arbitrary and capricious.
Licensee commenced Article 78 proceeding challenging city taxi and limousine commission’s revocation of his for-hire vehicle driver’s license and imposition of fines. The Supreme Court, New York County, transferred proceeding. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that substantial evidence supported city taxi and limousine commission’s revocation of for-hire vehicle driver’s license. Petition denied.
Former Department of Transportation employee filed petition seeking to annul determination terminating him from position of highway maintenance worker. The Supreme Court, Erie County, granted the petition in part, and Department appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that termination of employee was not disciplinary in nature and thus was subject to neither arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement nor provision of Civil Service Law governing removal or other disciplinary action. Reversed.
Petitioner commenced proceeding under Article 78, seeking to annul determination of city department of education denying his request for certification as a school bus driver. The Supreme Court, New York County, granted the petition. Department appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that department’s determination was not arbitrary and unreasonable, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. Reversed and remanded.
Motorist brought article 78 proceeding to review a determination of the State Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board, upholding revocation of his driver’s license for refusal to submit to a chemical bloodalcohol test. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that: [1] evidence was sufficient to support ALJ’s finding that motorist was driving on a “public highway,” and [2] motorist was not prejudiced by delay of more than six months in holding chemical test refusal hearing following his arrest. Determination confirmed and proceeding dismissed.
Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed March 27, 2009, which, upon reconsideration, adhered to its prior decision ruling that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause.
Former police officer, who was fired after his driver’s license was revoked for failing to submit to a chemical test following an arrest for driving while intoxicated, brought an Article 78 proceeding challenging the summary termination of his employment. The Supreme Court, Albany County, 35 Misc.3d 841, 942 N.Y.S.2d 775, dismissed, and the officer appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that possession of a valid driver’s license was not an express condition or requirement of the officer’s employment, as required for summary termination. Reversed.
The issues to be determined by the ALJ at the license revocation hearing were limited to whether the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had been operating a vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, whether the officer made a lawful arrest of petitioner, whether the warnings with regard to the consequences of refusal to take the chemical test were sufficient and whether petitioner refused to take such test.
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended truck driver’s license. Proceeding pursuant to article 78, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that finding by DMV was supported by substantial evidence that truck driver violated statute prohibiting driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions, warranting suspension of his license after crash; driver admitted he was driving his tractor-trailer at a speed of 50 to 55 miles per hour while the road was wet and it was raining and dark, and driver’s truck hit a disabled vehicle stopped in a breakdown lane, killing one passenger and injuring another. Dismissed.
Adoption of Federal Regulations
What Constitutes a CMV
Major Disqualifying Offenses
Major Disqualifying Offenses (Alcohol)
Serious Traffic Offenses
Identification of Conviction
Masking Convictions
10-Day Posting Requirement
Other CDL Provisions
Disqualification of Drivers (Railroad and Out of Service)
No additional resources for New York at this time.