commercial driver's licensing- state law regulations
home federal regulations state law resources contact
 
Courses & Workshops
CDL Case Summaries
Course Materials
Participant Presentations
Webcasts
CDL List Serve
 
 

State Law & Regulations (including case law)

The federal rules for commercial driver's licensing and commercial motor vehicles apply to each state. Nevertheless, each state has the authority to modify the regulations within certain parameters. In this section you will find state specific statutes, regulations and some applicable case law. Please let us know of any cases or sources we may have missed.
   

  • Alabama
    • Click here to download all Alabama cases

    • Alabama Department of Human Resources ex rel. Tammy Yancey v. Ronald Yancey, 54 So. 3d 415 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)

      A father was found in contempt for willful failure to pay child support and the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR) had suspended his commercial driver's license, as authorized by Ala. Code § 30-3-171. The trial court noted that the father's ability to earn income was much greater if he was driving a truck and ordered the DHR to reinstate the license. The court considered whether the trial court had the authority to order DHR to reinstate the father's driver's license. The procedure for the review of DHR's decision to suspend or revoke the license of a person who has failed to pay child support was set forth in Ala. Code § 30-3-172. The Alabama Legislature affirmatively granted DHR the authority to make all decisions regarding whether to suspend or revoke an obligor's driver's license when he or she has failed to pay child support for at least six months.

    • Alabama Department of Public Safety v. Brian Alston, 39 So. 3d 1176 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)

      The DPS argued that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter based on the longstanding principles of sovereign immunity. It based its sovereign immunity argument on its contention that the appeal to the trial court was a lawsuit rather than an administrative appeal. The driver filed an administrative appeal to the trial court seeking review of the DPS's decision. Next, the DPS argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it reversed its administrative ruling despite the provisions of the Ala. Admin. Code r. 760-x-1-.12, Ala. Admin. Code, Ala. Code § 32-6-49.7(b), and 49 C.F.R. § 383.51, which the DPS said required the mandatory disqualification of the driver's CDL based on his having received the two citations. However, the DPS failed to provide any evidence of either citation to the trial court, leaving that court with no basis for upholding the disqualification of the driver's CDL.

    • Burdine v. Arkansas Dept. of Finance & Admin., 2010 Ark. 455 (2010)

      After licensee was arrested in Missouri and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI), and licensee's driving privileges were suspended, the Department of Finance and Administration's Office of Driver Services's (DFA) disqualified licensee's commercial driver's license (CDL). Licensee appealed. The Circuit Court, Benton County, No. CV–2009–1237–4, affirmed. Licensee appealed. The Supreme Court held that the suspension of licensee's driver's license in Missouri constituted a conviction for DWI, warranting disqualification of licensee's CDL. Affirmed.

    • Cooley v. State Department of Public Safety, 827 So. 2d 124 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)

      A truck driver admitted to consuming alcohol in Tennessee and took a breathalyzer test, indicating a blood alcohol level of .05 percent. He pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. Alabama authorities notified him his commercial driver's license was disqualified for one year, based on this conviction. The appellate court held the Alabama and Tennessee statutes were comparable regarding the blood alcohol level (.08 percent or greater) for convictions based on driving while intoxicated or impaired and driving under the influence, Ala. Code § 32-5A-191 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-418(c) (2001). The statutes of both states provided that a blood alcohol content of .04 percent or greater was considered driving under the influence for a commercial driver and was punishable by a disqualification of at least one year of the driver's commercial driver's license, Ala. Code § 32-6-49.12(c) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-405. Because the driver's conduct in Tennessee, if committed in Alabama, would have been grounds for disqualification of his commercial driver's license, appellee department was authorized to impose a one-year disqualification of that license. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.

    • Dixon v. Hot Shot Exp., Inc., 44 So.3d 1082 (2010)

      Administratrix of deceased passenger's estate brought wrongful-death action against tractor driver and driver's employer. The Walker Circuit Court, No. CV-03-191, entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of defendants. Administratrix appealed. The Supreme Court held that Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act and federal regulation regarding operation of commercial vehicle in hazardous conditions did not preempt Alabama's guest-passenger statute. Affirmed.

    • Miller v. Arkansas Dept. of Finance and Admin., 2012 Ark. 165 (2012)

      Driver appealed suspension of his license. Following hearing, the Circuit Court, Washington County, affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court held that statute that required driver to surrender license upon arrest for certain crimes was not unconstitutional as applied. Affirmed.

    • Robinette v. Department of Finance and Admin., Not Reported in S.W.3d (2011)

      Licensee sought review of decision of Department of Finance and Administration's Office of Driver Services (DFA), suspending his driver's license for two years. The Circuit Court, Pulaski County, affirmed. Licensee appealed. The Supreme Court held that: [1] denial of licensee's motion for summary judgment was final and appealable, and [2] trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying licensee's challenge to notice. Affirmed.

  • Alaska
    • Click here to download all Alaska cases

    • Brockway v. State, Not Reported in P.3d (2011)

      Police officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was driving a commercial motor vehicle in violation of the law, and thus officer's traffic stop of defendant was lawful. Officer testified that he was trained and experienced in enforcing Alaska's commercial motor vehicle laws, and that he had stopped vehicles similar in size and proportions to the one defendant was driving that had been rated over the 10,001 pound threshold. Officer's estimate was close, in that defendant's truck's gross vehicle rating was 9,990 pounds. Officer's belief that the truck was a commercial motor vehicle was supported by evidence that the truck was registered to what appeared to be a commercial business. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

    • Burnett v. State, 264 P.3d 607 (2011)

      Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, Dennis P. Cummings, J., of driving under the influence. He appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Mannheimer, J., held that: [1] defendant's spinning of his vehicle's tires did not create reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed negligent driving; [2] stop of defendant's vehicle was not justified under community caretaker doctrine; and [3] spinning of vehicle's tires, without more, did not support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated. Reversed.

    • Cluff v. State, Not Reported in P.2d (1993)

      A jury convicted Leland S. Cluff of driving a commercial motor vehicle without a commercial driver's license, a class A misdemeanor. AS 28.33.150(a)(1). Cluff appeals his conviction, raising three related contentions: that his conduct was not prohibited by AS 28.33 .150; that AS 28.33.150 is vague if it is construed to prohibit his conduct; and that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction under AS 28.33.150. Affirmed.

    • Charles Lee Davis v. State of Alaska, 235 P.3d 1017 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010)

      Defendant argued that the State had no authority to enforce the federal law regulating commercial motor vehicles. The appellate court found that the adopted portions of the federal regulations were now state law and were enforced by various state agencies. By expressly adopting the pertinent portions of the federal regulations and revising them as necessary to apply them to Alaska roadways, the State Department of Transportation acted consistently with its statutory authority and the legislature's objective. The evidence showed that defendant was operating a commercial motor vehicle where defendant presented no evidence that his vehicle was exempt from the state regulations because it was used "exclusively" for non-commercial purposes. Defendant was using his tractor-trailer to haul property belonging to another person or persons. Even if he did not receive monetary compensation, defendant was engaged in activities that were incidental to and done in furtherance of his business. Defendant did not show that the State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, nor did he show that he was prejudiced in any way. Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial. The judgment was affirmed.

    • Clifford C. Haywood v. State of Alaska, 193 P.3d 1203 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

      Before the trial court and on appeal, defendant argued that former Alaska Stat. § 28.33.140 did not authorize the revocation of a commercial driver's license for a conviction of driving under the influence unless the motorist was operating a commercial vehicle at the time of the offense. On review, the court held that former Alaska Stat. § 28.33.140 did not allow the disqualification of a commercial driver's license for a conviction involving a non-commercial motor vehicle. Because Alaska Stat. § 28.33.140(a) and (b) were reasonably susceptible of two contradictory interpretations--one allowing revocation of a commercial license upon a conviction for driving a private vehicle while under the influence and a second allowing revocation only if the conviction for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence was committed while driving a commercial vehicle--the statute was ambiguous. Under the rule of lenity, resolution of the ambiguity required adoption of the meaning most favorable to defendant. The portion of the district court judgment disqualifying defendant from driving a commercial motor vehicle was vacated. The remainder of the judgment was affirmed.

    • Varilek v. State, Not Reported in P.2d (1995)

      A jury convicted Larry Varilek of driving a commercial motor vehicle without a commercial driver's license, a class A misdemeanor. AS 28.33.150(a)(1). Varilek appeals, contending that District Court Judge Peter G. Ashman should have suppressed the evidence arising from an unlawful search of his vehicle by a commercial vehicle enforcement officer whose commission as a special officer had temporarily lapsed. Varilek also contends that Judge Ashman incorrectly instructed the jury on the evidence required to establish that Varilek had been driving a "commercial motor vehicle." Affirmed.

  • Arizona
    • Click here to download all Arizona cases

    • Carrillo v. Houser, 224 Ariz. 463 (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), following trial in the Municipal Court, City of Phoenix, Carol Berry, J. Defendant appealed. The Superior Court, No. LC2008-000551-001DT, affirmed. Defendant sought special action relief. The Court of Appeals, 222 Ariz. 356, 214 P.3d 444, vacated judgment. City appealed. The Supreme Court, Bales, J., held that implied consent statute generally does not authorize law enforcement officers to administer test to determine alcohol concentration without warrant unless arrestee expressly agrees to test.

    • Golden Eagle Distribs. v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec., 180 Ariz. 565 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)

      Employer complied with the federal mandate under 49 C.F.R. § 391.93 to randomly conduct drug tests. The employee tested positive for cocaine seven hours into his workday. The employer discharged the employee from his position as a truck driver because he was no longer qualified to operate a motor vehicle, and federal regulations prohibited the employer from using the employee as a driver because he tested positive for cocaine. Employee applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Appeals Board ultimately held that the employee qualified for unemployment insurance benefits. The employee's actions were connected with his work under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-619.01 (Supp. 1993) because they adversely affected the employer's interests. The discharge for intoxication was disqualifying, and the employee should not have been awarded unemployment insurance benefits.

    • Laguna v. McFate, Not Reported in P.3d (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Substantial evidence supported an ALJ's decision to suspend a driver's license. The officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired. The driver admitted to the officer that he had been drinking earlier that evening, and the officer concluded that the driver had returned home shortly before the officer had arrived. Upon arriving home, the driver had driven his truck into another vehicle with enough force to move that vehicle four feet. Additionally, the officer did not see any evidence that the driver had consumed any alcohol after his arrival. The fact that the driver provided a different explanation of the night's events at his administrative hearing did not preclude the ALJ's finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver had driven under the influence of alcohol. A.R.S. § 28-1385.

    • State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84 (2013)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  The state filed a petition for special-action relief after the Superior Court, Pima County, Jane A. Butler, Commissioner Pro Tem, granted juvenile's motion to suppress evidence of a warrantless blood draw that was conducted after his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The Court of Appeals, 231 Ariz. 42, 290 P.3d 435, reversed. The Supreme Court granted review. Holdings: As matters of first impression, the Supreme Court, Bales, V.C.J., held that: [1] independent of the implied-consent statute, the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw; [2] if the arrestee is a juvenile, the juvenile's age and a parent's presence are relevant, though not necessarily determinative, factors that courts should consider in assessing the voluntariness of consent to a warrantless blood draw; and [3] trial court acted within its discretion in ruling that juvenile's consent was involuntary.

    • State v. Rhinehart, Not Reported in P.3d (2010)

      Defendant's arrest for driving under the influence was supported by probable cause. A department of public safety officer testified that when he transported defendant to the police station, he knew that she had been the driver in a singlevehicle rollover accident. When the officer first made contact with defendant, he observed signs of impairment and chose not to administer field sobriety tests because he could see she was unsteady on her feet. Further, the officer excluded other potential causes for the accident. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

    • State v. Rumsey, 225 Ariz. 374 (2010)

      Defendant was convicted by jury in the Superior Court, Pima County, No. CR20080258, Richard S. Fields, J., of manslaughter, aggravated assault of a minor under 15 years of age, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) while impaired to the slightest degree, driving with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, and driving while under the extreme influence of intoxicating liquor with an alcohol concentration of .15 or more. Defendant appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Vásquez, P.J., held that: [1] defendant's blood draw was taken in violation of her right to counsel, but [2] there was no nexus between the violation and the evidence obtained so as to require suppression.

  • Arkansas
    • Click here to download all Arkansas cases

    • Brumley v. Keech, 2012 Ark. 263 (Ark. 2012)

      Appellants alleged negligence and requested punitive damages for alleged violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR). On appeal, appellants argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of appellees' failure to comply with the FMCSR for post-accident-testing for controlled substances. The circuit court excluded evidence of appellees' failure to comply with the post-accident-testing requirements based on its finding that the evidence was not the type of conduct in which malice could be inferred. The reviewing court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that appellees failed to comply with the post-accident-testing requirements of the FMCSR. The alleged violations of 49 C.F.R. § 382.303 occurred after the accident and there was no indication that the violations contributed to or caused the accident. Also, the alleged violations did not support a punitive-damages award. There was no evidence that the driver had been drinking alcohol or using controlled substances prior to the accident or that he was under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substances at the time of the accident.

    • Burdine v. Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 2010 Ark. 455 (Ark. 2010)

      Driver was arrested for DWI in another state. The charge was nolle prossed, and an administrative hearing was held, which resulted in the suspension of his driving privileges. The driver argued that the suspension of his driver's license was not a conviction for DWI that warranted disqualification. He claimed that the administrative findings were not a conviction under Arkansas law and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations only required a one-year suspension when a person was convicted of a DWI as defined by state law. The court found that Arkansas had adopted the federal regulations. The administrative tribunal's ruling was a conviction as defined by 49 C.F.R. § 383.5. Under 49 C.F.R. § 384.206, once the DFA received adverse information about the driver and found no action had been taken as a result, it was required to implement the disqualification. The circuit court did not err in affirming the DFA's disqualification of the driver.

  • California
    • Click here to download all California cases

    • Halajian v. D & B Towing, 209 Cal.App.4th 1 (2012)

      Truck owner filed petition for replevin, naming towing company as a defendant. The Superior Court, Fresno County, No. 11CECG00005, Debra J. Kazanjian, J., sustained demurrer without leave to amend. Truck owner appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeal, Franson, J., held that: [1] driver's license and automobile registration requirements do not violate federal constitutional right to travel; [2] towing and impounding truck upon arrest for license and registration violations did not violate Fourth Amendment; [3] truck owner was a "driver" covered by the Vehicle Code; and [4] truck was covered by the Vehicle Code even if it was not "used for commercial purposes." Affirmed.

    • People v. Meyer, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1279 (Cal. App. 2010)

      A person who held a commercial driver's license at the time of violation of a traffic offense, but who surrendered the license, was barred from completing traffic school in lieu of adjudicating the traffic offense pursuant to Veh. Code, § 42005, subd. (c), notwithstanding that the section uses the present tense. Given that the "worst of the worst" would be the ones most likely or highly motivated to cheat, it would not further the federal legislative purpose to leave a loophole such as this in place.

    • People v. Superior Court (Costa), 183 Cal.App.4th 690, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 (Cal. App. 2010)

      Faced with criminal murder charges, a commercial driver could be found to have acted with malice. Malice can be implied so as to support a second degree murder indictment where a commercial license holder drove a truck that should have been put out of service for bad breaks, where he ignored warnings and suggestions that he was driving unsafely down a two lane highway that couldn't accommodate the truck in rush hour and later caused fatal accident.

    • Rehman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 178 Cal. App. 4th 581 (Cal. App. 2009)

      Driver was stopped for operating his tractor-trailer under the influence of alcohol. Breath tests showed a blood alcohol content of more than 0.04 but less than 0.08 percent. At the hearing, Driver relied on Veh. Code, § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), in arguing that his license suspension should be rescinded because his blood alcohol content was not 0.08 percent or more. The trial court concluded that the reference to 0.08 percent in the statute was a drafter's oversight. The court held that § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), could not be read literally because it conflicted with, and could not be harmonized with, Veh. Code, § 13353.2, subd. (a)(3), providing for suspension based on a blood alcohol content of 0.04 percent or more. To avoid absurd results, the court construed § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), to allow the California DMV to sustain an order of suspension imposed under Veh. Code, § 13353.2, subd. (a)(3), on a person for driving a vehicle requiring a commercial driver's license with a blood alcohol content of 0.04 percent or more where there was proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the person's blood alcohol content was 0.04 percent or more.

    • Weaver v. Chavez, 35 Cal. Rptr.3d 514 (Cal. App. 2005)

      With respect to a jury instruction on negligence, a federal regulation promulgated under Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which requires operators of commercial motor vehicles to use "extreme caution" when driving in inclement weather, imposes higher duty of care than "reasonable or prudent" standard in California's basic speed law, and thus operators of commercial motor vehicles are required to comply with regulation. 49 U.S.C.A. § 31131; Cal.Vehicle Code § 22350; 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.2, 392.14.

    • Ziehlke v. Valverde, 191 Cal.App.4th 1525 (2011)

      Driver filed petition for writ of mandate challenging the suspension of his commercial driver's license (CDL) after he was arrested for driving his pickup truck while having an elevated blood alcohol level. The Superior Court, Calaveras County, No. CV35599, John E. Martin, J., denied the petition, and driver appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeal, Scotland, Retired P.J. sitting by assignment, held that: [1] administrative per se proceeding did not violate due process, and [2] driver was not similarly situated to persons licensed by other states for equal protection purposes. Affirmed.

  • Colorado
    • Click here to download all Colorado cases

    • Colorado Dept. of Revenue v. Hibbs, 122 P.3d 999 (2005)

      Commercial truck driver challenged Department of Revenue's one-year revocation of his commercial driver's license after he was found to have been driving commercial vehicle while intoxicated at level four times the legal limit. The District Court, Chaffee County, Kenneth M. Plotz, J., reversed the order. Department of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, 107 P.3d 1061, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Hobbs, J., held that former statute's verified report requirement was satisfied by police officer's own signature and affirmation on department's form, and notarized report was not required.

    • Fallon v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 250 P.3d 691 (2010)

      Department of Revenue appealed from judgment of the District Court, Arapahoe County, Cheryl L. Post, J., reversing the revocation of petitioner's driver's license by the Department of Revenue for refusing to submit to testing as required by express consent statute. The Court of Appeals, Davidson, C.J., held that: [1] Department's power to subpoena witnesses is discretionary; [2] Department's refusal to subpoena witness did not impair licensee's ability to challenge reasonableness of stop and legality of arrest; [3] officer had reasonable suspicion justifying traffic stop; and [4] officer had probable cause for arrest.

    • Garcia v. Huber, 252 P.3d 486 (2010)

      Motorist sought review of finding by state Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division that motorist was a persistent drunk driver. The District Court, Douglas County, Paul A. King, J., affirmed finding. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carparelli, J., held that statutory presumption of accuracy of blood alcohol content (BAC) analysis done on behalf of law enforcement agency applies only to revocation determinations and not to "persistent drunk driver" determinations.

    • Harte v. Routt County Dist. Court, 2012 COA 183 (Colo. Ct. App. October 25, 2012) (No. 11CA1815)*

      Defendant's successfully completed deferred judgment under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(2) constituted a conviction of an alcohol-related driving offense, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301, and therefore, she was not entitled to seal her arrest and criminal records under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-308. The legislature intended the definition of "conviction" in the alcohol-related driving offenses exception to the sealing statute to include a successfully completed deferred judgment, even though "conviction" was defined in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1307(2)(a) to exclude a successfully completed deferred judgment.

      *No final published opinion available as of date.

    • In re Harte, --- P.3d ---- (2012)

      After defendant pleaded nolo contendere to driving under the influence of alcohol and successfully completed deferred judgment and sentence, and court dismissed her case, defendant petitioned to seal the criminal case records. The District Court, Routt County, Michael A. O'Hara, J., denied petition. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davidson, C.J., held that defendant was statutorily ineligible to petition to seal her records.

    • Long v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 296 P.3d 329 (2012)

      Driver sought review of decision of the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, revoking driver's license for one year based on his refusal to submit to testing as required by express consent law. The District Court, City and County of Denver, Brian R. Whitney, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Booras, J., held that: [1] Department properly made an initial revocation determination based on the information submitted to it by the law enforcement officer before holding a hearing; [2] information contained in arresting officer's express consent affidavit supported Department's initial revocation determination; [3] driver failed to establish "extraordinary circumstances" exception to the general rule of express consent law that drivers are entitled to their chosen form of test; [4] driver failed to establish that he was not properly advised under the express consent statute; and [5] officer conducted valid traffic stop.

    • Shiplet v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 266 P.3d 408 (2011)

      Motorist sought judicial review of a decision of the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, revoking his driver's license for nine months based on motorist's refusal to submit to blood or breath test under express consent statute. The District Court, Jefferson County, R. Brooke Jackson, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Booras, J., held that: [1] evidence supported conclusion that motorist, who was hearing impaired, understood his obligation to take a blood or breath test after police officer requested for him to do so; [2] officer was not required by statute to procure a sign language interpreter to help motorist communicate with officer.

    • Wiesner v. Huber, 228 P.3d 973 (2010)

      Licensee appealed from decision of the District Court, Arapahoe County, Joyce S. Steinhardt, J., affirming the three-month suspension of his driver's license and the finding that he was a "persistent drunk driver" by the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division. The Court of Appeals, Román, J., held that presumption of accuracy in the law enforcement blood or breath test results applies to the revocation of a license for a 0.08 or more blood alcohol content (BAC), but does not apply to the higher – 0.17 – BAC required for a "persistent drunk driver" finding.

  • Connecticut
  • Delaware
    No cases at this time.
  • District of Columbia
    No cases at this time.
  • Florida
    • Click here to download all Florida cases

    • McIntyre v. Seminole County School Bd., 779 So.2d 639 (Ct. App. Fla. 2001)

      An area transportation manager who supervised school bus drivers tested positive for drugs but did not violate federal regulations prohibiting persons who must hold a commercial driver's license (CDL) from operating a commercial vehicle while under the influence of controlled substances because manager's job description stated that a CDL was "preferred" but not required, and job description did not indicate that manager operated a school bus or other commercial vehicle but that he performed managerial and supervisory functions.

  • Georgia
    • Click here to download all Georgia cases

    • Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259, 658 S.E.2d 592 (2008)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant complained that he was denied due process because the implied consent notice read to him failed to inform him that his refusal to submit to chemical testing would result in his lifetime disqualification from having a commercial driver's license. Court held due process does not require that the arresting officer inform the driver of all the consequences of refusing to submit to testing because the officer had made it clear that refusing the test was not a safe harbor, free of adverse consequences.

    • Williams v. State, 303 Ga.App. 407, 693 S.E.2d 613 (Ct. App. Ga. 2010)

      Acknowledges that a uniform traffic citation charging driver with a violation of the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act (the Uniform Act) OCGA § 40-5-140 et seq.) was valid because the Uniform Act implements the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (the Federal Safety Act), Title XII of Public Law 99-570, which is designed to reduce or prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and injuries by permitting commercial drivers to hold only one license; disqualifying commercial drivers who have committed certain criminal or other offenses or serious traffic violations; and strengthening commercial driver licensing and testing standards.

  • Hawaii
    No cases at this time.
  • Idaho
    • Click here to download all Idaho cases

    • Archer v. State, Dept. of Transp., 145 Idaho 617 (2008)

      Driver sought review of Transportation Department's suspension of commercial driver's license based on driver's failed breath test for blood alcohol concentration. The Sixth Judicial District Court, Bannock County, Peter D. McDermott, J., reinstated license. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Perry, J., held that absence of a calibration record attached to breath test results did not establish testing not in accordance with proscribed methods. Reversed.

    • Atwood v. State, Transp. Dept., --- P.3d ---- (2014)

      Licensee appealed the suspension of his driver's license. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County, Joel E. Tingey, J., affirmed, and licensee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Gratton, J., held that officer's sworn statement providing that corporal instructed licensee to not eat, drink, or belch for fifteen minutes, that corporal observed licensee during the fifteen-minute observation period, and that corporal administered two evidentiary breath samples that read .084/.082 was sufficient to provide Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) with statutory authority and satisfied the statutory requirements to trigger licensee's driver's license suspension. Affirmed.

    • Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011)

      A commercial licensee's failure to take an alcohol breath test was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement, and thus he was disqualified based on his DUI conviction. After the conviction the licensee received notice that he was disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle. This was not a violation of the licensee's due process rights because the statutes were not ambiguous. Further, the administrative disqualification of licensee's CDL following a conviction for DUI does not violate the double jeopardy clause because the legislature intended for the one year CDL disqualification to be civil not criminal. A CDL disqualification was not so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform the civil remedy into a criminal penalty and the CDL disqualification is not historically viewed as a punishment. The disqualification, while intended to deter future wrongdoing, also serves to provide for the safety of the public at-large.

    • In re Driver's License Suspension of Besaw, Not Reported in P.3d (2013)

      George Joseph Besaw, Jr. appeals from the district court's decision on judicial review affirming a hearing officer's order that sustained the suspension of Besaw's driver's license for failing a breath alcohol concentration test.

    • In re Johnson, 153 Idaho 246 (2012)

      Motorist filed petition for judicial review of administrative suspension of driver's license following arrest for driving under influence (DUI) and sought stay of suspension pending review. The Judicial District Court, Latah County, John R. Stegner, J., granted stay and vacated suspension. Department of Transportation appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Perry, Judge Pro Tem, held that: [1] petition for judicial review filed prior to hearing officer's ruling was premature, and [2] DOT was not entitled to award of attorney fees under statute governing same in administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding. Judgment of District Court vacated; appeal dismissed.

    • In re Trottier, 155 Idaho 17 (2013)

      Idaho Transportation Department served driver with notice of administrative license suspension and lifetime disqualification of his commercial driver's license (CDL) after he was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and failed a blood alcohol concentration test. Driver requested a hearing, and hearing officer upheld the license suspension and sustained the lifetime CDL disqualification. Upon judicial review, the Second Judicial District Court, Latah County, John R. Stegner, District Judge, vacated hearing officer's decision. Transportation Department appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Gratton, J., held that: [1] evidence was sufficient to support hearing officer's determination that police officer had legal cause to stop driver, although nighttime videotape of driver making right turn and apparently crossing over centerline was difficult to discern; [2] evidence was sufficient to support hearing officer's determination that police officer adequately monitored driver during traffic stop for the 15-minute monitoring requirement for blood alcohol testing; and [3] driver's due process rights in the CDL proceeding were not violated. Reversed.

    • Peck v. State, Dept. of Transp., 153 Idaho 37 (2012)

      Licensee sought judicial review of administrative order suspending driving license for driving while intoxicated. The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, Steven C. Verby, J., affirmed the suspension, and licensee appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Gutierrez, J., held that: [1] administrative hearing requested by licensee to challenge suspension was held within the statutorily allowable time frame; [2] District Court was required to affirm suspension, absent a showing that any substantial right of licensee had been prejudiced; [3] driver's license suspension advisory form was not deficient, and thus, did not constitute a violation of licensee's due process rights; [4] licensee's disqualification from driving a commercial vehicle was not subject to appellate review; [5] hearing officer's finding that the point of contact between driver's licensee and the arresting officer occurred in Idaho was supported by substantial and competent evidence; [6] breath test variations did not facially undermine their credibility; and [7] hearing officer's finding that the weight of the evidence in arresting officer's affidavit was sufficient to uphold a license suspension was supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record. Affirmed.

    • Platz v. State, 154 Idaho 960 (2013)

      The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) appealed from consolidated decisions of the District Court, Second Judicial District, Latah County, John R. Stegner, J., vacating the administrative license suspension (ALS) of motorist's driver's license after he failed a blood alcohol concentration test, and vacating order disqualifying motorist's commercial driver's license (CDL) based upon the failed blood alcohol concentration test. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Gratton, J., held that: [1] hearing officer's determination that state police trooper's administration of breath test complied with 15-minute monitoring requirement was supported by substantial evidence in ALS hearing; [2] district court had authority to stay the ALS; and [3] CDL hearing officer's refusal to relitigate issue of whether motorist failed valid blood alcohol concentration test did not violate motorist's statutory or due process rights. Reversed.

    • Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transp., 150 Idaho 164 (2011)

      Motorist appealed from the suspension of his driver's license by Idaho Department of Transportation (IDOT) that followed his failure of a breath test. The District Court, Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County, David C. Nye, District Judge, reversed IDOT's decision. IDOT appealed. The Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that motorist failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to claim that notice of license suspension provided insufficient notice, for due process purposes, of one-year disqualification from operating a commercial vehicle. Decision of district court reversed with directions.

    • Williams v. State, 153 Idaho 380 (2012)

      Following his second conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), driver was issued lifetime disqualification by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD), prohibiting driver from holding commercial driver's license (CDL). On petition for judicial review of hearing officer's decision upholding driver's disqualification, the District Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai County, Lansing L. Haynes, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Gratton, C.J., held that: [1] lifetime CDL disqualification was civil in nature and did not rise to the level of criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes; [2] statute providing for lifetime CDL disqualification was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to driver; [3] driver was not deprived of substantive due process by lifetime CDL disqualification; and [4] lifetime CDL disqualification did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Affirmed.

  • Illinois
    • Click here to download all Illinois cases

    • City of Highland Park v. Kane, 2013 IL App (2d) 120788 (2013)

      Licensee petitioned to rescind the summary suspension of her driving privileges in connection with her arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Circuit Court, Lake County, Joseph R. Waldeck, J., granted request. City appealed. The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, J., held that: [1] trial court's finding that an inoperative rear license plate light was not a valid basis for stop was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, but [2] officer had a valid basis for stop based on licensee's failure to signal a turn. Reversed.

    • Odom v. White, 408 Ill.App.3d 1113 (2011)

      Two motorists appealed decisions of the Secretary of State denying their petitions to rescind the suspension of their driver's licenses based on blood alcohol tests conducted after they were involved in motor vehicle accidents. The Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Joe Harrison and Terry H. Gamber, JJ., affirmed the decisions of the Secretary. Motorists appealed, and the appeals were consolidated for oral argument and decision. The Appellate Court, Welch, J., held that Secretary's decisions that the mere fact that an injured party was carried from the scene established a type A injury triggering blood alcohol testing were clearly erroneous. Reversed.

    • People v. Anderson, 2013 IL App (2d) 121346 (2013)

      Defendant was charged with driving under influence (DUI). The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Liam C. Brennan, J., granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, and People appealed. The Appellate Court, McLaren, J., held that: [1] doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply to require trial court to give preclusive effect to determination in summary suspension proceedings that police officer had probable cause to arrest for DUI, and [2] officer had probable cause to arrest for DUI. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Aronson, 408 Ill.App.3d 946 (2011)

      In prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI), speeding and improper lane usage, defendant petitioned to rescind statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges. The Circuit Court of Du Page County, Robert G. Kleeman, J., granted the motion, and State appealed. The Appellate Court, Jorgensen, P.J., held that evidence was sufficient to establish that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol, given defendant's testimony and unavailability of video tape of defendant's traffic stop. Affirmed.

    • People v. Arrendondo, 2012 IL App (3d) 110223 (2012)

      Motorist filed motion to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license. The Circuit Court, Will County, Robert Livas, J., granted motion. State appealed. The Appellate Court, McDade, J., held that rescission of motorist's statutory summary suspension of his driver's license was against manifest weight of the evidence. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Boeckmann, 238 Ill.2d 1 (2010)

      In separate cases, defendants were convicted of underage consumption of alcohol. The Circuit Court, Clinton County, William J. Becker, J., granted the defendants' motions alleging that a statute requiring suspension of driver's license for defendants placed on court supervision violated due process as applied. The Secretary of State appealed. The Supreme Court, Kilbride, J., held that: [1] mandatory suspension of driver's license for defendants who received court supervision for underage consumption of alcohol did not violate due process as applied to defendants whose offenses did not involve use of automobile; [2] mandatory suspension of driver's license if defendant received court supervision for underage consumption of alcohol was not arbitrary; and [3] mandatory suspension of driver's license, in conjunction with criminal penalties, did not implicate Proportionate Penalties Clause. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Clements, 2012 IL App (3d) 110213 (2012)

      After driver was arrested at checkpoint for driving under the influence, and issued a notice of statutory summary suspension, he petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension and later moved to suppress evidence. The Circuit Court, 14th Judicial Circuit, Whiteside County, William S. McNeal, J., granted the petition and the motion. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Wright, J., held that: [1] there was no investigatory stop of driver's vehicle, and, thus, no seizure, but [2] even if there was a stop, driver's unsafe speed made the stop and seizure reasonable. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Damkroger, 408 Ill.App.3d 936 (2011)

      Motorist who was arrested twice in 30 days for driving under the influence (DUI), each of which triggered the summary suspension of her driver's license, filed a motion in the second case for issuance of a monitoring device driving permit (MDDP). The Circuit Court granted the motion, but the Secretary of State refused to issue the MDDP on the ground that the motorist was not a "first offender." The Circuit Court, De Kalb County, Melissa S. Barnhart, J., issued a rule to show cause and, when the Secretary continued to refuse to issue the MDDP, held Secretary in indirect civil contempt of court. Secretary appealed. The Appellate Court, Birkett, J., held that motorist was not a "first offender" on the date of her second DUI arrest. Reversed.

    • People v. Davis, 2012 IL App (2d) 110581 (2012)

      Motorist filed petition to rescind statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges, which had been suspended after state charged motorist with driving under the influence (DUI). The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Cary B. Pierce, J., denied the petition, and motorist appealed. The Appellate Court, Hutchinson, J., held that: [1] motorist could request hearing on petition to rescind only after being served with notice of suspension; [2] notice of suspension was not defective; [3] results of test of motorist's urine were admissible; and [4] police officer had probable cause to arrest motorist for DUI. Affirmed.

    • People v. Dittmar, 2011 IL App (2d) 091112 (2011)

      State appealed from orders of the Circuit Court, Stephenson County, James M. Hauser, J., granting defendant's motion to quash his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and suppress evidence, granting defendant's motion for leave to file an untimely petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license, and granting the petition to rescind the summary suspension. The appeals were consolidated. The Appellate Court, Birkett, J., held that: [1] sheriff's deputy who pulled his squad car behind defendant's stopped vehicle was pursuing an aim other than the detection, prevention, or investigation of crime; [2] checking on defendant's stopped vehicle was a reasonable public safety endeavor for deputy; and [3] trial court could not rescind the summary suspension based on its conclusion that deputy lacked reasonable grounds to believe defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Dovgan, 2011 IL App (3d) 100664 (2011)

      Defendant, who had been charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI), filed motion to suppress evidence of a breath test result administered four-and-a-half hours after his arrest. The Circuit Court, Will County, Amy Bertani–Tomczak, J., granted motion. State appealed.The Appellate Court, Schmidt, J., held that definition of "alcohol concentration" in Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act (UCDLA) as that which results from a breath test administered within two hours of a driver being stopped or detained did not apply to defendant's case. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Elliott, 2014 IL 115308 (2014)

      While judicial review of summary suspension of defendant's driver's license was pending, defendant was arrested for and charged with driving while license suspended. The summary suspension was subsequently set aside, and defendant filed motion to dismiss criminal charge for driving while license suspended. The Circuit Court, Perry County, James W. Campanella, J., denied motion, and following bench trial, entered judgment of conviction. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court, 365 Ill.Dec. 487, 978 N.E.2d 742, reversed and vacated conviction. People appealed. The Supreme Court, Thomas, J., held that rescission of summary suspension of driver's license after defendant was arrested for driving while license suspended did not render charge invalid. Appellate court Judgment reversed. Circuit court judgment affirmed.

    • People v. Farris, 2012 IL App (3d) 100199 (2012)

      Defendant in driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) case sought rescission of a statutory summary suspension of her driver's license and moved to suppress evidence resulting from a blood alcohol test taken without her consent by use of force. At hearing, arresting officer sought to amend his sworn report to state that defendant had refused to consent to test, rather than submit to it. The Circuit Court for Kankakee County, Kenneth A. Leshen, and Susan Tungate, JJ., granted defendant's petition to rescind, and motion to suppress, while denying the officer's motion to amend. The state appealed. The Appellate Court, Holdridge, J., held that: [1] arresting officer had no statutory right to use force to extract blood sample when the defendant refused; [2] trial court correctly denied arresting officer's motion to amend his complaint at the hearing for statutory summary suspension; and [3] trial court correctly granted the defendant's petition to rescind the statutory suspension of her driver's license. Affirmed.

    • People v. Flint, 2012 IL App (3d) 110165 (2012)

      Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), reckless driving, and improper lane usage. The Circuit Court, Will County, Joseph C. Polito, J., granted defendant's petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension and motion to suppress evidence, determining that police officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Carter, J., held that officer had reasonable suspicion to support traffic stop. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Grabeck, 2011 IL App (2d) 100599 (2011)

      After his driving privileges were suspended following an arrest for driving under the influence (DUI), defendant petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges, and State sought to amend officer report to indicate that notice of suspension was served on defendant by mail. The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Robert G. Kleeman, J., granted defendant's petition to rescind. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Burke, J., held that failure by officer to specify manner by which defendant was given notice of his suspension did not warrant rescission. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Hansen, 2012 IL App (4th) 110603 (2012)

      Defendant charged with driving under the influence (DUI) filed petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension of his driver's license and motion to “quash arrest,” alleging that police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop. The Circuit Court, Jersey County, Eric S. Pistorius, J., granted the petition and motion, and state appealed. The Appellate Court, Steigmann, J., held that officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop. Reversed and remanded.

    • People v. Hardek, 2011 IL App (3d) 100561 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Driver charged with driving under the influence (DUI) filed petition to rescind statutory summary suspension of his driver's license. The 12th Judicial Circuit Court, Will County, James E. Egan, J., granted petition. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Carter, P.J., held that driver's signing hospital consent form after refusing police request for chemical testing did not constitute consent to testing within meaning of implied consent law. Reversed.

    • People v. Heritsch, 2012 IL App (2d) 090719 (2012)

      Defendant was convicted following stipulated bench trial in the Circuit Court, Winnebago County, Richard A. Lucas, J., of aggravated driving while license revoked (DWLR). Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court, Hutchinson, J., held that applicable license revocation was for a controlled substance offense, not DUI, so that fifteenth or subsequent conviction for DWLR was not aggravated DWLR. Affirmed as modified; cause remanded.

    • People v. Keithley, 399 Ill.App.3d 850 (2010)

      Defendant who was charged with improper lane usage, following too closely, and driving under the influence (DUI) filed motion to rescind the statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges. The Circuit Court, St. Clair County, Zina R. Cruse, J., rescinded the suspension. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Welch, J., held that arresting officer's failure to observe defendant for 20 minutes did not preclude suspension based on refusal to submit to a breath alcohol test. Reversed.

    • People v. Mayor, 2012 IL App (2d) 120050 (2012)

      Driver petitioned to rescind the summary suspension of his driving privileges following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Circuit Court of Du Page County, No.11-–DT-–3971; the Hon. Cary B. Pierce, Judge, presiding, denied petition. Driver appealed. The Appellate Court, Schostok, J., held that an improper length of suspension of driving privileges imposed by the Secretary of the State was not grounds for rescission of summary suspension. Affirmed.

    • People v. Moreland, 2011 IL App (2d) 100699 (2011)

      After defendant's driving license was suspended for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), the Circuit Court, Du Page County, Cary B. Pierce, J., granted defendant's petition to rescind suspension due to defendant not having been afforded hearing within 30 days after he filed petition to rescind. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Burke, J., held that defendant was entitled to rescission of statutory suspension of driving privileges. Affirmed.

    • People v. Pollitt, 2011 IL App (2d) 091247 (2011)

      Driver who held commercial driver's license (CDL) filed petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges following driving under the influence (DUI) arrest, on allegation of procedural violations. The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Cary B. Pierce, J., granted the petition. State's motion to reconsider was denied. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Schostok, J., held that: [1] sworn report was defective that had incorrect date for when driver was notified of summary suspension, warranting rescission, and [2] the trial court acted within its discretion by denying motion to reconsider after state's untimely attempt to amend sworn report. Affirmed.

    • People v. Solan, 2012 IL App (2d) 110944 (2012)

      Motorist petitioned to rescind summary suspension of his driving privileges, which was instituted based on complaint against motorist charging motorist with driving under the influence (DUI). The Circuit Court, Du Page County, Liam C. Brennan, J., granted petition. State appealed. The Appellate Court, Burke, J., held that complaint against motorist adequately indicated that defendant had been arrested for DUI, as required to support suspension of driving privileges. Reversed.

  • Indiana
    • Click here to download all Indiana cases

    • Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793 (2012)

      Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, and his driver's license was suspended. Transfer was granted. The Supreme Court held that defendant, who was automobile passenger and rode down highway with jar of marijuana between his legs, used vehicle in committing offense of possessing marijuana, as would require suspension of license. Affirmed.

    • Commissioner, Dept. of Revenue v. Partlow, 769 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)

      Driver, who had been diagnosed with epilepsy as a young teenager and had not had any seizures relating to such illness for fifteen years, was medically qualified to hold commercial driver's license under Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration regulations where driver's physician testified it was not likely that driver's condition continued to require anti-seizure medication and that the amount of medication prescribed for driver was not likely to be therapeutic. Driver's physician also testified that the risk of driver experiencing another seizure was extremely remote.

    • Frohardt v. Bassett, 788 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)

      Penske rental truck that driver was operating when truck hit motorist's vehicle was not a "commercial motor vehicle" pursuant to Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and similar state statute, and thus driver was not required to possess a commercial driver's license when operating truck, since truck weighed less than minimum weight for a commercial motor vehicle, and driver was not an employee of Penske.

    • Gibson v. Hand, 756 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)

      Appellant-Respondent, Gary Gibson, Commissioner, Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, appeals the trial court's grant of Appellee-Petitioner's, Richard Hand, Verified Petition for Hardship Driver's License. Reversed.

    • Hassfurther v. State, 988 N.E.2d 811 (2013)

      Driver filed petition for judicial review of administrative license suspension following his refusal to consent to chemical testing for intoxication following arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The Superior Court denied petition. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] officer had probable cause to believe that driver was operating vehicle while intoxicated, and thus had probable cause to offer driver chemical test for intoxication, and [2] driver failed to establish that he was not adequately informed about license suspension if he refused chemical test. Affirmed.

    • Hazelwood v. State, 3 N.E.3d 39 (2014)

      Recidivist driving violator filed petition for rescission of lifetime suspension of his driving privileges. The Circuit Court denied petition. Violator appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] rehabilitative justice provision of state constitution did not preclude application of license reinstatement statute to bar from applying for rescission of lifetime suspension, and [2] application of license reinstatement statute to bar violator from seeking for rescission did not constitute "punishment," within scope of proportionality clause of state constitution and Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Affirmed.

    • Hory v. State, 954 N.E.2d 475 (2011)

      Defendant was convicted in a bench trial in the Adams Superior Court of illegal parking. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that federal motor safety regulations did not expressly or impliedly preempt local traffic safety laws, and thus defendant could be convicted of illegal parking even if defendant was a trucker engaged in interstate commerce. Affirmed.

    • Illinois Bulk Carrier, Inc. v. Jackson, 908 N.E.2d 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)

      States that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations eliminate the distinction between independent contractors and employees so that an attempt by motor carriers to avoid liability simply by labeling a driver as an independent contractor is unavailing.

    • Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. McNeil, 931 N.E.2d 897 (2010)

      Motorist petitioned for judicial review of determination of Bureau Of Motor Vehicles (BMV) that motorist, following his most recent conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI), was an habitual traffic violator (HTV) and thus eligible for ten-year driver's license suspension. The Circuit Court, Allen County, reinstated motorist's driving privileges upon finding that the two-year statute of limitations applied such that the passage of more than two years from the accrual of the cause of action to the notice of suspension barred the BMV from suspending motorist's driver's license. The BMV appealed. The Court of Appeals held that administrative action to suspend motorist's driver's license did not constitute an action for "a forfeiture of penalty given by statute" as was necessary for two-year statute of limitations to apply. Reversed.

    • Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Orange, 889 N.E.2d 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)

      Holder of commercial driver's license (CDL) who was convicted of operating a noncommercial vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement could be granted probationary driving privileges to drive noncommercial vehicles, even though he was ineligible to drive a commercial motor vehicle under state statute incorporating Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (MCSIA); MCSIA did not restrict CDL holder's right to drive noncommercial vehicles, and state law could not be more restrictive than MCSIA.

    • Majors v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1112 (2011)

      Defendant convicted of driving a 28,000-pound oil rig through a red light, colliding with another vehicle and killing the other driver, appealed his 11-year sentence as inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. The Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the sentence.

    • Orndorff v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 982 N.E.2d 312 (2012)

      Driver sought review of decision of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), suspending her driver's license for ten years based on her status as a habitual traffic violator (HTV). The Circuit Court, Monroe County, denied driver's request for preliminary injunction. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] eight-year delay in imposing suspension threatened the public interest, given that license suspension would cause driver to lose her job and thrust her and her family into poverty, thus supporting driver's claim of laches; [2] driver presented a prima facie case of an articulable public policy interest that outweighed public policy supporting denying laches, thus supporting injunction; [3] one's status as an HTV is not dependent upon the person's possession of a valid driver's license; and [4] driver had no adequate remedy at law, thus supporting injunction. Reversed and remanded.

    • Silverman v. Fifer, 837 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)

      Under preemption doctrine, federal statute precluded Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles from issuing restricted commercial driver's license based on hardship, to over-the-road truck driver whose commercial driver's license had been suspended because he had refused to take breath test for evidence of intoxication.

    • State v. Bryant, 4 N.E.3d 808 (2014)

      Defendant was charged with Class D felony operating a vehicle as an habitual traffic violator (HTV). The Superior Court, Hendricks County, granted defendant's motion to dismiss. State appealed. The Court of Appeals held that defendant was properly charged with Class D felony operating a vehicle as HTV. Reversed and remanded.

    • Thomas v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 979 N.E.2d 169 (2012)

      Motorist filed petition for judicial review of decision of Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), determining that motorist was a habitual traffic violator (HTV) and suspending his driving privileges for ten years. The Superior Court denied the petition, and motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] general ten-year statute of limitations applied to BMV's determination that motorist qualified as HTV, and [2] statute of limitations began to run on date of motorist's third conviction for a traffic violation. Affirmed.

  • Iowa
    • Click here to download all Iowa cases

    • Dickerson v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 786 N.W.2d 874 (2010)

      The Iowa Department of Transportation was not entitled to revoke the commercial driver's license or the ordinary driver's license of a driver who refused chemical testing without being advised as to the consequences of the refusal on his licenses. The officer who stopped the driver had a statutory obligation to advise the driver of the consequences of his refusal, and the officer's failure to provide the required information rendered the driver's refusal involuntary and invalidated subsequent proceedings under the statute. I.C.A. §§ 321.208, 321J.8. Affirmed on appeal.

    • Lewis v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Ames, 776 N.W.2d 859 (2010)

      Former civil service employee sought trial de novo following decision by city civil service commission to terminate his employment. The District Court, Story County, reversed the decision of commission, and city appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court held that city employee's failure to maintain driver's license due to suspension of license following arrest for driving under influence (DUI) warranted employee's termination. Judgment of Court of Appeals vacated; District Court judgment reversed.

    • State v. Barrans, 798 N.W.2d 736 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  A defendant was given the opportunity to call, consult, and see a member of the defendant's family or an attorney, as required under Iowa law. After the defendant was arrested for operating while intoxicated and brought to a state trooper's patrol station, the defendant was allowed to make four phone calls, two to friends, and two to attorneys. Although the defendant was unable to reach any of the four people he contacted, the defendant indicated that he did not know anyone else he wanted to contact. It was only after the defendant said he no longer wanted to contact anyone that the trooper asked the defendant whether he wanted to consent to chemical testing. Further, the trooper had advised the defendant that the purpose of the calls was that they related to the test. I.C.A. § 804.20.

    • State v. Calvert, 800 N.W.2d 755 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Police officer was not required, as a condition precedent to implied consent, to provide defendant with the results of her preliminary breath screening test (PBT) upon defendant's request. Defendant was convicted of operation while intoxicated after officer stopped her upon suspicion of driving while intoxicated, noted several signs of intoxication, administered several field sobriety tests which defendant failed, and conducted a PBT which revealed that defendant was driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of almost twice the legal limit. State law only required medical personnel to disclose the results of an evidentiary chemical test to an individual at his or her request. I.C.A. §§ 321J.11, 321J.2.§

    • State v. Carey, 820 N.W.2d 159 (2012)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for operating while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2011), asserting the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his refusal to submit to chemical testing. He claims the implied consent advisory he was read failed to comply with the statutory requirements, and as a result, he claims he was denied substantive due process rights. Affirmed.

    • State v. Grose, 797 N.W.2d 622 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant-appellant appealed from the district court's denial of his motion to suppress and his subsequent conviction of and sentence for operating while intoxicated, second offense. He contends he was denied substantive due process when given an improper and misleading implied consent advisory, thus rendering his consent involuntary and uninformed. He further contends the district court erred in concluding he was not denied his rights under Iowa Code section 804.20 (2007). Affirmed.

    • State v. Helble, 784 N.W.2d 201 (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  A defendant was not prejudiced by any failure of his trial counsel to object to the admission of two incriminating videotapes. Even if counsel had successfully objected to the admission of the videotapes, there was testimony from the arresting officer that the strong odor of alcohol was on the defendant's breath and his balance appeared poor. Further, the videotape of the defendant's arrest would have been admitted for impeachment purposes due to the defendant testifying at trial that he was not intoxicated when he was arrested in contrast to the videotape where he told the officer repeatedly that he had had too much to drink. I.C.A. § 321J.2. Affirmed.

    • State v. Hutton, 796 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 2011)

      The Iowa Supreme Court considered a claim that a driver's consent to a chemical breath test was involuntary because the advisory "inaccurately represented the consequences of his decision to submit to the test or not." Additional language in the advisory incorrectly overstated the potential adverse consequences of taking the chemical test. Specifically, it warned the driver that his commercial driver's license (CDL) would be revoked for one year if he took the chemical test and failed it. Despite this language, the driver agreed to take the test anyway-and registered a .205 blood alcohol concentration. The Court held that the driver had no basis for arguing his consent to the test was involuntary.

    • State v. Overbay, 810 N.W.2d 871 (2012)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  After defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI), second offense, the District Court, Polk County, granted defendant's motion to suppress blood test results. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, 2011 WL 3689151, affirmed. State sought further review, which was granted. The Supreme Court held that inaccurate information concerning refusal consequences did not render defendant's consent to chemical testing involuntary. Reversed, vacated, and remanded.

    • State v. Rieks, 808 N.W.2d 756 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant appealed his conviction for operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2009). He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the chemical test result as the implied consent advisory read to him was improper under Iowa Code section 321J.8 rendering his consent involuntary. He also claims the district court should have granted his motion to suppress because the arresting officer violated his rights under Iowa Code section 804.20. Affirmed.

    • State v. Sharp, 797 N.W.2d 623 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant appealed OWI conviction, arguing he was denied substantive due process and his statutory right to be given the proper implied consent advisory under sections 321.208(2) and 321 J.8(1) (c)(2). He asserts he could not have given informed and voluntary consent to chemical testing because the implied consent advisory he received was misleading and not in compliance with the Iowa Code. Affirmed.

    • Watson v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 838 N.W.2d 680 (2013)

      Motorist appealed decision of the Department of Transportation (IDOT) suspending his commercial driving license (CDL) for operating a commercial motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .04 or more. The District Court, Polk County, affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 2012 WL 4900475. The Supreme Court granted motorist's request for further review. The Supreme Court held that: [1] Supreme Court was not required to defer to IDOT's interpretation of CDL revocation statute and could review the issue de novo, and [2] margin of error adjustment requirement for breath test results in the non-CDL context did not apply to cases involving CDL revocations. Affirmed.

    • Wiebenga v. Iowa DOT, 530 N.W. 2d. 732 (Iowa 1995)

      Blood alcohol test results that are inadmissible in criminal proceeding may be used as basis to disqualify driver from holding commercial driver's license, even though such results may not be used to revoke regular driver's license because a statute providing for rescission of revocation refers to statutory provisions governing revocation of regular licenses, but does not refer to provisions governing disqualification of commercial licenses. Persons who possess commercial license are held to higher standards than persons holding regular license.

    • Williamson v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 822 N.W.2d 122 (2012)

      Petitioner appealed the district court decision affirming the ruling of the Iowa Department of Transportation revoking his driver's license. He claimed the revocation was invalid because the arresting officer failed to fill out all parts of the "Request and Notice Under Iowa Code Chapter 321J/Section 321.208" form before giving it to him. Affirmed.

  • Kansas
    • Click here to download all Kansas cases

    • Becker v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 157 P.3d 1129 (2007)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Donald A. Becker appeals from a judgment of the trial court affirming the suspension of his driving privileges. Becker contends that his substantive due process rights were violated when he was not provided the implied consent advisories relating to commercial driver's licenses, even though he was not driving a commercial vehicle when he was arrested. We disagree and affirm.

    • Cuthbertson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 42 Kan.App.2d 1049 (2009)

      Holder of commercial and noncommercial driver's licenses sought review of a decision from the Kansas Department of Revenue to impose an administrative suspension of his driver's license and a lifetime suspension of his commercial driver's license (CDL). The District Court, Norton County, William B. Elliott, J., upheld the Department's decision. License holder appealed. The Court of Appeals, Pierron, J., held that the license holder was not prejudiced by gratuitous statements from police officer regarding the effect a failed breath test would have on his CDL. Affirmed.

    • Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625 (2008)

      Driver sought review of administrative license suspension based on his failing of a chemical breath test. The District Court, Johnson County, Kevin P. Moriarty, J., dismissed the suspension order. Department of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, 36 Kan.App.2d 561, 142 P.3d 735, reversed. Driver filed petition for review. The Supreme Court, Beier, J., held that: [1] statutory list of issues that may be decided in an administrative driver's license suspension hearing did not authorize consideration of whether reasonable suspicion existed to support the traffic stop; [2] exclusion of search and seizure issues from agency decision did not violate procedural due process; [3] as a matter of first impression, traffic stop based on officer's mistake of law was not supported by reasonable suspicion; but [4] exclusionary rule would not apply in administrative driver's license suspension proceedings. Affirmed.

    • McQuade v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 256 P.3d 896 (2010)

      Owen McQuade appeals the decision of the district court which affirmed the decision of the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) suspending his driving privileges. The facts of this case are not in dispute. McQuade was arrested for DUI but refused to submit to testing. Eventually, McQuade was served with notice of suspension, a form DC–27, and he filed a timely request for an administrative hearing. After that hearing, the suspension of McQuade's driving privileges was upheld. The suspension order contained notice to McQuade that action would be taken on his driving privileges unless he timely filed a petition for review with the district court.

    • Robinson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 37 Kan.App.2d 425 (2007)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist sought judicial review of decision of Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) affirming the administrative suspension of his commercial driving privileges. On de novo review, the District Court, Lyon County, W. Lee Fowler, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Marquardt, P.J., held that: [1] trooper who stopped motorist, who was driving noncommercial vehicle, on suspicion of driving under the influence was not required, under implied consent law, to advise motorist that if he failed a sobriety test or if he refused testing, his commercial driver's license could be administratively suspended for one year, in contrast to 30-day suspension of noncommercial driver's license, and [2] motorist's procedural due process rights were not violated. Affirmed.

    • Rother v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 297 P.3d 1194 (2013)

      Raymond Rother appeals the district court's decision to uphold the Kansas Department of Revenue's (KDR) suspension of his driving privileges. Rother argues that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for review on the ground that the petition raised issues that were not considered at the administrative hearing. Rother also argues that the administrative hearing officer abused his discretion and violated Rother's due process rights by denying his request for a continuance of the hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment.

    • State v. Becker, 36 Kan.App.2d 828 (2006)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Ellis County, Thomas L. Toepfer, J., of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Marquardt, P.J., held that implied consent notice that officer read to defendant prior to breath test did not violate his substantive due process rights. Affirmed.

    • State v. Bradley, 42 Kan.App.2d 104, 208 P.3d 788 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009)

      Substantial compliance with the statutory requirement that driver arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) be given advisory notices before a blood alcohol test is administered is sufficient.

    • State v. Crum, 270 Kan. 870, 19 P.3d 172 (Kan. 2001)

      Warrantless stop and inspection of commercial truck that was authorized to transport property for hire did not violate either federal or state constitution, even though officer stopped truck solely to conduct inspection and lacked any suspicion that there was violation of any state law because commercial trucking occurred on 24-hour basis, governing statute was entirely reasonable in not limiting when commercial vehicle could be stopped. The fact that statute failed to specify frequency of permissible stops was not in and of itself constitutional error. Further, the statute limited inspection to determining whether driver and vehicle were in compliance with applicable motor carrier laws, rules, and regulations, and place of stops, i.e., state highways and trafficways, was sufficiently limited, given public interest in safety.

    • State v. Whiteman, 291 P.3d 1073 (2013)

      Justin L. Whiteman appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test he agreed to take after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). We affirm.

    • Stroud v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 204 P.3d 1191 (2009)

      The limited issue raised by a driver in his petition for review of the administrative suspension of his commercial driver's license for his failure to pass a chemical breath test, that the stop was not based on reasonable suspicion, was properly dismissed. Although the court found that the stop of the driver's vehicle was not based upon reasonable suspicion, the exclusionary rule did not apply in administrative proceedings. Whether reasonable grounds existed to believe a driver was under the influence may be considered in an administrative license suspension proceeding, but not whether a traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion or other constitutional arguments.

    • Tubbs v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 222 P.3d 1019 (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  A defendant was not entitled to suppress evidence of his breath test results. Before the defendant was given the breath test, he was provided with a form that contained statutorily required implied consent advisories for commercial driver's licenses (CDL), and there was no requirement for the officer to read CDL advisories to an individual with a CDL when driving a noncommercial vehicle. Therefore the defendant had notice of the impact of a test refusal or test failure on his CDL.

  • Kentucky
  • Louisiana
    • Click here to download all Louisiana cases

    • Austin v. Department of Public Safety, Office of Motor Vehicles, 77 So.3d 474 (2011)

      After driver's refusal to submit to test for chemical intoxication, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety, Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV), suspended his commercial driving privileges, and driver sought to reinstate the commercial license following acquittal on the driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge. The Second Judicial District Court, Bienville Parish, No. 41807, ordered the OMV to reinstate the commercial driver's license. The OMV appealed. The Court of Appeal held that a commercial driver's license suspended for refusal to test could not be reinstated due to acquittal on DWI charge. Reversed.

    • Brooks v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, 66 So.3d 1236 (2011)

      Commercial driver licensee sought judicial review of his adjudication, and reinstatement of driver's license. The Twenty–Seventh Judicial District Court, St. Landry Parish, No. 10-C-3450-A, ordered state to reinstate licensee's commercial driver's license, and state appealed. The Court of Appea held that: [1] state was required to immediately reinstate licensee's commercial driver's license, once prosecutor dismissed the charges of operating a vehicle while intoxicated; [2] licensee's commercial driver's license was not subject to suspension in accordance with federal regulation that included convictions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated; and [3] "implied consent" statute was insufficient to support state's refusal to reinstate licensee's commercial driver's license. Affirmed.

    • Dore v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, Office of Motor Vehicles, --- So.3d ---- (2014)

      Motorist whose commercial drivers' license (CDL) was disqualified for one year based on his refusal to take a breath test after being arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) filed application after reinstatement of his CDL to have the notation of refusal to take a test stricken from his driving record. The Twenty–Seventh Judicial District Court, St. Landry Parish, No. 12-C-5293-B, granted the application. Department of Public Safety appealed. The Court of Appeal held that: [1] motorist was not entitled to have the notation stricken, and [2] trial court should not have considered motorist's argument that disqualification statute did not provide sufficient notice of the length of notification. Reversed.

    • Griffin v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, Not Reported in So.3d (2013)

      The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV), sought review of a district court judgment ordering it to reinstate Dennis Griffin, Jr.'s commercial driver's license. Affirmed.

    • In re Lafleur, 129 So.3d 540 (2013)

      Motorist petitioned for judicial review of decision by Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles, to suspend his driving privileges after he was arrested for operating motor vehicle while under influence of alcohol. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline, No. 73460-A, ordered reinstatement of driving privileges, and Department appealed. The Court of Appeal held that: [1] motorist whose driving privileges were suspended following arrest for operating vehicle while under influence was entitled to reinstatement of privileges after district attorney declined to pursue criminal charges, and [2] hearing officer's determination that "Department met its burden of proving the statutory requirements of the Louisiana Tests for Suspected Drunken Drivers law" was not "conviction," within meaning of statute governing suspension of driver's licenses upon conviction for operating motor vehicle while under influence of alcohol. Affirmed.

    • Jobe v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections,..., 94 So.3d 217 (2012)

      Licensee filed a motion that sought to prohibit the Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV) from denying him a commercial driver's license with hazardous material endorsement (HME). The Forty–Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, No. 72,808, granted the motion. The OMV appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the OMV acted unreasonably in waiting approximately two years after licensee was sentenced for driving while intoxicated (DWI) to suspend his commercial driver's license. Affirmed.

    • Moore v. State Dept. Of Public Safety, 655 So. 2d. 644 (La. Ct. App. 1995)

      Following suspension of motorist's commercial Class A driver's license for driving with excessive blood alcohol content, the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ouachita Parish, granted motorist hardship license to drive commercial vehicles, and Department of Public Safety and Corrections appealed. The Court of Appeal, held that trial court did not have authority to grant motorist hardship license for commercial vehicles while prohibiting his driving private vehicles or any vehicle for his personal use.

    • Navarre v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections,..., --- So.3d ---- (2014)

      Licensee filed a petition to review the suspension of his driver's license. The Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, No. 2011-005080-B, reinstated licensee's commercial driver's license. The Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV), appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court committed reversible error when it reinstated licensee's commercial driver's license after the operating a vehicle while intoxicated charge against licensee was dismissed. Reversed.

    • Parker v. Stalder, 704 So. 2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 1997)

      Driver filed petition to challenge suspension of his commercial driver's license by Department of Public Safety and Corrections. The Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, affirmed suspension. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeal, held that relevant period in statute providing for suspension of commercial driver's license for two serious traffic violations within three-year period is time between occurrence of violations, rather than time between convictions for such violations.

    • State Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections v. Riggleman, 62 So.3d 898 (2011)

      Motorist filed application for trial de novo after his driver's license was suspended by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) pursuant to the "Tests for Suspected Drunken Drivers" law, based on motorist's refusal to submit to a chemical test of his breath. The Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, No. 237,873, reversed. Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPS) appealed. The Court of Appeal held that as a matter of first impression, once motorist refused to submit to breath test as directed by arresting officer, driver's license suspension statute became applicable, notwithstanding the motorist's subsequent submission to the blood test. Reversed.

  • Maine
    • Click here to download all Maine cases

    • Turner v. Secretary of State, 12 A.3d 1188 (Me. 2011).

      The Secretary of State suspended Turner's commercial driving license for a period of three years based on its finding, pursuant to a blood-alcohol test, that Turner had operated a commercial vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.04%. Turner petitioned for judicial review, and the Superior Court vacated the Secretary of State's decision. The Secretary of State appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the police officer had sufficient probable cause to require Turner to take a blood-alcohol test where officer smelled an odor of alcohol on his breath, and he admitted that he had consumed alcohol. The Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and affirmed the license suspension.

  • Maryland
    • Click here to download all Maryland cases

    • Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jaigobin, 413 Md. 191, 991 A.2d 1251 (Md. Ct. App. 2010)

      Holder of CDL sought review of decision by the Motor Vehicle Administration disqualifying his CDL for one year following his acceptance of probation before judgment on charge of driving under the influence per se. Upon grant of certiorari, the Court of Appeals held that probation before judgment (PBJ) constituted a "conviction" as that term was defined in the Maryland Commercial Driver's License Act.

    • Hill v. Motor Vehicle Admin, 415 Md. 231, 999 A.2d 1019 (Md. Ct. App. 2010)

      A form that advised motorist of potential penalties for failing or refusing to submit to breath test clearly advised motorist that his CDL would be disqualified if he refused the test, and the form that was read to motorist during stop was not incompatible with the General Assembly's legislative intent with respect to the stricter sanctions imposed upon holders of CDLs.

    • Schramm v. Foster, 341 F.Supp.2d 536 (D. Md. 2004)

      Parents of minor motorist who was injured in collision, individually and as motorist's guardian, as well as motorist's passenger and his parents, brought personal injury actions against driver of tractor-trailer involved in collision, driver's employer, and company that brokered shipment being transported by driver, alleging negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, and violations of Motor Carrier Act (MCA) and federal motor carrier safety regulations. Plaintiffs and shipment broker cross-moved for summary judgment on issues of broker's liability. The court held that a principal / agent relationship did not exist between tractor-trailer driver and broker; and that the broker was not vicariously liable for any negligence by driver, even if driver was its agent. The broker could not be held liable for negligent entrustment under Maryland law. Further still, the MCA does not create private right of action for personal injuries and in any event, liability did not exist under MCA, even if private right of action existed.

  • Massachusetts
    • Click here to download all Massachusetts cases

    • Com. v. Leboeuf, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 45, 934 N.E.2d 1285 (Mass. Ct. App. 2010)

      Defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license filed a motion to suppress on grounds that officer's warrantless administrative inspection of commercial vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court reported case to the Appeals Court for resolution of an important question of law. The Appeals Court held that statute authorizing warrantless administrative safety inspections of commercial vehicles provided an adequate substitute for a warrant, and random stop of commercial vehicle for the purpose of conducting administrative safety inspection was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

  • Michigan
    • Click here to download all Michigan cases

    • Green v. Secretary of State, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2013)

      The Secretary of State appeals as of right the trial court's order restoring full driving privileges to Christopher Thomas Green. Affirmed.

    • People v. Hammoud, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2012)

      Defendant Kazem Hammoud appeals by leave granted the circuit court's order affirming his bench-trial conviction of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license (DWLS) pursuant to a Dearborn City Ordinance that is substantively identical to MCL 257.904(1). The district court sentenced defendant to 24 months of probation with the first 30 days to be served in jail. Reversed and remanded for entry of an acquittal.

    • People v. Nunley, 491 Mich. 686 (2012)

      In prosecution for second-offense driving while license suspended (DWLS), the 15th District Court denied the prosecution's motion in limine to admit a certificate of mailing, as generated by Department of State (DOS), as proof that defendant received notice that his license was suspended. Interlocutory appeal was granted. The Circuit Court, Washtenaw County, affirmed district court's ruling that admission of certificate without testimony would violate Confrontation Clause. Prosecution's interlocutory application for leave to appeal was granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that certificate of mailing was not "testimonial" under Confrontation Clause, such that admission of certificate did not require accompanying witness testimony. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed; case remanded to district court.

    • Taylor v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich.App. 333, 548 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)

      Statutes requiring applicants for group vehicle designations to have not suffered suspension or revocation of their driving privileges within 36 months preceding application and providing that circuit courts lacked jurisdiction to review denials of applications based on such ground constituted exercise of state's power to enhance safety, and concomitant life, health and welfare of public, in use of state's road system, and therefore retroactive application of such statutes did not violate constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

  • Minnesota
    • Click here to download all Minnesota cases

    • Bauer v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Police officer had probable cause to believe that driver was driving while impaired outside of the driver's refusal to take field sobriety tests, supporting the revocation of the driver's license pursuant to the implied consent law. The police officer saw the driver run a red light and smelled alcohol on him when he pulled him over. The driver had red, watery eyes and admitted to drinking a couple of alcoholic beverages. Additionally, the driver was belligerent, uncooperative, slurred his speech, and was swaying while on his feet. M.S.A. § 169A.51.

    • Beito v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  A driver's indecision over whether to attempt to contact a lawyer before consenting to a blood or urine test over the course of 45 minutes unreasonably delayed the test and constituted a refusal under Minnesota's implied consent law. The driver was arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for minor injuries sustained in a one-car, rollover accident. The arresting officer read the driver the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory (ICA). Over the next 45 minutes the officer read the ICA eight more times and allowed the driver access to a phone to call an attorney for approximately 25 minutes. Driver stated he would not provide a blood or urine test until contacting an attorney, despite indicating to the officer that he no longer want to contact an attorney several times. M.S.A. § 171.19.

    • Dotray v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  For purposes of a motorist's challenge to revocation of his license under an implied consent law for refusal of test, a police officer had a legally sufficient basis to execute a traffic stop. The officer testified that he stopped the motorist's vehicle because he saw the vehicle fail to stop at a stop sign. While the motorist cross-examined the officer regarding whether he used speed-detection equipment to confirm that the vehicle failed to stop and implied the officer could not have seen whether the motorist had stopped, the motorist failed to offer any testimony whether he stopped at the stop sign. Additionally, the court found the officer's testimony credible. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; Minn.Stat. § 169.30(b) (2008).

    • Edstrom v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  District court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new implied consent hearing based on newly discovered evidence. After defendant's implied consent hearing, the state gave defendant a copy of a video recording of the traffic stop captured by the dashboard camera in officer's squad car. The events that the officer described as justifying the traffic stop were not depicted in the video. The district court reasonably found that the period of the officer's challenged observations preceded the recording. Therefore, the video recording did not "conclusively prove" that the traffic stop was unlawful. rule 60 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.

    • Hoekstra v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 839 N.W.2d 536 (2013)

      After driver pleaded guilty to fourth-degree driving while impaired, the Commissioner of Public Safety disqualified him from holding a commercial driver's license. Driver sought judicial review of his commercial license disqualification, alleging that the disqualification was the result of an unlawful traffic stop. The District Court, Meeker County, sustained license disqualification. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] police officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant violated provision of motor vehicle equipment statute so as to support traffic stop, and [2] term "covers," as used within provision of motor vehicle equipment statute prohibiting a person from equipping a motor vehicle with any equipment or material that covers a headlamp, tail lamp, or reflector, or operating a motor vehicle so equipped, includes equipment or material that only partially covers a headlamp, tail lamp, or reflector. Affirmed.

    • Krenz v. Cloverleaf Cold Storage, 2005 WL 2277285 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) *Unpublished

      Employer violated federal transportation-safety laws when its dispatcher told commercial driver to drive a shift without allowing him the ten preceding consecutive hours off duty. Because Employer violated federal transportation-safety laws, the court concludes that commercial driver had good cause per se to quit, that he was not required to report his complaint to his employer and give it yet another opportunity to respond to his complaint, and that he was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.

    • Kruckow v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2010)

      The commissioner of public safety was entitled to revoke the driver's license of a driver for driving while impaired. The driver argued that the revocation was improper because the police officer's certification of the test results appeared to have been dated before her urine tests results were known. Even if the officer's certification was defectively completed, other supporting documentation indicated certification was proper. The officer submitted to the commissioner his narrative report, the notice and order of revocation, and the breath test results, which indicated an alcohol concentration of .18, and the officer did not forward the information to the commissioner until after the test results were known and thus the driver was not prejudiced. Minn.Stat. § 169A.52.

    • Lund v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 783 N.W.2d 142 (2010)

      Motorist filed petition for judicial review of decision of the Commissioner of Public Safety revoking his driver's license in implied consent proceeding, based on motorist's arrest for driving while impaired. Prior to hearing on petition, motorist filed discovery motion seeking computer source code for breath-test device. The District Court, Mower County, denied motion and affirmed license revocation. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, 2009 WL 1587135, reversed and remanded. Subsequently, motorist sought taxation of costs and disbursements against Commissioner. The Court of Appeals allowed taxation of costs and disbursements, and Commissioner appealed. The Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity barred taxation of costs and disbursements against Commissioner. Reversed.

    • Pallas v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 781 N.W.2d 163 (2010)

      Driver sought review of decision of Commissioner of Public Safety, refusing to reinstate his Minnesota driver's license after Illinois permanently revoked his Illinois license. The District Court, Carver County, affirmed. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals held that Commissioner was not authorized to condition reinstatement of driver's Minnesota license upon driver's obtaining a letter clearing the lifetime revocation of his Illinois license. Reversed and remanded.

    • Risk v. Eastside Beverage, 664 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  It is "employment misconduct" under statutory provisions for disqualification of unemployment benefits for an employee, during working hours, to have an alcohol concentration level over the legal limit while driving his employer's vehicle, even if he neither was convicted under any criminal driving while under the influence (DWI) statute nor lost his driver's license under the implied consent statute.

    • Sirovy v. State, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2010)

      State statute providing that commercial drivers with Minnesota licenses will be disqualified from operating commercial motor vehicles when they violate specified federal regulations did not constitute unlawful delegation of state legislative authority to federal government. The Minnesota legislature could adopt extant federal law by reference. Moreover, the federal regulations that were incorporated into the statute had not changed since their incorporation. M.S.A. Const. Art. 1, § 1; Minnesota Statutes section 171.165, subd. 1.

    • State v. Greenman, 825 N.W.2d 387 (2013)

      Defendant charged with driving while impaired (DWI) in connection with his operation of electric personal assistive mobility device moved to dismiss. The District Court, Hennepin County, granted motion, and state appealed. The Court of Appeals, Chutich, J., held that two-wheeled, self-balancing, battery-powered device designed for use in places inaccessible to cars or bicycles, including interiors of buildings, did not constitute "motor vehicle" for purposes of DWI statute. Affirmed.

    • State v. Loeffel, 749 N.W.2d 115 (2008)

      Defendant entered a guilty plea, in the District Court, Nicollet County, to second-degree gross misdemeanor driving while impaired (DWI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that a prior civil driver's license revocation obtained under Wisconsin law, under which law a person suspected of driving under the influence is not entitled to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing, may be used in Minnesota as a qualified impaired driving incident, for purposes of statutorily enhancing a criminal driving while impaired charge to second-degree gross misdemeanor DWI. Affirmed.

    • State v. Patterson, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2013)

      Appellant challenges his two convictions of driving while impaired (DWI), arguing that his license was not previously revoked under the enhancement statute, that the jury was instructed incorrectly, that he was barred from presenting a relevant case, and that the district court erred in correcting the sentencing order. Because the enhancement statute recognizes revocation of reciprocal driving privileges as a prior revocation, and because the district court did not err in its jury instructions, ruling on the relevance of caselaw, or in correcting a clerical error, we affirm.

    • State v. Smith, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2014)

      On appeal from his conviction of driving while intoxicated (DWI), appellant argues that (1) the district court erred when it concluded that the stop of appellant's vehicle was supported by an honest suspicion of criminal activity that was both reasonable and articulable and (2) appellant's consent to an alcohol-concentration test was coerced. Affirmed.

    • State v. Sterling, 782 N.W.2d 579 (2010)

      Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence and subsequent waiver of his right to a jury trial, defendant was convicted by the District Court, Watonwan County, on stipulated facts of two counts of fourth-degree driving while impaired (DWI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] deputy could require motorist to submit to a blood or urine alcohol concentration test once deputy determined that breath testing machine malfunctioned, and [2] results of urine test were admissible despite later printout from breath testing machine. Affirmed.

    • Stevens v. Commissioner of Public Safety, --- N.W.2d ---- (2014)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  The commissioner of public safety revoked motorist's driver's license after she was arrested for driving while impaired (DWI) and refused to submit to chemical testing. Following motorist's appeal, the District Court, Hennepin County, sustained the revocation. Motorist again appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] sufficient evidence supported trial court's finding that motorist refused to submit to chemical testing; [2] unconstitutional-conditions doctrine did not apply to motorist's Fourth Amendment challenge to the implied-consent statute; [3] and even if the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine did apply, the implied-consent statute was not unconstitutional under the doctrine. Affirmed.

  • Mississippi
    • Click here to download all Mississippi cases

    • Gore v. State, --- So.3d ---- (2013)

      Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Webster County, of driving under the influence (DUI) as a first offense, and was sentenced to 48 hours in county jail, suspended subject to completion of six months of probation and additional conditions, and ordered to pay a fine of $520.50. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] results of breath alcohol test were admissible, and [2] defendant was not deprived of a protected property right. Affirmed.

    • Lumpkin v. Birdsong, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So.2d 230 (Miss. 1951)

      Driver employed by railroad to drive truck to transport other employees and tools to and from work was, in respect to use of truck, operating "a private commercial carrier" by motor vehicle used in furtherance of commercial enterprise of railroading for purpose of statute in regard to operator's licenses.

  • Missouri
    • Click here to download all Missouri cases

    • Addison v. Director of Revenue, 302 S.W.3d 735 (2010)

      Driver filed petition for review of Director of Revenue's decision to disqualify his commercial driving privileges for a second year. The Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Barbara W. Wallace, J., found that the Director of Revenue was restricted from imposing a double period of suspension and ordering the Director to reinstate license. Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, George W. Draper III, J., held that driver's one-year disqualification period could not be credited against subsequent one-year disqualification period. Reversed and remanded.

    • Akins v. Director of Revenue, 303 S.W.3d 563 (2010)

      After driver's driving privileges were denied, following his convictions for three counts of second degree vehicular assault, he sought review. The Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Shannon Renee Dougherty, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Richard B. Teitelman, J., held that driver's three convictions for vehicular assault did not constitute one conviction, under statute that required the director of revenue to deny driving privileges for ten years to “any person who has been convicted more than twice for offenses relating to driving while intoxicated,” even though the convictions all arose out of one incident; overruling Harper v. Director of Revenue, 118 S.W.3d 195. Affirmed.

    • Baber v. Director of Revenue, State, 317 S.W.3d 680 (2010)

      Driver sought judicial review of decision of the Director of Revenue disqualifying driver's commercial driving privilege following his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The Circuit Court, Platte County, Daniel M. Czamanske, J., reversed the disqualification, and Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, James M. Smart, Jr., J., held that suspension of base driver's license constituted a conviction for purposes of Commercial Driver's License Act meriting disqualification of commercial driving privileges. Reversed.

    • Bender v. Director of Revenue, 320 S.W.3d 167 (2010)

      Driver's license holder sought review of the Director of Revenue's decision to disqualify his driving privileges based on refusal to submit to a chemical test of his blood. The Circuit Court, Lincoln County, Ben Burkemper, J., upheld the decision. Driver's license holder appealed. The Court of Appeals, Clifford H. Ahrens, J., held that driver's license holder's submission to court-ordered search warrant for blood test did not preclude revocation for refusal to submit to test. Affirmed.

    • Bieker v. Director of Revenue, 345 S.W.3d 254 (2010)

      Automobile driver who had been arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and refused a breath test sought judicial review of Director of Revenue's revocation of driving privileges. The Circuit Court, Greene County, William R. Hass, Special Judge, found driver was not legally arrested and that officer did not have valid reasonable cause to believe driver was driving while intoxicated. Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, P.J., held that evidence was sufficient to support finding that police officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe driver was driving while intoxicated. Affirmed.

    • Bland v. Director of Revenue, 324 S.W.3d 451 (2010)

      Motorist sought review of administrative revocation of his driving privileges for refusal to submit to chemical testing. The Circuit Court, Shannon County, Sandra West, Associate Circuit Judge, reinstated motorist's license, and Director of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, Gary W. Lynch, J., held that officer had probable cause to believe that motorist was intoxicated. Reversed and remanded with directions.

    • Bone v. Director of Revenue, 404 S.W.3d 883 (2013)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Driver sought review of Director of Revenue's (DOR) suspension of his driver's license and the disqualification of him from holding a commercial driver's license (CDL) following his driving-while-intoxicated charge. The Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Robert G. Wilkins, J., found that statutes requiring suspension of driver's license and disqualification of CDL were unconstitutional. Director of Revenue appealed. The Supreme Court, Mary R. Russell, C.J., held that: [1] issues regarding constitutionality of statutes were tried by implied consent, and [2] statutes did not violate Spending Clause of the United States Constitution. Reversed.

    • Bouillon v. Director of Revenue, 306 S.W.3d 197 (2010)

      Director of Revenue appealed order of the Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Barbara W. Wallace, J., reinstating motorist's driving privileges. The Court of Appeals, Sherri B. Sullivan, J., held that: [1] evidence was sufficient to establish that officer had probable cause to believe that motorist was intoxicated, and [2] evidence was sufficient to support finding that motorist had recently driven vehicle. Reversed and remanded with directions.

    • Bowers v. Director of Revenue, 193 S.W.3d 887 (2006)

      Motorist sought review of decision of the Director of the Department of Revenue, issuing a 10-year license denial to motorist based on multiple convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Circuit Court, Newton County, Kevin L. Selby, J., ordered that Director set aside the denial of driving privileges and reinstate operator's license to motorist. Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, P.J., held that: [1] copy of motorist's DWI conviction supported Director's denial of motorist's license, and [2] motorist failed to refute driving record introduced by Director. Reversed and remanded with directions.

    • Bruce v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 323 S.W.3d 116 (2010)

      Motorist filed petition for review of decision by Director of Revenue revoking motorist's driving privileges based on her refusal to submit to a chemical test upon her arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The Circuit Court, Jackson County, Gregory B. Gillis, J., denied petition. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lisa White Hardwick, C.J., held that: [1] trial court's finding that officer had probable cause to arrest motorist for driving while intoxicated (DWI) was supported by evidence, and [2] there was sufficient evidence that motorist refused to submit to a chemical breath test.

    • Cardenas v. Director of Revenue, 339 S.W.3d 608 (2011)

      After licensee was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and refused to take an alcohol breath test, his driving privileges were revoked. Licensee appealed. The Circuit Court, Pulaski County, Tracy L. Storie, J., reinstated licensee's driving privileges. The Director of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, Robert S. Barney, P.J., held that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that police officer's testimony was not “competent” and was not admissible. Reversed and remanded.

    • Coble v. Director of Revenue, 323 S.W.3d 74 (2010)

      After the Director of Revenue revoked driver's driving privileges based on his failure to submit to a breath analysis, driver appealed. The Circuit Court, Greene County, Randall W. Shackelford, J., reinstated driver's driving privileges. The Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Robert S. Barney, P.J., held that: [1] driver's arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI) was not rendered invalid, for the purpose of civil license revocation proceeding, based on the fact that the arrest occurred more than 90 minutes after driver's accident, and [2] driver's arrest for DWI was not rendered invalid because driver was arrested by officers outside of the city limits. Reversed.

    • Covert v. Director of Revenue, 344 S.W.3d 272 (2011)

      Motorist filed petitions for judicial review, challenging administrative revocation of her driver's license for refusing to submit to chemical test of her blood alcohol concentration, and challenging suspension of her driver's license for having a blood alcohol concentration above .08. After consolidating the petitions, the Circuit Court, Franklin County, Stanley D. Williams, J., found that Director of Revenue could revoke motorist's license for refusing test, but set aside the order suspending motorist's license, on grounds that statutes required exclusion of blood alcohol evidence obtained pursuant to a court-issued warrant. Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Robert G. Dowd, Jr., J., held that: [1] motorist's license could be both revoked and suspended, and [2] results of motorist's court-ordered blood test were admissible at suspension proceedings. Reversed and remanded.

    • Davis v. Director of Revenue, 346 S.W.3d 319 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist whose license had been revoked following his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI) appealed revocation. The Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Mark T. Stoll, J., affirmed revocation. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Kenneth M. Romines, J., held that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that motorist was given time to contact an attorney after being read the implied consent warning. Affirmed.

    • Downs v. Director of Revenue, 344 S.W.3d 818 (2011)

      Licensee sought review of a decision from the Director of Revenue to suspend driving license for one year based on results of breath test taken after licensee was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The Circuit Court, Camden County, Bruce Colyer, J., entered judgment in favor of licensee and reinstated driving privileges. Director of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, J., held that licensee's breath test results were not rendered inadmissible by agency failure to complete transfer of breath alcohol program. Reversed and remanded.

    • Folkedahl v. Director of Revenue, 307 S.W.3d 238 (2010)

      Driver's license holder sought review of a decision from the Director of Revenue to suspend his driving privilege due to arrest for driving while intoxicated. The Circuit Court, Platte County, Daniel M. Czamanske, J., set aside the suspension. Director of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, Victor C. Howard, J., held that setting administrative hearing in wrong county was not a procedural defect that rendered trial de novo under Suspension and Revocation Administrative Procedure Act (SRAPA) unavailable. Reversed and remanded.

    • Grafeman v. Director of Revenue, 344 S.W.3d 861 (2011)

      Motorist sought review of decision of Director of Department of Revenue, suspending his driver's license for driving with an excessive blood-alcohol content (BAC). After granting motorist's motion to exclude results of BAC test that police had performed on motorist, the Circuit Court, Miller County, Kenneth L. Oswald, J., entered judgment reinstating motorist's license. Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Thomas H. Newton, J., held that permits to operate BAC testing equipment issued to police officers by Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) were valid. Reversed and remanded.

    • Holloway v. Director of Revenue, 324 S.W.3d 768 (2010)

      Motorist's driving privileges were revoked after she refused to submit to a chemical test to determine her blood alcohol content (BAC). Subsequently, the Circuit Court, Butler County, Thomas D. Swindle, J., entered judgment finding that officer had no reasonable grounds to believe motorist was driving while intoxicated. Director of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, William W. Francis, Jr., J., held that evidence was insufficient to establish that police officer had reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that motorist was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition. Affirmed.

    • Johnston v. Director of Revenue, 305 S.W.3d 465 (2010)

      Driver's license holder sought review of a decision from the Director of Revenue suspending his driver's license on basis of an out-of-state conviction for driving under the influence. The Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Barbara Wallace, J., upheld the decision. Driver's license holder appealed. The Court of Appeals, Roy L. Richter, J., held that driver's license holder could not collaterally challenge date of Kentucky DUI conviction, warranting suspension of license on notice of such conviction. Affirmed.

    • Linhardt v. Director of Revenue, 320 S.W.3d 202 (2010)

      Driver brought action against Director of Revenue, challenging the suspension of her driving privileges for failure to maintain financial responsibility. The Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Barbara Wallace, J., dismissed and remanded for an administrative hearing. Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Nannette A. Baker, J., held that trial court did not have authority to remand the case following determination that driver had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

    • Mason v. Director of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 426 (2010)

      After the director of revenue revoked licensee's driving privileges, licensee appealed. The Circuit Court, Camden County, Jack A. Bennett, J., reversed. The director appealed. [Holding:] The Court of Appeals, William W. Francis, Jr., J., held that the fact that licensee's arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) was unlawful, as the officer who arrested licensee did so outside of his city and county limits, had no negative ramifications for civil license revocation proceeding. Reversed and remanded.

    • Mayfield v. Director of Revenue, MO, 335 S.W.3d 572 (2011)

      Driver petitioned for reinstatement of his driver's license. The Circuit Court, Marion County, Robert M. Clayton, II, J., granted petition. The Director of Revenue appealed. The Court of Appeals, Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., P.J., held that driver's drug paraphernalia conviction precluded reinstatement of his driving privileges. Reversed and remanded.

    • Neal v. Director of Revenue, State, 312 S.W.3d 444 (2010)

      Driver whose license was revoked for failure to submit to breath test requested trial de novo. After refusing to grant the Director of Revenue's request for a continuance, the Circuit Court, Pulaski County, Colin Long, Associate Circuit Judge, ordered the driver's license reinstated, and Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Don E. Burrell, J., held that director was entitled to a continuance. Reversed and remanded.

    • Norris v. Director of Revenue, 304 S.W.3d 724 (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Driver sought review of decision of Director of Revenue to revoke driver's driving privileges. The Circuit Court, Dent County, Sanborn N. Ball, J., reinstated driving privileges. Director of Revenue appealed. The Supreme Court, Richard B. Teitelman, J., held that: [1] statutory 20–minute time period to attempt to contact an attorney begins immediately after the officer has informed the driver of the implied consent law, irrespective of whether the driver requested an attorney before or after an officer informs him of the implied consent law, abrogating Williams v. Dir. of Revenue, 277 S.W.3d 318, and Paxton v. Dir. of Revenue, 258 S.W.3d 68, and [2] driver's request to speak to an attorney after being given Miranda warning was sufficient to invoke 20–minute rule. Affirmed.

    • Prins v. Director of Revenue, 333 S.W.3d 17 (2010)

      Driver petitioned for a trial de novo after Director of Revenue suspended driver's driving privileges for allegedly driving while intoxicated (DWI). The Circuit Court, Benton County, Mark B. Pilley, J., granted driver's motion for sanctions on the basis of spoliation of evidence by disallowing the introduction of any evidence or testimony regarding driver's stop and arrest. Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Western District, Victor C. Howard, J., held that: [1] Spoliation doctrine was not a proper basis to exclude any of Director of Revenue's evidence regarding the stop and arrest of driver, and [2] Director of Revenue had no duty to produce videos of traffic stop as long as they were not available to Director. Reversed and remanded.

    • Pruitt v. Director of Revenue, 303 S.W.3d 658 (2010)

      Driver sought judicial review of decision by Director of Revenue to revoke driver's license for failure to submit to blood test of driver's alcohol level. The Circuit Court, Callaway County, Patrick A. Horner, J., reinstated driver's license, and Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Joseph M. Ellis, J., held that driver was required to submit to blood alcohol test or have her driving privileges suspended. Reversed and remanded.

    • Radmacher v. Director of Revenue, 405 S.W.3d 607 (2013)

      Driver sought review of Department of Revenue's disqualification of his privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle following his guilty plea to the charge of second-degree assault for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated resulting in injury. The Circuit Court, Cass County, Daniel Olsen, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, James Edward Welsh, C.J., held that evidence was sufficient to support disqualification of driver's commercial driver's license. Affirmed.

    • Rohlman v. Director of Revenue, 323 S.W.3d 459 (2010)

      Automobile licensee sought judicial review of 60–day suspension of driver's license. The Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Margaret McCartney, J., ordered the Director of Revenue to remove the 60–day suspension from licensee's driving record, and the Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, Clifford H. Ahrens, J., held that Director was statutorily obligated to suspend driver's license for a second time, for a period of 60 days. Reversed and remanded.

    • Ross v. Director of Revenue, 311 S.W.3d 732 (2010)

      Driver who had been convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) sought review of decision of Director of Revenue revoking his driver's license for refusing to submit to breath test. The Circuit Court, Platte County, Daniel M. Czamanske, J., upheld revocation of license. Driver appealed. On transfer from the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, Mary R. Russell, J., held that driver was "arrested" for purposes of statute governing revocation of driver licenses, and thus revocation of driver's license was proper. Affirmed.

    • Schneider v. Director of Revenue, 339 S.W.3d 533 (2011)

      After the director of revenue suspended licensee's driving privileges, licensee appealed. The Circuit Court, St. Charles County, Matthew E.P. Thornhill, J., affirmed. Licensee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Patricia L. Cohen, J., held that licensee's alcohol breath test results were admissible. Affirmed.

    • Sostman v. Director of Revenue, 363 S.W.3d 55 (2011)

      Commercial truck driver petitioned for review of suspension of his driving privileges. The Circuit Court, Franklin County, Stanley D. Williams, J., reversed. Director of Revenue appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., held that: [1] police officer had probable cause to believe that driver committed an alcohol-related traffic offense, and [2] evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that driver had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) over .08, warranting suspension of his driving privileges. Reversed and remanded.

    • State v. Chong-Aguirre, 413 S.W.3d 378 (2013)

      Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Newton County, Timothy W. Perigo, J., of first-degree drug trafficking. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Don E. Burrell, J., held that: [1] defendant failed to preserve issue of whether trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion to suppress evidence, and [2] evidence supported finding that defendant had possession of cocaine loaded on commercial truck, even though defendant was one of two co-drivers who had control of truck and access to the contents of the trailer. Affirmed.

    • Strup v. Director of Revenue, 311 S.W.3d 793 (2010)

      Motorist sought judicial review of decision of the Director of Revenue, disqualifying his commercial driving privilege for one year based on his arrest for driving while intoxicated with a blood alcohol content of .08% or more. The Circuit Court, Johnson County, Joseph P. Dandurand, J., entered order directing the director to reinstate motorist's commercial driving privilege. Director appealed. The Supreme Court, Zel M. Fischer, J., held that: [1] motorist's due process rights were not violated for failure to provide him with a pre-disqualification hearing, and [2] suspension of motorist's base driving privilege constituted a “conviction” of driving under the influence of alcohol which merited the disqualification. Reversed; disqualification of reinstated.

    • Weil v. Director of Revenue, 304 S.W.3d 768 (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Driver's license holder sought review of an order from the Director of Revenue to revoke his driving privileges for one year for refusal to take a breath test. The Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, Michael F. Stelzer, J., upheld the order. Driver's license holder appealed. The Court of Appeals, Roy L. Richter, J., held that failure to provide driver 20 minutes in which to contact attorney after reading implied consent law precluded license revocation. Reversed and remanded.

    • White v. Director of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298 (2010)

      Motorist petitioned for judicial review of the administrative suspension, by the Director of Revenue, of motorist's license to drive, which suspension was based on motorist's arrest on probable cause to believe he was driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or greater. After trial de novo, the Circuit Court, Henry County, Wayne Patrick Strothmann, J., reinstated motorist's driving privilege. Director appealed. Holdings: On transfer from the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, Patricia Breckenridge, J., held that: [1] in the Circuit Court, the Director of Revenue had the burden of production and the burden of persuasion, and the rules of civil procedure governed the trial de novo, overruling Berry v. Dir. of Revenue, 885 S.W.2d 326, Reinert v. Dir. of Revenue, 894 S.W.2d 162, Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1, Verdoorn v. Dir. of Revenue, 119 S.W.3d 543, Coyle v. Dir. of Revenue, 181 S.W.3d 62, York v. Dir. of Revenue, 186 S.W.3d 267, and Guhr v. Dir. of Revenue, 228 S.W.3d 581, and [2] Circuit Court's determination that state highway patrol sergeant lacked probable cause to arrest motorist for an alcohol-related offense was not against the weight of the evidence. Circuit Court affirmed.

    • Williams v. Director of Revenue, 335 S.W.3d 70 (2011)

      Motorist petitioned for review of decision of the Director of Revenue revoking his driving license based on an alleged refusal to submit to a breath or blood test. The Circuit Court, Benton County, Mark Brandon Pilley, J., reversed the Director's decision and reinstated motorist's driving privileges. Director appealed. The Court of Appeals, James Edward Welsh, J., held that ambiguities that occurred after motorist's alleged refusal to submit to a breath test were not grounds to reverse the Director's revocation of motorist's driving license. Reversed and remanded.

  • Montana
    • Click here to download all Montana cases

    • Anderson v. State, 339 Mont. 113 (2007)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist who was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) filed petition seeking reinstatement of his driver's license. The District Court, Ninth Judicial District, Toole County, Marc G. Buyske, P.J., denied petition. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Jim Rice, J., held that officer's misreading of implied consent law did not invalidate motorist's refusal to submit to breath test. Affirmed.

    • Brown v. State, 349 Mont. 408 (2009)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Driver petitioned for reinstatement of driver's license following refusal to submit to chemical testing under implied consent law. The Twelfth Judicial District Court, Hill County, John C. McKeon, J., denied reinstatement. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, James C. Nelson, J., held that: [1] there is no requirement that an investigating officer have a specific amount of experience in law enforcement to form a particularized suspicion or find probable cause, abrogating State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 631 P.2d 293, State v. Schatz, 194 Mont. 59, 634 P.2d 1193, and State v. Morsette, 201 Mont. 233, 654 P.2d 503, and [2] officer had reasonable grounds to believe that motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol. Affirmed.

    • Chain v. State, Dept. of Justice, Motor Vehicle Div., 322 Mont. 381 (2004)

      After driver's application for a driver's license was denied, due to driver's driving privileges being revoked in Michigan, he filed a complaint that requested that the Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division, grant his application. The District Court, Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, Ted O. Lympus, J., granted the Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division, summary judgment. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Patricia O. Cotter, J., held that the Department's decision to deny driver a Montana driver's license was not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

    • In re License Suspension of Cybulski, 343 Mont. 56 (2008)

      Motorist petitioned for reinstatement of her driver's license, which had been suspended after she refused to submit to a chemical test. After a hearing, the District Court, Sixteenth Judicial District, County of Custer, Gary L. Day, J., reinstated the motorist's driver's license. The state appealed. The Supreme Court, W. William Leaphart, J., held that: [1] deputy had particularized suspicion that motorist was driving under influence of alcohol, and [2] deputy had probable cause to arrest motorist for driving under influence of alcohol. Reversed.

    • In re Suspension of Driving Privilege of Alexanders, 322 Mont. 528 (2004)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Non-commercial driver filed a petition challenging the suspension of his driving privileges after sheriff deputy mistakenly completed and provided driver with suspension of commercial driver's license form, instead of non-commercial form. The 18th Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, Mike Salvagni, J., denied driver's petition. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, James C. Nelson, J., held that driver's refusal to submit to preliminary breath test (PBT) after being read non-commercial implied consent advisories was sufficient cause to suspend his driver's license. Affirmed.

    • Jess v. State ex rel. Records and Driver Control, 347 Mont. 381 (2008)

      Motorist petitioned for reinstatement of her drivers' license, which had been suspended after she refused to take a preliminary breath alcohol test. The District Court, Twenty–Second Judicial District, County of Stillwater, Blair Jones, J., denied the petition. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, W. William Leaphart, J., held that: [1] deputy retained his peace-officer power to arrest motorist for driving under the influence (DUI) even though deputy allegedly had not completed a peace-officer basic course by the time of the arrest, and [2] deputy had a particularized suspicion that motorist was driving under the influence, and thus motorist was not entitled to reinstatement of her drivers' license. Affirmed.

    • Muller v. State, Dept. of Justice, 364 Mont. 328 (2012)

      Motorist filed petition for reinstatement of driver's license that he had been automatically suspended under informed consent law by Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division. The 16th Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, Joe L. Hegel, J., denied reinstatement, and motorist appealed.The Supreme Court, Brian Morris, Presiding Judge, held that existing circumstances justified immediate, warrantless arrest for driving under influence (DUI), such that motorist's refusal to submit breath test required automatic suspension of driver's license. Affirmed.

    • Nichols v. Department of Justice, Driver's License Bureau, 359 Mont. 251 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Licensee sought review of decision of Department of Justice (DOJ), Driver's License Bureau suspending her driver's license. The District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, Ed McLean, Presiding Judge, denied petition to set aside suspension. Licensee appealed. The Supreme Court, Brian Morris, J., held that: [1] officer's request for breath test did not constitute unreasonable search or seizure; [2] officer's seizure of license did not constitute unreasonable seizure; and [3] implied consent laws did not unlawfully infringe on rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Affirmed.

    • Wagstaff v. Montana Dept. of Justice, Motor Vehicle Div., 323 Mont. 536 (2004)

      Dale Wagstaff (Wagstaff) appeals from the order entered by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, dismissing his petition for issuance of a probationary commercial driver's license. We affirm.

    • Weer v. State, 358 Mont. 130 (2010)

      Motorist petitioned for reinstatement of his drivers' license, which had been suspended after he refused to take a preliminary breath alcohol test after he was cited for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The District Court, County of Missoula, John W. Larson, Presiding Judge, denied petition. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Patricia O. Cotter, J., held that officer had sufficient facts to form a particularized suspicion to initiate an investigative stop. Affirmed.

  • Nebraska
    • Click here to download all Nebraska cases

    • Arndt v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 270 Neb. 172 (2005)

      Motorist's driver's license was revoked by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) following his arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Motorist appealed revocation. The District Court, Sarpy County, William B. Zastera, J., reversed. DMV appealed. The Supreme Court, Gerrard, J., held that sworn report submitted to director of DMV was insufficient to confer authority on him to revoke motorist's license administratively, as report was not prepared by the "arresting officer," pursuant to statutory requirement. Affirmed.

    • Caspers Const. Co. v. Nebraska State Patrol, 700 N.W.2d 587 (Neb. 2005)

      Neb.Rev.Stat. § 75-302(11) (Reissue 2003) defines "intrastate commerce" as "commerce between any place in this state and any other place in this state and not in part through any other state." "Motor carrier" is defined as "any person other than a regulated motor carrier who or which owns, controls, manages, operates, or causes to be operated any motor vehicle used to transport passengers or property over any public highway in this state." § 75-302(12).

    • Connelly v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 9 Neb.App. 708 (2000)

      Motorist sought judicial review of order of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), which revoked his driving privileges. The District Court, Douglas County, Sandra L. Dougherty, J., affirmed DMV's decision, and motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carlson, J., held that: (1) officer who questioned motorist and administered field sobriety tests was the "arresting officer," for purposes of regulation requiring arresting officer to testify at revocation hearing, and (2) motorist's due process rights were not violated by field training officer's failure to appear at hearing. Affirmed.

    • Freeman v. Neth, 18 Neb.App. 592 (2010)

      Motorist appealed revocation of his driver's license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The District Court, Buffalo County, John P. Icenogle, J., entered judgment reversing the DMV. The DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Moore, J., held that arresting officer's sworn report was not timely submitted to director of DMV as required to confer jurisdiction on DMV to revoke motorist's driver's license. Affirmed.

    • Kriz v. Neth, 19 Neb.App. 819 (2012)

      Motorist appealed from administrative decision revoking his driver's license. The District Court, Box Butte County, Leo Dobrovolny, J., affirmed, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Cassel, J., held that: [1] motorist was given reasonable time and opportunity to present evidence in driver's license revocation proceeding, and [2] it was not a violation of motorist's due process rights for the hearing officer not to ask for a continuance on her own motion. Affirmed.

    • Larkins v. Department of Motor Vehicles of State, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Officer's sworn report contained sufficient facts to establish, in license revocation proceeding, that motorist was operating or in physical control of vehicle. District court found that officer's report which stated, "stopped vehicle for speeding," was insufficient to establish that motorist was operating the vehicle. The notion that one's vehicle could be speeding without such person driving or operating the vehicle was illogical. Therefore, the sworn report was sufficient to establish that motorist was in control of the vehicle when it was stopped for speeding. Neb.Rev.St. § 60–498.01(3). Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Max Kelch, Judge. Motion for rehearing sustained. Original memorandum opinion withdrawn. Reversed and remanded with direction.

    • Law v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 18 Neb.App. 237 (2010)

      Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked licensee's driving privileges for one year after licensee was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and refused a chemical test. Licensee appealed. The District Court, Douglas County, J. Michael Coffey, J., reversed and vacated the order. DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Inbody, C.J., held that omission of second arresting officer's signature on sworn report as to licensee's refusal to submit to chemical test was technical deficiency that did not deprive DMV of jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded with directions.

    • Murray v. Neth, 279 Neb. 947 (2010)

      Motorist appealed revocation of his driver's license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The District Court, Scotts Bluff County, Randall L. Lippstreu, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, 17 Neb.App. 900, 773 N.W.2d 394, affirmed. Motorist filed petition for further review. The Supreme Court, Gerrard, J., held that: [1] Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) was authorized in administrative license revocation (ALR) proceeding to return the original sworn report to arresting officer for the purpose of soliciting a sworn addendum including information necessary to cure a jurisdictional deficiency, and [2] DMV's soliciting addendum to cure jurisdictional defect did not demonstrate that it was insufficiently impartial to fairly adjudicate charges. Affirmed.

    • O'Hara v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 14 Neb.App. 709 (2006)

      Motorist appealed from a decision of the District Court, Douglas County, Richard J. Spethman, J., that affirmed the revocation of motorist's driver's license by the state Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The Court of Appeals, Carlson, J., held that: [1] there was no proper revocation of motorist's driver's license from which motorist could appeal to District Court, and [2] order of administrative license revocation was not sufficient rendition of judgment to create revocation decision reviewable by District Court. Appeal dismissed, and cause remanded with directions.

    • Penry v. Neth, 20 Neb.App. 276 (2012)

      Driver sought judicial review of administrative revocation of her driver's license. The District Court, Lancaster County, Steven D. Burns, J., vacated and remanded administrative determination. Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed. The Court of Appeals, Moore, J., held that: [1] arresting officer's appearance in administrative license revocation (ALR) hearing by telephone was authorized by statute, and [2] allowing arresting officer to be sworn and to testify by telephone at ALR hearing did not violate driver's due process rights. Reversed and remanded with directions.

    • Polikov v. Neth, 699 N.W.2d 802 (Neb. 2005)

      The power to design a pretrial diversion program is a legislative function and that therefore, in enacting code sections that address the same, the Legislature did not run afoul of the separation of powers clause.

    • Sanderson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2006)

      The Department of Motor Vehicles (the Department) appeals the judgment of the district court for Madison County, which reversed the decision of the Department to revoke the driver's license of Kriss L. Sanderson for 1 year.

    • Searcey v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 12 Neb.App. 517 (2004)

      Motorist sought judicial review of a decision by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoking his driver's license. The District Court, Douglas County, Gregory M. Schatz, J., affirmed, and motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sievers, J., held that: [1] request for continuance on basis of arresting officer's unavailability failed to state facts sufficient to make a reasoned decision, but [2] denial of continuance would have resulted in substantial injustice. Affirmed.

    • State v. Arterburn, 276 Neb. 47 (2008)

      Defendants charged with driving under the influence (DUI) filed pleas in bar based on the disqualification of their commercial driver's licenses for one year. The County Court, Adams County, Jack R. Ott, J., overruled the pleas in bar. Defendants appealed. The District Court, Adams County, Stephen R. Illingworth, J., reversed. State appealed. The Supreme Court, Wright, J., held that: [1] prosecution for DUI, following disqualification of defendants' commercial driver's licenses, did not violate double jeopardy; [2] Legislature intended commercial license disqualification for DUI to be a civil sanction; and [3] commercial license disqualification for DUI was not so punitive in its purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature's intent to create a civil sanction. Judgments of District Court reversed, and causes remanded with directions.

    • Strong v. Neth, 267 Neb. 523 (2004)

      Commercial driver's license was administratively revoked by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Licensee appealed. The District Court, Scotts Bluff County, Randall L. Lippstreu, J., sustained the administrative revocation. Licensee appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Licensee filed petition for further review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court, Miller-Lerman, J., held that: [1] licensee's forfeiture of bond in lieu of appearance in Wyoming on charge of driving under the influence constituted “conviction” under Driver License Compact, and [2] licensee's conduct in Wyoming could be used to revoke his commercial driver's license in Nebraska. Affirmed.

    • Teeters v. Neth, 18 Neb.App. 585 (2010)

      Licensee sought review of Department of Motor Vehicles' revocation of her driver's license. The District Court, Dawson County, James E. Doyle IV, J., reversed. Department appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carlson, J., held that licensee was sufficiently identified in arresting officer's report as driver of vehicle so as to confer jurisdiction on Department to revoke driver's license. Reversed and remanded with directions.

    • Wilczewski v. Neth, 273 Neb. 324 (2007)

      Motorist applied for driver's license. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) denied application. Motorist appealed. The District Court, Douglas County, J. Michael Coffey, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, McCormack, J., held that motorist was not eligible for a driver's license until his fiveyear period of ineligibility to drive in another state had ended. Affirmed.

    • Yelli v. Neth, 16 Neb.App. 639 (2008)

      Commercial truck driver appealed the revocation of his commercial driver's license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The District Court, Stanton County, Robert B. Ensz, J., affirmed the revocation, and driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sievers, J., held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

  • Nevada
    • Click here to download all Nevada cases

    • Cramer v. State, DMV, 240 P.3d 8 (2010)

      In Case Number 53248, motorist petitioned for judicial review from decision by Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke his driver's license based on his arrest for driving under influence (DUI). The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, David Wall, J., affirmed revocation and motorist appealed. In Case Number 53380, motorist petitioned for judicial review following revocation of her driver's license following her arrest for DUI. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Mark R. Denton, J., ordered her driver's license reinstated, and Department appealed. Holdings: On consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court, Hardesty, J., held that: [1] hearing officer lacked discretion to admit expert affidavit of forensic scientist who had not been qualified as expert by district court, and [2] stipulation in unrelated criminal case as to expert's qualification to testify in that case did not comply with requirement on motorist's administrative appeal that expert affidavit be submitted by expert who had been qualified by district court. Judgment in Case Number 53248 reversed and remanded with instructions; judgment in Case Number 53380 affirmed.

    • Gutierrez v. First Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of..., Slip Copy (2013)

      This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenges a district court order denying a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which petitioner contended that the probable cause determination was insufficient due to an evidentiary error during the preliminary hearing. In particular, petitioner argues that the affidavit of the forensic specialist who tested petitioner's blood alcohol content was deficient because the forensic specialist was not qualified as an expert under NRS 50.320 and therefore the affidavit was inadmissible at the preliminary hearing. We disagree.

    • Laughlin v. State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Slip Copy (2010)

      Driver petitioned for review of revocation by Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) of his driving privileges. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Mark R. Denton, J., denied petition. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court held that ALJ did not improperly act as prosecutor. Affirmed.

    • Luce v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety, Slip Copy (2011)

      This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial review in a Department of Motor Vehicles driver's license revocation action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Doug Smith, Judge.

    • NAC 483.800 Federal regulations: Adoption by reference of..., NV ADC 483.800

      The Department hereby adopts by reference the provisions of 49 C.F.R. Parts 383 and 384 as they existed on October 1, 2004, and any subsequent amendments. Each amendment shall be deemed approved by the Department unless it disapproves the amendment within 60 days after the United States Department of Transportation has adopted such an amendment.

    • State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Johnson, 124 Nev. 1509 (2008)

      Motorist sought judicial review of administrative decision revoking his driving privileges. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Kenneth C. Cory, J., reversed the administrative order, and the Department of Motor Vehicles appealed. The Supreme Court held that: [1] trooper's hearsay statements should have been excluded, and [2] without the hearsay statements, substantial evidence did not support DUI adjudicator's decision to revoke motorist's license. Affirmed.

    • State, DMV v. Taylor-Caldwell, 229 P.3d 471 (2010)

      Licensee sought review of decision of administrative law judge (ALJ) affirming decision of Department of Motor Vehicles revoking her driver's license following a single test to determine the concentration of alcohol in licensee's breath. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Michelle Leavitt, J., reversed. State appealed. The Supreme Court, Douglas, J., held that revocation statute only required a single breath test to be over the legal limit in order to revoke license. District Court reversed.

    • State v. Elefante, 281 P.3d 1221 (2009)

      Motorist requested an administrative hearing to review a three-year revocation of his driver's license after he was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) for the third time in seven years. An administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the three-year revocation. Motorist petitioned for judicial review. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, James M. Bixler, J., granted the petition and reversed the ALJ's decision. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed. The Supreme Court held that DMV was required to revoke motorist's driving privileges for 90 days, not for three years. Affirmed.

    • State v. Hill, 281 P.3d 1221 (2009)

      Motorist, who had a prior driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) conviction on his record, and was convicted a second time of DUI as first time offender, sought reduction in revocation of his drivers license from one year to 90 days. The Ninth Judicial District Court, Douglas County, Michael P. Gibbons, J., vacated the administrative decision. State appealed. The Supreme Court, held that revocation of motorist's license was limited to period of 90 days, rather than one year. Affirmed.

    • State v. Meinhold-Thomas, 281 P.3d 1221 (2009)

      This is an appeal from a district court order granting a petition for judicial review in a driver's license revocation proceeding. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kenneth C. Cory, Judge.

    • Weaver v. State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494 (2005)

      Motorist petitioned for judicial review of Department of Motor Vehicles' (DMV) administrative revocation of his driver's license, based on result of blood alcohol test. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Ronald D. Parraguirre, J., denied the petition. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court held that: [1] officer who ordered blood alcohol test had reasonable grounds to believe motorist had been driving or in actual physical control of vehicle while intoxicated; [2] administrative law judge did not improperly shift burden of proof to motorist by allegedly requiring him to prove that he had not consumed alcohol before driving his vehicle; and [3] procedural due process requires that in administrative driver's license revocation proceedings, motorists must be permitted to submit evidence that they consumed alcohol only after driving. Affirmed.

    • Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536 (2002)

      Defendant was convicted in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Mark W. Gibbons, J., of six counts of driving with a prohibited substance in the blood or urine, one count of use of a controlled substance, and one count of possession of a controlled substance. She appealed. The Supreme Court, Leavitt, J., held that: (1) prohibited substance statute is constitutional; (2) conviction under prohibited substance theory did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause; (3) trial court properly instructed jury on proximate cause; and (4) independent laboratory's failure to refrigerate defendant's blood sample did not violate her due process rights. Affirmed.

    • Wright v. State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 122 (2005)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist petitioned for judicial review of Department of Motor Vehicles' (DMV) revocation of his license to drive. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, David Wall, J., denied the petition. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court held that: [1] factors for requesting evidentiary test for blood alcohol concentration, under implied consent law, are not limited to an officer smelling alcohol on the motorist's breath and the officer observing that the motorist has bloodshot eyes; [2] officer had reasonable grounds for requesting evidentiary test; and [3] officer's certification of cause for revocation was sufficient. Affirmed.

  • New Hampshire
  • New Jersey
    • Click here to download all New Jersey cases

    • State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008)

      States that in 1990, the New Jersey Commercial Driver License Act was enacted. And that it created an even more stringent standard to be applied to drivers of commercial vehicles which provides a penalty, in addition to any other applicable penalties, of a one to three-year commercial license suspension for commercial drivers caught driving with a BAC level of 0.04 percent or greater. The 0.04 percent BAC standard for commercial drivers was enacted both to comply with the federal standard in the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 and in recognition of the fact that significant impairment occurred well below the otherwise applicable 0.10 percent BAC levels.

    • State v. Nunnally, 420 N.J.Super. 58, 18 A.3d 1044 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2011)

      A driver arrested only for operation of a commercial motor vehicle by a driver with a prohibited alcohol concentration (CDL DUI) cannot be charged with general refusal based on that arrest.

    • State v. Pompa, 414 N.J.Super. 219, 997 A.2d 1107 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2010)

      State trooper was entitled to conduct administrative inspection of defendant's tractor trailer pursuant to closely regulated business exception to warrant requirement, given applicable federal regulations governing tractor trailers, and thus, trooper's inspection was permitted and authorized entry into tractor trailer's sleeper cabin since federal regulations extended that far. New Jersey has interest in guaranteeing safety of drivers on its roadways, and to that end, warrantless administrative inspections of tractor trailers further that interest by ensuring that largest vehicles on state roads are safe for transit and in compliance with established regulations.

  • New Mexico
    • Click here to download all New Mexico cases

    • Dominguez v. State of New Mexico Taxation and Revenue..., Not Reported in P.3d...

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Driver's failure to give a second breath sample two hours after the first one did not amount to a refusal under the Implied Consent Act (ICA) that warranted the revocation of his license. The driver was arrested under the suspicion that he was driving while intoxicated. He agreed to a breath test and gave the first sample, but afterwards the machine indicated that it was out of tolerance. By the time it was fixed two hours later, the driver refused to give a second sample. His failure to give a second sample did not amount to a refusal because, under the ICA, he was only required to give two samples within 15 minutes. NMAC 7.33.2.12(B)(1).

    • Moffitt v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dept. of Taxation and Revenue, Not Reported in P.3d (2010)

      Driver received adequate notice of his license revocation hearing, even though he did not actually receive notice of the hearing. Actual notice was not required in administrative license hearings, and the Motor Vehicle Division took actions that were reasonably calculated to provide notice of the hearing by sending notice by certified mail to the driver's counsel. The fact that it was never picked up did not mean that the Division failed to give reasonable notice of the hearing.

    • State v. Smith, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (N.M. 2004)

      Stating that during its 2003 session, the state legislature passed three bills to amend Section 66-8-102, the DWI statute. On March 19, 2003, the governor signed House Bill (HB) 250, 2003 Leg., 46th Sess. (N.M.2003), 2003 N.M. Laws, ch. 51, § 10, which lowered the limit for commercial drivers' blood or breath alcohol concentration to .04, and repeated, without change, the existing penalty provisions of Section 66-8-102(G).

  • New York
  • North Carolina
  • North Dakota
    • Click here to download all North Dakota cases

    • Bienek v. Department of Transp., 736 N.W.2d 492 (N.D. 2007)

      Department of Transportation's suspension of licensee's noncommercial driving privileges following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) was a "conviction," so as to support lifetime suspension of licensee's commercial driving privileges after his second DUI conviction, although licensee had accepted the suspension of his driving privileges prior to dismissal of the DUI charge. The word "conviction" was defined, in part, as a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in an authorized administrative tribunal, and Department's decision to suspend licensee's driving privileges was a determination made by an authorized administrative tribunal. NDCC 39-06.2-02(8), 39-06.2-10(8).

    • Dawson v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 830 N.W.2d 221 (2013)

      Driver sought review of decision of the Department of Transportation (DOT) to suspend his driving privileges for two years for driving under the influence of alcohol. The District Court, Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, Gail H. Hagerty, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Maring, J., held that: [1] witnesses' out-of-court statements regarding the time accident occurred were not admissible under present sense impression exception to hearsay, and [2] DOT's failure to establish time of driving precluded suspension. Reversed and remanded.

    • Hamre v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 842 N.W.2d 865 (2014)

      Truck driver sought judicial review of decision of Department of Transportation (DOT) disqualifying truck driver's commercial driver's license for one year. The District Court, Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, Harlan Patrick Weir, J., affirmed. Truck driver appealed. Holdings: The Supreme Court, Crothers, J., held that: [1] truck driver's specification of error stating that DOT erroneously applied statutory chapter governing commercial driver's licenses was minimally sufficient; [2] for purposes of statute requiring disqualification of commercial driver's licenseholder due to first conviction of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), administrative suspension of truck driver's noncommercial driving privileges following arrest for DUI was “conviction”; [3] statute requiring disqualification of commercial driver's licenseholder from operating commercial motor vehicle for one year due to first DUI conviction was not void for vagueness; and [4] truck driver was not entitled to attorney fees. Affirmed.

    • Lentz v. Spryncznatyk, 708 N.W.2d 859 (N.D. 2006)

      Statute providing for lifetime suspension of commercial driving privileges if licensee suffers a second conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) while operating a noncommercial motor vehicle was not applied retroactively, by Department of Transportation, to a licensee, for purposes of state's statutory presumption against retroactive application of legislation, though the licensee's first DUI offense had occurred before effective date of lifetime suspension provision, where the triggering offense, i.e., the second DUI conviction, occurred after the provision's effective date. NDCC 1-02-10, 39-06.2-10(8).

  • Ohio
    • Click here to download all Ohio cases

    • Eastlake v. Komes, Slip Copy (2010)

      After driver was found not guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence, driver sought to reverse administrative license suspension. The Willoughby Municipal Court, No. 09 TRC 00211, terminated the suspension. City appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lake County, held that driver was not informed of the consequences of refusing breath test, and was entitled to termination of administrative license suspension. Affirmed.

    • In re D.E., Not Reported in N.E.2d (2010)

      Juvenile court abused its discretion by imposing a 90-year suspension on the ability of a juvenile, adjudicated delinquent for committing acts consisting of the offense of aggravated vehicular homicide, to apply for a driver's license. While the aggravated vehicular homicide statute contained a provision for license suspensions to include a lifetime suspension, the juvenile code provided no indication that the limited jurisdiction of the juvenile court was extended for the purpose of imposing a lifetime suspension. R.C. 2152.01(C)(6).

    • Parma v. Benedict, Slip Copy (2013)

      Appellant appealed from his conviction in the Parma Municipal Court for operating a vehicle while intoxicated ("OVI"). He argued that the trial court impermissibly applied provisions of the law that had changed from the time of his criminal conduct to the time of his sentence. He also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and law, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence.

    • State v. Allen, Slip Copy (2010)

      A police officer's failure to notarize an administrative license suspension (ALS) form as required by state law did not render the suspension invalid. The police officer pulled over a defendant, administered a series of field sobriety tests, and administered a chemical test. After the test revealed that the defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was .204%, the police officer advised her that her license was suspended and gave the defendant an unsworn copy of the ALS form. The police officer failed to notarize the ALS form before submitting it to the Registrar and trial court. However the form and the state law on which it was based specifically stated that if found to be at or over the prohibited amount of alcohol a person's driving privileges would be suspended immediately, indicating that the defendant's driving privileges were suspended the moment the chemical test revealed a BAC of .204%. R.C. 4511.197(C).

    • State v. Arrazzaq, Slip Copy (2012)

      After his motion to suppress was denied, defendant-appellant Ulema Arrazzaq pleaded no contest to trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, carrying a concealed weapon, and having a weapon while under a disability. Both drug offenses carried firearm specifications. In one assignment of error, he claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. While the Court of Appeals disagreed with Arrazzaq's position on the motion to suppress, an error in his sentence required them to vacate his sentence in part and remand the case for correction of the sentencing error.

    • State v. Benjamin, Slip Copy (2011)

      Akie H. Benjamin appealed the trial court's denial of his Motion to Vacate Void Sentence Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(4). Benjamin contended that his sentence was void because the trial court failed to impose a statutorily mandated driver's license suspension, and thus, he was entitled to a resentencing hearing. Because the trial court failed to impose a statutorily mandated driver's license suspension, Benjamin's sentence is void, and the trial court must resentence Benjamin. However, the Court of Appeals limited Benjamin's resentencing hearing to the proper imposition of the statutorily mandated driver's license suspension.

    • State v. Boafor, Slip Copy (2013)

      Defendant-appellant Timothy Boafor appealed from the judgment of Mahoning County Court No. 4, which imposed a ninety-day license suspension after accepting a no contest plea to speeding at a rate of 77 mph in a 65 mph zone. First, appellant argued that a license suspension could not be imposed under R.C 4510.15 because this speeding charge could not be categorized as "relating to reckless operation." Second, appellant contended that he could only be convicted of a minor misdemeanor because the traffic ticket did not charge a third degree misdemeanor or mention predicate offenses. For the following reasons, the Court of Appeals concluded that both arguments had merit. Appellant's license suspension was vacated and his speeding conviction was to be modified to reflect only a minor misdemeanor.

    • State v. Brabant, Slip Copy (2011)

      Trial court did not err in denying a driver's appeal from an administrative license suspension for refusing a requested chemical breath test subsequent to his arrest for operating a vehicle under the influence. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crash, despite the driver's claim that he consumed alcohol after the crash. The abundant inconsistencies in the driver's story, coupled with the arresting officer's training and experience, provided the officer, who made the arrest at the driver's home after the driver left the scene, with reasonable grounds to believe the driver had violated the statute prohibiting driving under the influence. R.C. §§ 4511.19, 4511.197(A).

    • State v. Eaton, Slip Copy (2010)

      A defendant's refusal to take a chemical test following his arrest on suspicion of operating a vehicle while intoxicated was not involuntary. Defendant, who was driving a commercial vehicle at the time of his arrest, was asked to submit to a chemical test and informed in a recorded conversation that if he refused to submit, his license would be automatically suspended. The officer informed defendant that the legal limit for commercial drivers was .02 when it was actually .04, but still informed defendant as to the consequences of his refusal. The officer specifically informed the defendant of regulations applicable to commercial drivers, and asked defendant to follow along. The officer informed defendant that he could not help him make the decision, and that the defendant would have to decide on his own. R.C. § 4506.15(A)(2).

    • State v. Gant, Slip Copy (2013)

      This is an appeal from a judgment of the Maumee Municipal Court, which found appellant guilty of reckless operation. Appellant was clocked on radar by the Ohio State Highway Patrol traveling at 94 m.p.h. in a 70 m.p.h. zone on the Ohio Turnpike in Lucas County, Ohio. At sentencing, the trial court suspended appellant's driver's license for a period of sixty days, and imposed a fine and court costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.

    • State v. Haralson, Slip Copy (2013)

      Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from the Warren County Court of Common Pleas decision terminating the driver's license suspension of defendant-appellee, Tyrone Haralson, following Haralson's conviction for trafficking in marijuana. Reversed and remanded.

    • State v. Henry, 191 Ohio App.3d 151 (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was convicted in the Bowling Green Municipal Court, No. 09TRC04543, of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content. He appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] police officer's failure to retain slip from instrument check on breath testing machine did not warrant suppression of blood-alcohol test results from machine; [2] arresting officer's failure to warn defendant of the consequences of refusing an alcohol test or of an unlawful result upon defendant's commercial driver's license (CDL) did not warrant suppression of test results; and [3] results of blood-alcohol test performed using portable breath testing machine were admissible. Affirmed.

    • State v. Hutchings, Slip Copy (2013)

      Defendant-appellant, Mark R. Hutchings, appealed from the trial court's journal entry of sentencing, which included the suspension of his Michigan driver's license. Affirmed and remanded.

    • State v. Jenkins, Slip Copy (2010)

      A police officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a defendant was driving under a suspended license and was not within his limited driving privileges to conduct a traffic stop. Therefore the defendant was not entitled to suppress evidence related to the traffic stop. The officer observed the defendant speeding and was subsequently informed by dispatch that the defendant had limited driving privileges and was driving away from his home. OH Const. Art. 1, § 14; R.C. 4510.11.

    • State v. Knowlton, 971 N.E.2d 395 (2012)

      Defendant was convicted in the Marietta Municipal Court of operating a motor vehicle while impaired, failure to control, and failure to stop after an accident involving the property of others. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] evidence was sufficient to support conviction for failure to stop; [2] the trial court was not authorized to suspend defendant's driver's license as part of his failure to stop conviction; and [3] counsel's failure to make additional arguments in support of acquittal of the failure to stop charge did not prejudice defendant. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

    • State v. Ledley, Slip Copy (2010)

      Trial court abused its discretion when it suspended driver's driver's license after driver pled guilty to a violation under a statute that did not give the court the authority to suspend a driver's license. Driver was driving along a wet roadway when she failed to stop at a stop sign at the intersection and "clipped" a street sign, damaging it.

    • State v. Lewis, 187 Ohio App.3d 701 (2010)

      Motorist was charged with driving under influence (OVI), making improper turn, and failing to reinstate license. The Municipal Court, No. 09TRC-21296A, entered guilty verdict on traffic offenses, and not guilty verdict on OVI charge, and terminated administrative license suspension that was imposed following motorist's refusal to submit to chemical test. City appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hamilton County, held that not guilty verdict on charge for OVI did not permit termination of automatic administrative suspension of motorist's driver's license for having refused to submit to chemical test. Reversed and remanded.

    • State v. Manocchio, 138 Ohio St.3d 292 (2014)

      Motorist whose driver's license was subject to lifetime suspension filed motion for limited driving privileges. The Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, No. CR-435289, granted the motion, and state appealed. The Court of Appeals, 2012 WL 6061380, affirmed. State filed discretionary appeal. The Supreme Court held that: [1] granting of limited driving privileges was not a "modification" of the suspension, but [2] trial court was required to specify a purpose and place for the driving privileges. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

    • State v. McElfresh, Slip Copy (2012)

    • State v. McPhillamy, Slip Copy (2012)

      Defendant-appellant, Brad McPhillamy, appeals the July 5, 2011 judgment of the Erie County Municipal Court which denied his request for an administrative license suspension hearing. The Court of Appeals found that the request was untimely. Affirmed.

    • State v. Ritchie, Slip Copy (2011)

      Defendant's sentence of eight years in prison and suspended driving privileges for ten years starting after the prison term ended for his conviction of aggravated vehicular homicide was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Although defendant's punishment would span eighteen years and the maximum prison term was eight years, the court was also required to impose a suspension of defendant's driver's license from anywhere from three years to life. Moreover, nothing in the Sentencing Guidelines prohibited the court from requiring the suspension to be served consecutive to the prison term. R.C. §§ 2929.14(A)(2), 2903.06(B)(3).

    • State v. Sheppeard, Slip Copy (2013)

      Defendant appealed from his conviction of operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol ("OVI") and failure to stop after an accident, both first-degree misdemeanors, claiming that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, that the court erred in "changing its ALS [administrative license suspension] appeal ruling," and that his sentences were excessive and constituted a punishment for exercising his right to a jury trial. Affirmed.

    • State v. Starkey, 985 N.E.2d 295 (2012)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). The Municipal Court, Portage County, Ravenna Division, No. R2011 TRC 16356, granted defendant's motion to suppress results of urine test that had been conducted at scene of fatal accident involving defendant's commercial vehicle. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Portage County, held that: [1] police officers conducted test in violation of implied consent law; but [2] statutory violation did not require suppression of test results; and [3] trial court was required to determine whether defendant voluntarily consented to test. Reversed and remanded.

    • State v. Tweddell, Slip Copy (2010)

      Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). The Municipal Court, Portage County, Ravenna Division, No. R2011 TRC 16356, granted defendant's motion to suppress results of urine test that had been conducted at scene of fatal accident involving defendant's commercial vehicle. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Portage County, held that: [1] police officers conducted test in violation of implied consent law; but [2] statutory violation did not require suppression of test results; and [3] trial court was required to determine whether defendant voluntarily consented to test. Reversed and remanded.

    • State v. Vascik, Slip Copy (2011)

      Trial court did not improperly sentence defendant convicted of driving while intoxicated when it suspended her operator's license for 365 days and ordered to display restricted yellow license plates and have an ignition interlock device installed on her vehicle as a condition of obtaining limited driving privileges during the term of her suspension. Defendant argued that she was a school teacher with no previous alcohol-related offenses, or any other traffic violations, and no criminal record. She argued that it was unfair to add penalties to her sentence for not submitting to a blood alcohol test. But defendant's sentence was within statutorily prescribed limits, and the record did not include a transcript of defendant's sentencing hearing. R.C. §§ 4511.19(A)(1)(a), 4510.02(A) (5), 4510.021(A), 4510.021(C).

    • Westlake v. Gerber, Slip Copy (2011)

      Trial court erred in finding that a driver's refusal to take an alcohol test triggered an administrative license suspension when a police officer had no reasonable articulable suspension to pull the driver's car over. Police officer claimed that he pulled driver over for weaving in his lane. However, review of video from the police officer's dashboard camera revealed that the defendant was not weaving and the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to pull the driver over. Because the trial court concluded that the stop was unlawful, the request that the driver submit to chemical testing and the suspension of his driver's license for refusal to do so was likewise unlawful.

  • Oklahoma
    • Click here to download all Oklahoma cases

    • Gilworth v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 241 P.3d 1164 (2010)

      Motorist whose driver's license had been revoked for one year on basis that he had previously had his license revoked within ten years of the arrest giving rise to his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) filed request to modify the revocation. The District Court, Oklahoma County, denied request. Motorist appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying modification of one-year driver's license suspension. Affirmed.

    • Hedrick v. Commissioner of Dept. of Public Safety, 315 P.3d 989 (2013)

      After Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked driver's license following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and other intoxicants, driver filed petition appealing revocation. The District Court, McClain County, dismissed driver's petition. He appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Driver petitioned for writ of certiorari and the Supreme Court granted writ. Holdings: The Supreme Court held that: [1] Supreme Court would take judicial notice of statute providing that photocopies were to be considered originals and admissible; [2] certified copy of DPS's order was not required to perfect driver's appeal; and [3] driver's 30–day deadline to file appeal began to run ten days after date DPS mailed order. Court of Civil Appeals opinion vacated, and trial court reversed and remanded.

    • Jobe v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 243 P.3d 1171 (2010)

      Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Rogers County, of driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed, contending that allowing state to punish him through criminal prosecution after administratively revoking his driver's license impermissibly exposed defendant to double jeopardy. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that administrative revocation of defendant's driver's license under implied consent statutes did not constitute “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes and, thus, subsequent prosecution of defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol did not violate double jeopardy clause of State and Federal Constitutions. Ordered accordingly.

    • Kane v. State, 915 P.2d 932 (1996)

      Driver's licensee sought review of a decision from the Department of Public Safety revoking his driver's license for a period of three years following his third alcohol-related offense committed within a five-year period. The District Court, Cleveland County, reduced the revocation period to one year. On the Department's appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the one-year revocation. On certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the licensee's first revocation occurred when he actually lost driving privileges, which was within five years of his third revocation. The Court of Civil Appeals judgment vacated, and the District Court judgment reversed.

    • Mize v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 393 F.Supp.2d 1223 (W.D.Okla. 2005)

      Motorist who alleged that he suffered injury by operation of a motor carrier and that motor carrier was required to be and was, in fact, insured by insurer stated a claim against insurer under Oklahoma statute which created a direct cause of action by a person injured by operation of a motor carrier against the motor carrier's insurer, provided that the motor carrier was insured. 47 Okl.St.Ann § 230.30.

    • Pierce v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 327 P.3d 530 (2014)

      Motorist petitioned for review administrative suspension of driver's license following arrest for driving under influence (DUI). The District Court set aside suspension order and reinstated motorist's driving privileges. Appeal was taken, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. Certiorari review was granted. The Supreme Court held that: [1] delay of 20 months in conducting administrative suspension hearing violated motorist's state constitutional right to speedy remedy in civil action, and [2] trial court had jurisdiction to consider motorist's claim that 20–month delay in suspension hearing violated state constitutional right to speedy remedy, even if claim was not asserted in administrative proceedings. Opinion of Court of Civil Appeals vacated; judgment of District Court affirmed.

    • Price v. Reed, 725 P.2d 1254 (1986)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Implied consent law was challenged on grounds that it violated a constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy by subjecting licensee to retrial of criminal offense or to multiple punishments for its commission, and constituted impermissible encroachment either on executive or legislative branches upon powers constitutionally ascribed to judiciary. The District Court, Custer County, declared the "implied consent" provisions to be violative of State Constitution and reinstated driver's license which had been reversed. The Commissioner of the State Department of Public Safety appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) acquittal upon criminal charge of being in actual, physical control of vehicle while under the influence of alcohol raises no constitutional barrier to regulatory proceeding for revocation of driver's license, and (2) implied consent law was not tainted by unconstitutional encroachment upon powers of judiciary. Reversed and remanded.

    • State v. Hooley, 269 P.3d 949 (2012)

      Defendant, who had been charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI), filed motion to suppress the case, arguing that the district attorney was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of whether her stop and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, because the District Court, on defendant's prior appeal of Department of Public Safety's (DPS's) administrative revocation of her driver's license, had ruled that her stop and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court, Oklahoma County, granted the motion. State appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that in a matter of first impression, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply to preclude district attorney from litigating Fourth Amendment issue. Reversed and remanded.

    • Tate v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 268 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2001)

      Former employee who took medication to control focal seizures was not qualified for his position operating a commercial motor vehicle (CMV), as required for his prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. Although employee could perform the essential functions of a CMV operator while taking the prescribed dosage of medication, the fact that he had to take medication to control focal seizures necessarily rendered him unable to meet a job-related requirement of the employment position established under the Department of Transportation's (DOT) standards. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 101(8), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8); 49 C.F.R. §§ 390.3(d), 391.41(b)(8).

  • Oregon
    • Click here to download all Oregon cases

    • Bianco v. Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Div., 257 Or.App. 446 (2013)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist sought review of decision of administrative law judge (ALJ), on behalf of Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV), suspending his driving privileges under implied-consent law. The Circuit Court, Clackamas County, Deanne L. Darling, J., set aside administrative order, and DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schuman, P.J., held that: [1] administrative rule which requires the DMV to reschedule as soon as practicable an implied-consent hearing if a subpoenaed police officer is unable to appear does not require that the rescheduled hearing also be held as soon as practicable, and [2] rescheduling order was required to offer some explanation for second set-over of implied-consent hearing.

    • Burdette v. Miller, 243 Or.App. 423 (2011)

      Driver whose vehicle was struck by a dump truck brought a personal-injury action against truck driver and trucking company. After repeated, unsuccessful efforts to depose truck driver, plaintiff driver filed a motion for sanctions. The Circuit Court, Multnomah County, Jerry B. Hodson, J., held a hearing, granted the motion, and entered an order striking truck driver's defenses and adjudging him liable for plaintiff driver's injuries as a matter of law. Eventually, plaintiff driver dismissed his claims against trucking company, and judgment was entered against truck driver after a jury trial on damages. Truck driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Haselton, P.J., held that: [1] record supported a finding that truck driver's failures to appear at his noticed depositions were willful, and [2] trial court could strike truck driver's defenses as a sanction.

    • Owens v. Motor Vehicles Div., 319 Or. 259, 875 P.2d 463 (Or. 1994)

      With respect to whether the accuracy of the result of a chemical breath test administered to determine the blood alcohol content of a driver, who has been arrested for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), may be challenged (impeached) if the person who administers the test is qualified to administer the test under ORS 813.160 and if the methods, procedures, and equipment used in the test comply with the requirements of ORS 813.160, the Court held that it may not.

    • Richardson v. Oregon Dept. of Transp., Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 253 Or.App. 456 (2012)

      Motorist brought action seeking review of orders of Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) of the Oregon Department of Transportation, suspending motorist's driving privileges based on motorist's failure to pay 17 traffic fines incurred between 1996 and 1997. The Circuit Court, Clackamas County, Susie L. Norby, J., reversed. DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hadlock, J., held that: [1] DMV was not precluded from considering motorist's defense that his driving privileges could not be suspended twice for failure to pay same fines, and [2] motorist's driving privileges could not be suspended twice for failure to pay same fines.

    • State v. Moore, --- P.3d ---- (2013)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant who was charged with criminally negligent homicide moved to suppress results of warrantless testing of his blood and urine following the fatal car accident. The Circuit Court, Tillamook County, Mari Garric Trevino, J., granted motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 247 Or.App. 39, 269 P.3d 72. State's petition for review was granted. The Supreme Court, Balmer, C.J., held that implied consent advisory warning defendant that evidence of the refusal or failure to submit to blood alcohol testing may be offered against defendant did not constitute coercion of the sort that rendered defendant's consent to the search and seizure involuntary; abrogating State v. Machuca, 231 Or.App. 232, 218 P.3d 145.

    • Walker v. Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Div., 254 Or.App. 543 (2013)

      Motorist sought review of an order of the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) suspending motorist's driving privileges. The Circuit Court, Washington County, Marco Hernandez, J., set aside DMV's order, and DMV appealed. The Court of Appeals, Armstrong, P.J., held that arresting officer's extreme exhaustion was an “illness” allowing DMV to reschedule license suspension hearing under statutory exception.

  • Pennsylvania
    • Click here to download all Pennsylvania cases

    • Kolva v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 977 A.2d 1248 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)

      Following motorist's voluntary withdrawal from Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program, Department of Transportation could no longer enforce automatic one-year suspension of motorist's commercial driver's license.

    • Poborski v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 964 A.2d 66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)

      After the licensee was charged with DUI, he accepted an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition ("ARD") of the DUI charge. After he was notified of the suspension and disqualification, he filed a petition to be removed from the ARD program and to remand his case to the magistrate. The trial court granted the petition, after which the licensee argued that his voluntary withdrawal from the ARD program should trigger a nullification of the suspension and disqualification. The court stated that a licensee's mere acceptance into the ARD program was sufficient to trigger a license suspension. A licensee's acceptance of the ARD program, however, constituted a conscious choice of an alternative to prosecution and a knowing waiver of his rights to prove his innocence or risk conviction. It followed, then, that the trial court's grant of the licensee's petition to withdraw from the ARD program had to be read as a nullification of that knowing waiver. Therefore, while the DOT's suspension and disqualification were valid at the time they were made, the trial court's subsequent nullification of that acceptance had to be read to also nullify DOT's authority to continue any enforcement of its suspension and disqualification.

    • Commonwealth of Penn. v. Dugan, 769 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)

      Defendant was convicted of driving commercial motor vehicle without commercial driver's license, and he appealed. The Superior Court held that: (1) defendant who was driving pickup truck towing horse trailer was driving a commercial motor vehicle for which Class A license was required, and since defendant did not have Class A license, he was in violation of statute prohibiting driving commercial motor vehicle without commercial driver's license; and (2) the phrase "commercial motor vehicle" includes the concept of combination of motorized vehicles and towed vehicles for purposes of statute requiring the driver of a commercial motor vehicle to have a commercial driver's license.

    • Shewack v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 993 A.2d 916, (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)

      Offense on which licensee was convicted in Maryland was not sufficiently similar to a Pennsylvania offense so as to justify the Department of Transportation's (DOT) disqualification of licensee's commercial driver's license (CDL); the Maryland offense prohibited an individual from operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, while the Pennsylvania provision prohibits an individual from operating a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) with a suspended license.

    • Com. v. Williams, 624 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)

      Tractor trailer cab was "commercial vehicle," for purposes of convicting driver of operating commercial vehicle while under influence of alcohol, even though cab was not hooked to trailer and driver was using cab for personal transportation when he was stopped; cab alone was still monstrous vehicle with potential to cause severe damage if part of an accident and, thus, was within class of vehicles for which legislature intended to more severely limit permissible blood alcohol content of drivers.

    • Aten v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 649 A.2d 732 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)

      For purposes of disqualification of commercial driver's license based on West Virginia conviction for driving commercial motor vehicle without holding a commercial driver's license, fact that comparable Pennsylvania statute provides exception from conviction for driving without license if driver produces license within 15 days, while West Virginia law does not, did not prevent the offenses from being essentially similar where the driver lacked a valid commercial driver's license at the time of the offense and was unable to produce one within 15 days to avoid disqualification, and did not demonstrate that he would not have been convicted had the offense been committed in Pennsylvania.

    • Walck v. Com. Dept. of Transp. Bureau of Driver Licensing, 625 A.2d 1276 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)

      Cancelling commercial driver's license was justified where abstract of driver record history indicated that operator's New Jersey license was on suspended status for driving under the influence conviction when Pennsylvania license was issued.

  • Rhode Island
    No cases at this time.
  • South Carolina
  • South Dakota
    No cases at this time.
  • Tennessee
    • Click here to download all Tennessee cases

    • State v. Snyder, 835 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

      By enacting T.C.A. § 55-50-408, the legislature made it a crime to operate a commercial motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of point zero four (.04) or more. Neither the need to prove impairment nor the rebuttable presumption contained in T.C.A. § 55-10-408 applies in such cases. The language of the statute is clear and references to the other DUI provisions in the code indicate that the legislature intended to create a higher standard of care for those who drive commercial motor vehicles. The jury instruction given in this case was correct and this issue has no merit.

  • Texas
    • Click here to download all Texas cases

    • State v. Hollis, 327 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010)

      Statute providing, in certain circumstances, for deferred adjudication of guilt for certain traffic offenses authorizes a county court to grant deferred adjudication on appeal to a defendant who failed to invoke procedures providing for driving safety courses in relation to offense at justice court level, but statute prohibits the granting of deferred adjudication on appeal to a defendant who committed a serious traffic violation while driving a commercial motor vehicle.

    • Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres, 191 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)

      Driver of tractor-trailer, who was injured when tires separated from oncoming tractor-trailer and precipitated wreck involving four tractor-trailer rigs, belonged to the class that Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), prohibiting operation of vehicles with missing nuts or bolts and requiring a motor carrier to maintain motor vehicles in safe and proper operating conditions and a driver to be satisfied that vehicle was in safe operating condition, were intended to protect, and his injury was of a type that the regulations were designed to prevent, for purposes of determining whether injured driver had a negligence per se claim based on such regulations against owner and driver of oncoming tractor-trailer.

  • Utah
    • Click here to download all Utah cases

    • Assmann v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, 301 P.3d 3 (2013)

      After licensee's driver's license was revoked for a period of 36 months, licensee appealed. The Third District Court, Tooele Department, Robert W. Adkins, J., affirmed. Licensee appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] the Driver License Division was not required to produce a copy of the warrant obtained to test licensee's blood during license revocation proceeding, and [2] substantial evidence supported finding that licensee refused to submit to a chemical test. Affirmed.

    • Beller v. Rolfe, 194 P.3d 949 (2008)

      Motorist's driver license was suspended by the Utah Driver License Division after he was arrested for driving under influence of alcohol (DUI). Motorist petitioned for review by trial de novo, alleging that his traffic stop was unlawful. The Third District Court, Salt Lake, Tyrone E. Medley, J., determined that the stop was unlawful but ruled that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the license hearing. Motorist and the state appealed. The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to driver license revocation proceedings. Affirmed.

    • Cousino v. Rolfe, Not Reported in P.3d (2009)

      Appellant Nanette Rolfe, Chief of the Driver Control Bureau of the Driver License Division, challenges the district court's decision reinstating Appellee Curtis Cousino's driver license, which had been suspended as a result of his refusal to submit to a chemical test. The issue presented in this case is indistinguishable from the issue addressed in Huckins v. Rolfe, 2009 UT App 22. Rolfe moves for summary reversal.

    • Decker v. Rolfe, 180 P.3d 778 (2008)

      Licensee appealed from decision of the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., upholding the administrative suspension of his driver's license for refusing to take a breath test. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: [1] although licensee allegedly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, district court still had jurisdiction to review the Driver License Division's administrative decision; and [2] deputy's comments that, if deputy, like licensee, was facing a breath test at the sheriff's office, deputy would not take the test did not legally excuse or vitiate licensee's refusal to take breath test. Affirmed.

    • Gilley v. Blackstock, 61 P.3d 305 (2002)

      Motorist appealed order of the Third District Court, Tooele Department, David S. Young, J., dismissing her appeal of the Driver License Division's order to revoke her license. The Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate Presiding Judge, held that motorist's appeal exceeded the Utah Administrative Procedures Act's (UAPA) 30 day time limit. Affirmed.

    • Huckins v. Rolfe, 204 P.3d 186 (2009)

      Driver sought review of decision of the Driver Control Bureau of the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, suspending his driver license for failure to submit to chemical testing. The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Denise P. Lindberg, J., reinstated license. Division appealed. The Court of Appeals, Thorne, Associate P.J., held that driver license reinstatement provisions contained in statute governing license suspensions for impaired driving are not applicable to driver license revocations imposed for failure to submit to chemical testing. Reversed and remanded.

    • Johansson v. Rolfe, 257 P.3d 1046 (2011)

      Motorist appealed administrative suspension of his driver's license for refusing to take test of bloodalcohol levels. After a trial de novo, the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone E. Medley, J., upheld the suspension. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals held that motorist's refusal to take breath test at scene of arrest supported suspension of license. Affirmed.

    • Miller v. Blackstock, 36 P.3d 525 (2001)

      Motorist sought judicial review of Driver License Division's revocation of his license for failure to submit to a chemical test. After trial de novo, the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Ronald E. Nehring, J., revoked license for ten months. Parties appealed. The Court of Appeals, Russell W. Bench, J., held that: (1) license revocation process was not rendered defective by police officer's failure to provide motorist with a temporary license, and (2) any due process violation that occurred in motorist's not being given a temporary license would be cured by deducting applicable time from revocation period. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

    • Snedeker v. Rolfe, 176 P.3d 444 (2007)

      Defendant, who was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), challenged initial stop of his vehicle by state trooper. The Second District Court, Ogden Department, Parley R. Baldwin, J., concluded that initial stop was lawful. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that trooper had reasonable, articulable suspicion that vehicle defendant was driving was uninsured, as would justify stop. Affirmed.

    • State v. Turner, 283 P.3d 527 (2012)

      Following denial of his motion to suppress, defendant pled guilty in the Third District, Salt Lake Department, Vernice Trease, J., to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). He appealed. The Court of Appeals, McHugh, P.J., held that: [1] trial court's determination that state trooper's testimony concerning breath alcohol test machine met threshold reliability requirements was not unreasonable, and [2] defendant's argument that the admission of the breath alcohol test machine results violated his due process rights was inadequately briefed. Affirmed.

    • State v. Vialpando, 89 P.3d 209 (2004)

      Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court, West Valley Department, Pat B. Brian, J., of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held that: [1] trooper possessed requisite reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify initial detention of defendant, and [2] trial court's admission of results of defendant's alcohol breath test was not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

  • Vermont
    No cases at this time.
  • Virginia
  • Washington
    • Click here to download all Washington cases

    • Allen v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 169 Wash.App. 304 (2012)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist sought review of decision by Department of Licensing that suspended his personal driver's license for 90 days and disqualified his commercial driver's license (CDL) for one year. The Superior Court, Snohomish County, Linda Krese, J., affirmed. Motorist sought further review. The Court of Appeals, Cox, J., held that implied consent warning given by arresting officer did not misleadingly imply that the CDL disqualification would be for same length of time as the suspension or revocation of personal license.

    • Ball v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 113 Wash.App. 193 (2002)

      Department of Licensing revoked licenses of driver who offered unresponsive and unclear answers when asked if he wanted to speak to an attorney, and failed to follow instructions when taking a breath test, after being stopped for driving while intoxicated. Driver appealed. The Superior Court, Pierce County, Rosanne Buckner, J., reversed the revocation, and Department petitioned for discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Armstrong, J., held that driver refused to take the breath test, thus justifying revocation of his driving privilege.

    • Bauer v. State Employment Sec. Dept., 108 P.3d 1240 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)

      Court of Appeals would decline to adopt "constructive voluntary quit" or "constructive voluntary leaving" doctrine so as to preclude commercial truck driver, who was terminated after he lost his commercial driver's license following his commission of two serious traffic offenses, from obtaining unemployment benefits.

    • City of Kent v. Beigh, 145 Wash.2d 33 (2001)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, and he moved to suppress blood test results. The Kent Municipal Court granted motion. City petitioned for a writ of review. The Superior Court, King County, Leroy McCullough, J., denied writ. The Court of Appeals, 102 Wash.App. 269, 6 P.3d 1211, affirmed. After granting city's petition for review, the Supreme Court, Sanders, J., held that defendant was not physically incapable of providing breath test of blood alcohol content, and thus, police officer did not have authority under implied consent statute to request blood test.

    • City of Seattle v. St. John, 166 Wash.2d 941 (2009)

      Defendant, who had been arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), challenged blood alcohol test administered to him pursuant to a search warrant, after defendant refused to take a voluntary blood alcohol test. The Municipal Court held that the test was invalid. Appeal was taken. The Superior Court, King County, Michael J. Fox, J., reversed. Defendant appealed. Court of Appeals certified case.

    • City of Seattle v. Stalsbroten, 138 Wash.2d 227 (1999)

      Drunk driving defendant, following the Municipal Court's denial of his motion to suppress his refusal to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs), was convicted by a jury in the District Court, and he appealed. The Superior Court, King County, Ricardo Martinez, J., affirmed, and defendant sought discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Coleman, J., 91 Wash.App. 226, 957 P.2d 260, ruled that the refusal to perform FSTs should have been suppressed but concluded that the error was harmless and affirmed the conviction. On further review, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, Durham, J., held that: (1) a refusal to perform FSTs is not testimonial, and thus is not protected by the right against self-incrimination, and (2) admitting evidence at trial of such a refusal does not impermissibly compel self-incrimination.

    • City of Spokane v. Wrenn, Not Reported in P.3d (1999)

       

    • Desmon v. Washington Dept. of Licensing, 166 Wash.App. 313 (2012)

      School bus driver sought review of Department of Licensing's (DOL) cancellation of her commercial driver's license after she failed an audit retest. The Spokane Superior Court, Tari S. Eitzen, J., affirmed. Driver appealed to the Supreme Court. Holding: Upon transfer, the Court of Appeals, Korsmo, J., held that DOL lacked authority to cancel school bus driver's commercial driver's license after she failed a licensing retest that was done pursuant to an audit of a third-party tester.

    • Gonzales v. State Dept. of Licensing, 112 Wash.2d 890 (1989)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Department of Licensing revoked two drivers' licenses for refusal to submit to breathalyzer test after being arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Superior Court, King County, Warren Chan and Terrence A. Carroll, JJ., sustained the revocations, and drivers appealed. In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court, Andersen, J., held that: (1) although implied consent warnings stating that additional alcohol concentration tests could be obtained "at your own expense" were inaccurate as to indigent drivers and inclusion of such language in implied consent warning could therefore deny indigent driver opportunity to make knowing and intelligent decision, that language did not prejudice drivers who made no claim of indigency and thus would not serve as ground to invalidate revocations; (2) actual prejudice to driver would be required to invalidate revocation of driver's license based on refusal to take breathalyzer test after arrest for driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor based on inaccuracy of implied consent warning, where the action was civil and the officer had given all of the implied consent warnings, although he had failed to do so in a 100% accurate manner; and (3) accurate form of implied consent warning is that refusal to take breathalyzer test "may" be used in criminal trial.

    • Hoag v. State, Not Reported in P.3d (2001)

       

    • Jury v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 114 Wash.App. 726 (2002)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Two drivers sought judicial review of suspension of licenses. The Superior Court, Kittitas County, Michael Cooper, J., reversed, and the Department of Licensing appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that: (1) state patrol implied-consent warnings were not misleading, and (2) police officer's observation plus use of laser speed gun provided probable cause to arrest.

    • Leininger v. Washington State Dept. of Licensing, 120 Wash.App. 68 (2004)

      State department of licensing revoked license of driver who refused to take breath test for alcohol. The Superior Court, Benton County, Sharon Brown, J. Pro Tem., reinstated driver's driving privileges. Department appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that driver did not have right to an attorney prior to administration of breath test.

    • Lynch v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 262 P.3d 65 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Implied consent warnings given to driver were not rendered inaccurate or misleading by inclusion of statement concerning potential commercial driver's license (CDL) disqualification, notwithstanding driver's claim that statement falsely implied that CDL disqualification would be for the same period as her personal driver's license suspension or revocation, namely, 90 days if she failed the breath test and one year if she refused to take the test; CDL notification referred to CDL "disqualification" as opposed to personal driver's license "suspension or revocation," correctly implying that it was a separate consequence.

    • Maloney v. State, Dept. of Licensing, Not Reported in P.3d (2001)

       

    • Martin v. State Dept. of Licensing, 175 Wash.App. 9 (2013)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Driver sought review of Department of Licensing's suspension of his personal driver's license and disqualification of his commercial driver's license. The Cowlitz Superior Court, James E. Warme, J., reversed. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lisa Worswick, C.J., held that: [1] implied consent warnings were not rendered inaccurate or misleading by inclusion of statement concerning potential CDL disqualification; [2] implied consent warnings that were neither inaccurate nor misleading did not result in prejudice to driver; [3] driver's due process rights were not violated when hearing officer continued hearing after arresting officer failed to appear; and [4] statute requiring continuance did not violate equal protection.

    • McCalib v. State Dept. of Licensing, Not Reported in P.3d (2003)

       

    • Merseal v. State Dept. of Licensing, 99 Wash.App. 414 (2000)

      Truck driver appealed the administrative suspension of his commercial driver's license. The Superior Court, Adams County, Richard Miller, J., denied the appeal. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that: (1) deferred criminal prosecution did not divest Department of Licensing (DOL) of authority to suspend the commercial driver's license, and (2) statutes entitling private drivers but not commercial drivers to an occupational permit after suspension did not violate equal protection.

    • Pattison v. State Dept. of Licensing, 112 Wash.App. 670 (2002)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorists on separate occasions were arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence, had their licenses suspended or revoked, and appealed results of administrative hearing. After their cases were consolidated, the King County Superior Court, Julia Garratt, Judge Pro Tem, found that implied consent warning form used by State Patrol misstated the law, and Department of Licensing requested discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Becker, C.J., held that implied consent warning form did not misstate the law or impair a motorist's ability to make an informed decision about taking a breath test.

    • Shuman v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 108 Wash.App. 673 (2001)

      Driver appealed revocation of his driver's license by Department of Licensing. The Superior Court sustained the revocation and driver obtained discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Kato, J., held that admission of driver's refusal to submit to blood alcohol concentration (BAC) verifier test would work an injustice, so as to support bar under doctrine of collateral estoppel to admission of such evidence, which was excluded in underlying criminal evidentiary hearing following driver's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DWI).

    • Smith v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 88 Wash.App. 875 (1997)

      Motorist challenged administrative revocation of permanent driver's license for driving while under influence of intoxicants. The Superior Court, Clark County, Robert Harris, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seinfeld, P.J., held that proof of compliance with administrative provisions on periodic testing of breath test machine was not prerequisite to admission of test results.

    • State, Dept. of Licensing v. Grewal, 108 Wash.App. 815 (2001)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Minor driver sought judicial review of revocation of driver's license for driving while intoxicated. The Superior Court, Whatcom County, David Nichols, J., reversed. Department of Licensing appealed. The Court of Appeals, Webster, J., held that: (1) police report supported revocation, and (2) driver received adequate warnings under implied-consent statute.

    • State v. Avery, 103 Wash.App. 527 (2000)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Pierce County, Thomas J. Larkin, J., of vehicular homicide and failure to remain at the scene of an injury accident. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seinfeld, P.J., held that: (1) arrest necessary to trigger implied consent statute need not be for alcohol-related offense; but (2) implied consent statute did not apply as officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicants at time of his arrest for leaving scene of injury accident; and (3) defendant's voluntary consent to blood test, as opposed to breath test, was proper.

    • State v. Baldwin, 109 Wash.App. 516 (2001)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Spokane County, Linda G. Tompkins, J., of driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schultheis, J., held that: (1) defendant did not waive his right to challenge statute and blood test admission, although he did not raise issue in pretrial suppression motion; (2) implied consent statute was constitutional; (3) defendant's refusal to take blood test was admissible at trial; (4) court was not required to balance probative value of refusal to take the test with prejudicial value of that refusal; and (5) state trooper had statutory authority to request blood test.

    • State v. Bartels, 112 Wash.2d 882 (1989)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  State appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Spokane and King Counties, William J. Grant and Nancy A. Holman, JJ., which granted various defendants' motions to suppress blood alcohol content test results. The Supreme Court accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and Callow, C.J., held that inclusion in implied consent warning of erroneous statement that defendants had right to have qualified person administer additional blood alcohol content test "at your own expense" required suppression of test results as to those defendants who could not afford additional test at time of arrest.

    • State v. Berger, Not Reported in P.3d (2011)

       

    • State v. Elkins, 152 Wash.App. 871 (2009)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was convicted in a jury trial in the Superior Court, King County, Deborah Fleck, J., of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, driving under the influence (DUI), second degree assault, felony hit and run, and bail jumping. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lau, J., held that: [1] defendant who refused to submit to breath test could not challenge implied consent warning for its failure to address consequence applicable only to those who submit to test; [2] defendant waived for appellate review her challenge against implied consent warning for its failure to include language indicating that she would face a mandatory jail term for a DUI conviction after refusing a breath test; and [3] implied consent warning was not rendered insufficient for its failure to warn that defendant would face a mandatory jail term for a conviction for DUI after refusing a breath test.

    • State v. Koch, 126 Wash.App. 589 (2005)

      Defendant was convicted in the District Court of driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Superior Court, Pierce County, Beverly Grant, J., reversed. State filed motion for discretionary review. On review, the Court of Appeals, Armstrong, P.J., held that: [1] arresting officer's warning defendant to be cooperative did not improperly coerce him to submit to breath test, and [2] State toxicologist's testimony about reliability of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, although admitted in violation of motion in limine, did not warrant new trial.

    • State v. Mee Hui Kim, 134 Wash.App. 27 (2006)

      Defendant was convicted in bench trial in the Superior Court, King County, Douglass A. North, J., of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault in connection with head-on collision in which other driver died and passenger of defendant's car was injured. She appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schindler, A.C.J., held that: [1] officer had authority to obtain blood sample without defendant's consent; [2] result of blood alcohol test was admissible; and [3] evidence that passenger gave defendant date-rape drug was inadmissible.

    • State v. Morales, 173 Wash.2d 560 (2012)

      Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Lewis County, Richard W. Buzzard, Judge Pro Tem., of hit and run, driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), and vehicular assault. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 154 Wash.App. 26, 225 P.3d 311, affirmed. Defendant filed a petition for review. Following grant of petition, the Supreme Court, Wiggins, J., held that: [1] state failed to prove that defendant who was subject to mandatory blood test due to vehicular assault charge was actually read required warning of his right to have additional tests administered by any qualified person of his choosing, and, thus, results of defendant's blood test were inadmissible; [2] trial court's error in admitting results of defendant's mandatory blood test did not prejudice him with regard to hit and run charge; [3] trial court's error in admitting results of defendant's mandatory blood test prejudiced him with respect to charges of DUI and vehicular assault by means of DUI; and [4] trial court's error in admitting results of defendant's mandatory blood test prejudiced him with respect to charge of vehicular assault by reckless driving.

    • State v. Stymacks, Not Reported in P.3d (2000)

       

    • State v. Templeton, 148 Wash.2d 193 (2002)

      On review of consolidated cases involving trial courts' decisions on motions to suppress breath test evidence in prosecutions for driving under the influence (DUI), based on officers' failure to properly advise defendants of the right to counsel, the Court of Appeals, 107 Wash.App. 141, 27 P.3d 222, affirmed suppression of evidence. On separate review of other consolidated cases involving the same issue, the Court of Appeals, 108 Wash.App. 490, 28 P.3d 789, concluded that failure to properly advise defendants was harmless and did not warrant suppression of evidence. Review was granted and defendants' appeals were consolidated. The Supreme Court, Ireland, J., held that: (1) defendants' challenge did not implicate right to counsel under Fifth or Sixth Amendments; (2) Supreme Court was authorized to promulgate rule providing for the advisement of the right to counsel as soon as feasible after arrest; (3) police advisement of rights forms failed to inform defendants of their right to consult counsel before taking breath test; but (4) insufficiency of advisement of rights forms was harmless given that defendants did not allege that, if warned, they would have requested counsel before submitting to the breath tests.

    • Thompson v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 138 Wash.2d 783 (1999)

      Commercial driver appealed disqualification of his commercial license by Department of Licensing. The Superior Court, Clark County, Barbara Johnson, J., sustained the disqualification. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, 91 Wash.App. 887, 960 P.2d 475, affirmed, and driver sought review. The Supreme Court, Talmadge, J., held that: (1) overruling State v. Frederick, 100 Wash.2d 550, 674 P.2d 136 (1983) and Franklin v. Klundt, 50 Wash.App. 10, 746 P.2d 1228 (1987), suppression of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test results in prior criminal proceeding presented collateral estoppel bar to admission of that evidence, and (2) resolving an issue of first impression, the "knowing and intelligent decision" rule regarding a BAC test applies in commercial driver's license disqualification hearings.

    • Tillman v. State, Dept. of Licensing, Not Reported in P.3d (2012)

       

    • Town of Clyde Hill v. Rodriguez, 65 Wash.App. 778 (1992)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  A motorist charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor moved to suppress evidence of his breath test on grounds that the implied consent warning he received was inadequate. The Superior Court, King County, Faith Enyeart, J., granted the suppression motion, and the town appealed. The Court of Appeals, Agid, J., held that: (1) language of the warning given to motorist was adequate to indicate that motorist had the right to take additional tests, and (2) law enforcement officers were not required to use exact words of implied consent statute or to include statutory reference to implied consent provision.

    • Vance v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 116 Wash.App. 412 (2003)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist appealed administrative hearing officer's decision sustaining the revocation of motorist's license to drive, based on refusal to submit to breath test. The Superior Court, King County, Donald Haley, J., affirmed. Discretionary review was granted. The Court of Appeals, Ellington, J., held that: (1) traffic stop for speeding occurred as result of fresh pursuit, so that county sheriff's deputy was authorized to stop motorist after motorist crossed county line; (2) motorist lacked right to counsel before deciding whether to take a breath test; and (3) motorist's indecision regarding whether to submit to breath test did not require state trooper to clarify motorist's implied consent rights.

    • Veranth v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 90 Wash.App. 1028 (1998)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist sought de novo review of the Licensing Department's revocation of his driver's license under the implied consent law after he refused to take a breath test. The Superior Court, King County, Marsha Pechman, J., set aside the revocation, and the Department appealed. The Court of Appeals held that any deficiency in the refusal report owing to the arresting officers' use of an abbreviation was merely technical, and thus did not deprive the Department of jurisdiction to revoke the motorist's license.

  • West Virginia
  • Wisconsin
    • Click here to download all Wisconsin cases

    • In re Refusal of Anagnos, 341 Wis.2d 576 (2012)

      Motorist requested a refusal hearing after he refused to take a chemical test following his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). The Circuit Court, Walworth County, dismissed the state's case, concluding that motorist's refusal was lawful. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, 337 Wis.2d 57, 805 N.W.2d 722, affirmed. State petitioned for review. The Supreme Court held that: [1] trial court may entertain argument at refusal hearing that motorist's arrest was unlawful because traffic stop that preceded it was not justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and [2] officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop of motorist's vehicle. Reversed and remanded.

    • In re Refusal of Bentdahl, 351 Wis.2d 739 (2013)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Defendant was charged with refusal to submit to testing of his blood-alcohol level at time of his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). After defendant was acquitted of the underlying OWI and PAC charges, he moved to dismiss the refusal charge. The Circuit Court, Columbia County, granted the motion, and state appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for Circuit Court to exercise its discretion as to whether to dismiss the refusal charge. State petitioned for review. The Supreme Court held that trial court lacked discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charge. Affirmed as modified and remanded. Reversed and remanded.

    • In re Refusal of Fricano, 326 Wis.2d 267 (2010) UNPUBLISHED

      Appellant does not dispute that he failed to request a refusal hearing within the ten-day time limit set by statute. As a result of his failure to meet the statutory deadline, the circuit court lost competency to proceed. Accordingly, the court properly dismissed the motion to re-open the refusal revocation proceedings. On grounds of competency rather than jurisdiction, appeal dismissed.

    • In re Refusal of Nackers, 736 N.W.2d 543 (Table) (Wis.Ct. App. 2007) UNPUBLISHED

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Nackers appealed an order finding his refusal to submit to chemical testing unreasonable. His contention was that the officer violated Wisconsin's implied consent law by failing to inform him that as a holder of a commercial driver's license he would be placed out-of-service for refusing to submit to testing and then later failing to issue an out of service order. Because the officer properly read Nackers the Informing the Accused form in its entirety, including the portion detailing the possibility of the issuance of an out-of-service order the order was affirmed. Further, whether the officer was required to issue an out-of-service order was not an issue for the refusal hearing.

    • State v. Carter, 794 N.W.2d 213 (Wis. 2010)

      State failed to establish, as basis for enhancing sentence in prosecution for operating while under the influence (OWI), that two "zero tolerance" suspensions in another state resulted from a refusal to submit to chemical testing; driving record from other state did not state whether the suspensions arose from a refusal to submit to testing or from a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00. "Conviction," as used in statute relating to counting of out-of-state convictions for sentence enhancement purposes in prosecution for OWI, refers to an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal.

    • State v. Devries, 334 Wis.2d 430 (2011)

      Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Walworth County, of drunk driving as a fifth offense. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant had two previous convictions in other jurisdictions for driving under the influence for purposes of enhancing her penalty, and [2] proceedings in California and Arizona in regards to defendant's convictions for driving while intoxicated were not constitutionally flawed. Affirmed.

    • State v. Goss, 338 Wis.2d 72 (2011)

      Defendant was convicted, in the Circuit Court, Eau Claire County, of fifth offense drunk driving. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant's petition for review was granted. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of first impression, probable cause existed for police officer to request a preliminary breath test (PBT) from defendant non-commercial driver for driving or operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), where defendant was known by officer to be subject to a .02 PAC standard based on defendant's prior convictions for drunk driving, and officer smelled alcohol on defendant. Affirmed.

    • State v. Hamilton, 338 Wis.2d 213 (2011) UNPUBLISHED

      Driver appealed the judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, fourth offense, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). He contended there was no probable cause to administer the preliminary breath screening test (PBT), and the circuit court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Court of Appeals concluded there was probable cause. Affirmed.

    • State v. Hill, Slip Copy (2014)

      Driver appealed his conviction for third-offense operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI). Hill argued that as he was operating a utility terrain vehicle (UTV) at the time of the offense, he was charged under the wrong drunk-driving statute and the court improperly denied his motion to dismiss. Court of Appeals agreed that as driver was operating a UTV, he should be charged with intoxicated operation of a UTV under WIS. STAT. § 23.33(4c). Reversed.

    • State v. Hoppe, 847 N.W.2d 869 (2014)

      Following judgment of conviction and sentence for seventh-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI), defendant moved for postconviction relief, challenging condition of extended supervision that prohibited him from operating a motor vehicle. The Circuit court, Outagamie County, entered order denying motion. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that trial court had no statutory authority to impose condition that defendant not operate a vehicle during nine-year period of extended supervision. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part; order reversed; and cause remanded with directions.

    • State v. Marshland Acres, Inc., 348 Wis.2d 29 (2013)

      Dairy farm operator was found guilty in the Circuit Court, Pepin County, of violating statutory vehicle width and weight restrictions with respect to a manure spreader. Farm operator appealed, arguing that the manure spreader was an implement of husbandry exempt from the width and weight restrictions. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] primary purpose of manure spreader was to transport large quantities of manure; [2] manure was "property"; and [3] manure spreader was a commercial motor vehicle operated on a highway, excluding it from the definition of an implement of husbandry. Affirmed.

    • State v. Torbeck, 344 Wis.2d 299 (2012) UNPUBLISHED

      The State appealed from a judgment of the circuit court dismissing a third operating while intoxicated (OWI) charge against defendant. Driver did not have any alcohol in her system at the time she crashed her vehicle, but she had "huffed" the substance 1, 1–Difluoroethane (DFE), which is commonly found in air spray cans. The circuit court dismissed the charge after concluding that DFE is not an "intoxicant" within the meaning of the OWI statute. Court of Appeals agreed. Affirmed.

    • Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 348 Wis.2d 282 (2013)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist, who had been arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and apparently refused a chemical test to ascertain his blood alcohol concentration, filed a request to extend time period within which he was required by implied consent law to request a refusal hearing. The Circuit Court, Waukesha County, denied request for an extension of time and dismissed request for a refusal hearing. Motorist appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court held that circuit court lacked competency to hear motorist's request to extend ten-day time period within which he was required to request a refusal hearing based on excusable neglect. Affirmed.

    • Village of Grafton v. Seatz, 352 Wis.2d 747 (2014)

      Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Ozaukee County, of first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI), and was ordered to install an ignition interlock device in his motor vehicle. He appealed. The Court of Appeals held that trial court was required to order installation of the ignition interlock device on defendant's vehicle even though his prior OWI conviction occurred more than ten years before the latest offense and defendant could not be convicted as a repeat offender. Affirmed.

  • Wyoming
    • Click here to download all Wyoming cases

    • Bowen v. State, Dept. of Transp., 245 P.3d 827 (2011)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist petitioned for judicial review of administrative suspension of his driver's license following contested case hearing, alleging that suspension was improper because the officer performing the breath test was not properly trained on the breath testing device. The District Court, Goshen County, Keith G. Kautz, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Voigt, J., held that as a matter of first impression, motorist was collaterally estopped from litigating the admissibility of his breath test results.

    • Bryant v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 55 P.3d 4 (2002)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist sought judicial review of Office of Administrative Hearing's (OAH) order sustaining the implied consent suspension of his driver's license as well as the disqualification of his commercial driver's license. The District Court, Carbon County, Kenneth E. Stebner, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Lehman, J., held that: (1) motorist's allegation that arresting officer lacked valid certification to conduct a chemical analysis of the motorist's blood, breath, or urine was irrelevant, because motorist had refused chemical testing, and (2) arresting officer's alleged failure to offer a chemical test that was "approved by the Department of Health (DOH)" was not a defense, under the circumstances.

    • Elliott v. State, 247 P.3d 501 (2011)

      Defendant was charged with driving while under influence (DWUI) of alcohol. The District Court, Converse County, John C. Brooks, J., certified question to the Supreme Court, Hill, J., which held that State was not collaterally estopped from pursuing criminal charge for DWUI after hearing officer in administrative proceeding to suspend license determined that police officer lacked probable cause to arrest.

    • Escarcega v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dept. of Transp., 153 P.3d 264 (Wyo. 2007)

      Motorist was not entitled to warning that his failure to submit to chemical test could result in the disqualification of his commercial driver's license.

    • Harvey v. State, Dept. of Transp., 250 P.3d 167 (2011)

      Following the administrative suspension of motorist's driver's license by the Department of Transportation (DOT) due to motorist's arrest for driving while under the influence, motorist filed petition for judicial review. The District Court, Carbon County, Wade E. Waldrip, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that police officer had probable cause to believe that motorist, who was driving a forklift, committed a traffic violation due to his failure to display a slow moving vehicle emblem on forklift.

    • Hwang v. State, Dept. of Transp., 247 P.3d 861 (2011)

      Driver appealed an order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) suspending his driver's license after driver's arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI). The District Court, Albany County, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that: [1] substantial evidence supported hearing officer's conclusion that police officer observed driver for the required 15 minutes prior to administering chemical breath test to driver, and [2] driver was not permitted to supplement the record on appeal.

    • In re Hittner, 189 P.3d 872 (2008)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Motorist sought judicial review of Office of Administrative Hearing's (OAH) order sustaining the implied consent suspension of his driver's license as well as the disqualification of his commercial driver's license. The District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Supreme Court, Hill, J., held that: [1] substantial evidence supported finding that motorist was given complete implied consent advisements following his arrest for driving under the influence and most assuredly that he was not misled in any way about what his rights were, and [2] substantial evidence supported finding that motorist refused second breath test.

    • King v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 161 P.3d 1086 (2007)

      Driver sought review of decision of the Department of Transportation, suspending his commercial driver's license after he pled guilty to driving while under the influence. The District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J., dismissed. Defendant appealed. Defendant brought action against the Department seeking declaration that statute allowing the Department to suspend commercial licenses was unconstitutional. The District Court, Laramie County, Peter G. Arnold, J., dismissed. Defendant appealed. Cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that defendant failed to preserve for review issue of hearing examiner's power to suspend his license because the issue should have been preserved in the administrative proceeding.

    • McCallie v. State ex rel., Dept. of Transp., --- P.3d ---- (2014)

      Driver petitioned for judicial review of his disqualification by Department of Transportation (DOT) from driving commercial vehicles for one year. The District Court, Uinta County, Dennis L. Sanderson, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Burke, J., held that: [1] trooper had probable cause to make warrantless arrest of driver, and [2] record contained substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's findings that driver was driving or in control of a commercial motor vehicle and had an alcohol concentration of 0.04% or more.

    • Regan v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 292 P.3d 849 (2012)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  In separate cases, motorists arrested for driving while under influence (DWUI) petitioned for judicial review of order of Office of Administrative Hearings affirming administrative suspension of their driver's licenses. In separate proceedings, the District Court, Albany County, 2012 WL 3767695 and 2012 WL 3767696, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J., affirmed. Both motorists appealed. Although not consolidated, appeals were joined. The Supreme Court, Hill, J., held that: [1] implied consent advisement that included warning under municipal implied consent ordinance of criminal sanction for refusal to consent to chemical test was not impermissibly coercive, and [2] Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to consider constitutionality of municipal implied consent ordinance.

    • Schouboe v. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 238 P.3d 1246 (2010)

      IMPLIED CONSENT  Licensee sought review of decision of the District Court, Teton County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J., upholding his implied consent suspension of his driver's license. The Supreme Court, Hill, J., held that licensee was in actual physical control of vehicle when police found him.

    • State, Dept. of Transp. v. Robbins, 246 P.3d 864 (Wyo. 2011)

      The district court erred in finding that clear and convincing evidence, rather than a preponderance of the evidence, is required to uphold a commercial driver's license disqualification in a contested case proceeding and in finding that Robbins' constitutional right to due process was violated.

    • Vasco v. State, Dept. of Transp., 253 P.3d 515 (2011)

      After licensee's driver's license was suspended for six months based on his refusal to submit to chemical testing following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, he sought a hearing. The Office of Administration (OAH) upheld the suspension. Licensee sought review. The District Court, Albany County, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J., affirmed. Licensee appealed. The Supreme Court, Kite, C.J., held that: [1] police officer had probable cause to arrest licensee for interference with a police officer, and [2] police officer had probable cause to arrest licensee for DUI.

    • Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. Potvin, 247 P.3d 54 (2011)

      Motorist sought judicial review of decision by Department of Transportation to suspend motorist's license based on refusal to submit breath or blood sample. The District Court, Teton County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J., reversed suspension, and Department appealed. The Supreme Court, Hill, J., held that substantial evidence supported finding that police officers had probable cause to contact motorist at his home following one-car accident and to request that motorist submit to chemical breath or blood test, as required for suspension due to refusal to submit blood or breath sample.

 
 
commercial licensing laws resource
divider
Home  |   Federal Regulations  |  State Law and Regulations  |  Resources, Facts and Links  |  Contact NJC
The National Judicial College - judicial resource