State Law & Regulations (including case law)
The federal rules for commercial driver's
licensing and commercial motor vehicles apply to each state.
Nevertheless, each state has the authority to modify the regulations
within certain parameters. In this section you will find state
specific statutes, regulations and some applicable case law.
Please let us know of any cases or sources we may have missed.
- Alabama Department of Human Resources ex rel. Tammy Yancey v. Ronald Yancey, 54 So. 3d 415 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
A father was found in contempt for willful failure to pay child support and the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR) had suspended his commercial driver's license, as authorized by Ala. Code § 30-3-171. The trial court noted that the father's ability to earn income was much greater if he was driving a truck and ordered the DHR to reinstate the license. The court considered whether the trial court had the authority to order DHR to reinstate the father's driver's license. The procedure for the review of DHR's decision to suspend or revoke the license of a person who has failed to pay child support was set forth in Ala. Code § 30-3-172. The Alabama Legislature affirmatively granted DHR the authority to make all decisions regarding whether to suspend or revoke an obligor's driver's license when he or she has failed to pay child support for at least six months.
- Alabama Department of Public Safety v. Brian Alston, 39 So. 3d 1176 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
The DPS argued that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter based on the longstanding principles of sovereign immunity. It based its sovereign immunity argument on its contention that the appeal to the trial court was a lawsuit rather than an administrative appeal. The driver filed an administrative appeal to the trial court seeking review of the DPS's decision. Next, the DPS argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it reversed its administrative ruling despite the provisions of the Ala. Admin. Code r. 760-x-1-.12, Ala. Admin. Code, Ala. Code § 32-6-49.7(b), and 49 C.F.R. § 383.51, which the DPS said required the mandatory disqualification of the driver's CDL based on his having received the two citations. However, the DPS failed to provide any evidence of either citation to the trial court, leaving that court with no basis for upholding the disqualification of the driver's CDL.
- William H. Cooley v. State Department of Public Safety, 827 So. 2d 124 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
A truck driver admitted to consuming alcohol in Tennessee and took a breathalyzer test, indicating a blood alcohol level of .05 percent. He pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. Alabama authorities notified him his commercial driver's license was disqualified for one year, based on this conviction. The appellate court held the Alabama and Tennessee statutes were comparable regarding the blood alcohol level (.08 percent or greater) for convictions based on driving while intoxicated or impaired and driving under the influence, Ala. Code § 32-5A-191 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-418(c) (2001). The statutes of both states provided that a blood alcohol content of .04 percent or greater was considered driving under the influence for a commercial driver and was punishable by a disqualification of at least one year of the driver's commercial driver's license, Ala. Code § 32-6-49.12(c) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-405. Because the driver's conduct in Tennessee, if committed in Alabama, would have been grounds for disqualification of his commercial driver's license, appellee department was authorized to impose a one-year disqualification of that license. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.
- Charles Lee Davis v. State of Alaska, 235 P.3d 1017 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010)
Defendant argued that the State had no authority to enforce the federal law regulating commercial motor vehicles. The appellate court found that the adopted portions of the federal regulations were now state law and were enforced by various state agencies. By expressly adopting the pertinent portions of the federal regulations and revising them as necessary to apply them to Alaska roadways, the State Department of Transportation acted consistently with its statutory authority and the legislature's objective. The evidence showed that defendant was operating a commercial motor vehicle where defendant presented no evidence that his vehicle was exempt from the state regulations because it was used "exclusively" for non-commercial purposes. Defendant was using his tractor-trailer to haul property belonging to another person or persons. Even if he did not receive monetary compensation, defendant was engaged in activities that were incidental to and done in furtherance of his business. Defendant did not show that the State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, nor did he show that he was prejudiced in any way. Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial. The judgment was affirmed.
- Clifford C. Haywood v. State of Alaska, 193 P.3d 1203 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
Before the trial court and on appeal, defendant argued that former Alaska Stat. § 28.33.140 did not authorize the revocation of a commercial driver's license for a conviction of driving under the influence unless the motorist was operating a commercial vehicle at the time of the offense. On review, the court held that former Alaska Stat. § 28.33.140 did not allow the disqualification of a commercial driver's license for a conviction involving a non-commercial motor vehicle. Because Alaska Stat. § 28.33.140(a) and (b) were reasonably susceptible of two contradictory interpretations--one allowing revocation of a commercial license upon a conviction for driving a private vehicle while under the influence and a second allowing revocation only if the conviction for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence was committed while driving a commercial vehicle--the statute was ambiguous. Under the rule of lenity, resolution of the ambiguity required adoption of the meaning most favorable to defendant. The portion of the district court judgment disqualifying defendant from driving a commercial motor vehicle was vacated. The remainder of the judgment was affirmed.
- Golden Eagle Distribs. v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec., 180 Ariz. 565 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
Employer complied with the federal mandate under 49 C.F.R. § 391.93 to randomly conduct drug tests. The employee tested positive for cocaine seven hours into his workday. The employer discharged the employee from his position as a truck driver because he was no longer qualified to operate a motor vehicle, and federal regulations prohibited the employer from using the employee as a driver because he tested positive for cocaine. Employee applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Appeals Board ultimately held that the employee qualified for unemployment insurance benefits. The employee's actions were connected with his work under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-619.01 (Supp. 1993) because they adversely affected the employer's interests. The discharge for intoxication was disqualifying, and the employee should not have been awarded unemployment insurance benefits.
- Brumley v. Keech, 2012 Ark. 263 (Ark. 2012)
Appellants alleged negligence and requested punitive damages for alleged violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR). On appeal, appellants argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of appellees' failure to comply with the FMCSR for post-accident-testing for controlled substances. The circuit court excluded evidence of appellees' failure to comply with the post-accident-testing requirements based on its finding that the evidence was not the type of conduct in which malice could be inferred. The reviewing court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that appellees failed to comply with the post-accident-testing requirements of the FMCSR. The alleged violations of 49 C.F.R. § 382.303 occurred after the accident and there was no indication that the violations contributed to or caused the accident. Also, the alleged violations did not support a punitive-damages award. There was no evidence that the driver had been drinking alcohol or using controlled substances prior to the accident or that he was under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substances at the time of the accident.
- Burdine v. Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 2010 Ark. 455 (Ark. 2010)
Driver was arrested for DWI in another state. The charge was nolle prossed, and an administrative hearing was held, which resulted in the suspension of his driving privileges. The driver argued that the suspension of his driver's license was not a conviction for DWI that warranted disqualification. He claimed that the administrative findings were not a conviction under Arkansas law and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations only required a one-year suspension when a person was convicted of a DWI as defined by state law. The court found that Arkansas had adopted the federal regulations. The administrative tribunal's ruling was a conviction as defined by 49 C.F.R. § 383.5. Under 49 C.F.R. § 384.206, once the DFA received adverse information about the driver and found no action had been taken as a result, it was required to implement the disqualification. The circuit court did not err in affirming the DFA's disqualification of the driver.
- People v. Meyer, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1279 (Cal. App. 2010)
A person who held a commercial driver's license at the time of violation of a traffic offense, but who surrendered the license, was barred from completing traffic school in lieu of adjudicating the traffic offense pursuant to Veh. Code, § 42005, subd. (c), notwithstanding that the section uses the present tense. Given that the "worst of the worst" would be the ones most likely or highly motivated to cheat, it would not further the federal legislative purpose to leave a loophole such as this in place.
- People v. Superior Court (Costa), 183 Cal.App.4th 690, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 (Cal. App. 2010)
Faced with criminal murder charges, a commercial driver could be found to have acted with malice. Malice can be implied so as to support a second degree murder indictment where a commercial license holder drove a truck that should have been put out of service for bad breaks, where he ignored warnings and suggestions that he was driving unsafely down a two lane highway that couldn't accommodate the truck in rush hour and later caused fatal accident.
- Rehman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 178 Cal. App. 4th 581 (Cal. App. 2009)
Driver was stopped for operating his tractor-trailer under the influence of alcohol. Breath tests showed a blood alcohol content of more than 0.04 but less than 0.08 percent. At the hearing, Driver relied on Veh. Code, § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), in arguing that his license suspension should be rescinded because his blood alcohol content was not 0.08 percent or more. The trial court concluded that the reference to 0.08 percent in the statute was a drafter's oversight. The court held that § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), could not be read literally because it conflicted with, and could not be harmonized with, Veh. Code, § 13353.2, subd. (a)(3), providing for suspension based on a blood alcohol content of 0.04 percent or more. To avoid absurd results, the court construed § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(C)(i), to allow the California DMV to sustain an order of suspension imposed under Veh. Code, § 13353.2, subd. (a)(3), on a person for driving a vehicle requiring a commercial driver's license with a blood alcohol content of 0.04 percent or more where there was proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the person's blood alcohol content was 0.04 percent or more.
- Weaver v. Chavez, 35 Cal. Rptr.3d 514 (Cal. App. 2005)
With respect to a jury instruction on negligence, a federal regulation promulgated under Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which requires operators of commercial motor vehicles to use "extreme caution" when driving in inclement weather, imposes higher duty of care than "reasonable or prudent" standard in California's basic speed law, and thus operators of commercial motor vehicles are required to comply with regulation. 49 U.S.C.A. § 31131; Cal.Vehicle Code § 22350; 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.2, 392.14.
- Harte v. Routt County Dist. Court, 2012 COA 183 (Colo. Ct. App. October 25, 2012) (No. 11CA1815)*
Defendant's successfully completed deferred judgment under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(2) constituted a conviction of an alcohol-related driving offense, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301, and therefore, she was not entitled to seal her arrest and criminal records under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-308. The legislature intended the definition of "conviction" in the alcohol-related driving offenses exception to the sealing statute to include a successfully completed deferred judgment, even though "conviction" was defined in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1307(2)(a) to exclude a successfully completed deferred judgment.
*No final published opinion available as of date.
- State v. Burnell, 290 Conn. 634, 966 A.2d 168 (Conn. 2009).
Stating that the legislature enacted Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-1 to comply with federal law that conditioned the receipt of certain highway funds on the states' enactment of commercial driver's license programs to address various safety problems, including the maintenance of multiple licenses in different states to minimize the administrative impact of checkered driving records.
No cases at this time.
District of Columbia
No cases at this time.
- McIntyre v. Seminole County School Bd., 779 So.2d 639 (Ct. App. Fla. 2001)
An area transportation manager who supervised school bus drivers tested positive for drugs but did not violate federal regulations prohibiting persons who must hold a commercial driver's license (CDL) from operating a commercial vehicle while under the influence of controlled substances because manager's job description stated that a CDL was "preferred" but not required, and job description did not indicate that manager operated a school bus or other commercial vehicle but that he performed managerial and supervisory functions.
- Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259, 658 S.E.2d 592 (2008)
Defendant complained that he was denied due process because the implied consent notice read to him failed to inform him that his refusal to submit to chemical testing would result in his lifetime disqualification from having a commercial driver's license. Court held due process does not require that the arresting officer inform the driver of all the consequences of refusing to submit to testing because the officer had made it clear that refusing the test was not a safe harbor, free of adverse consequences.
- Williams v. State, 303 Ga.App. 407, 693 S.E.2d 613 (Ct. App. Ga. 2010)
Acknowledges that a uniform traffic citation charging driver with a violation of the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act (the Uniform Act) OCGA § 40-5-140 et seq.) was valid because the Uniform Act implements the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (the Federal Safety Act), Title XII of Public Law 99-570, which is designed to reduce or prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and injuries by permitting commercial drivers to hold only one license; disqualifying commercial drivers who have committed certain criminal or other offenses or serious traffic violations; and strengthening commercial driver licensing and testing standards.
No cases at this time.
- Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011)
A commercial licensee's failure to take an alcohol breath test was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement, and thus he was disqualified based on his DUI conviction. After the conviction the licensee received notice that he was disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle. This was not a violation of the licensee's due process rights because the statutes were not ambiguous. Further, the administrative disqualification of licensee's CDL following a conviction for DUI does not violate the double jeopardy clause because the legislature intended for the one year CDL disqualification to be civil not criminal. A CDL disqualification was not so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform the civil remedy into a criminal penalty and the CDL disqualification is not historically viewed as a punishment. The disqualification, while intended to deter future wrongdoing, also serves to provide for the safety of the public at-large.
- Turner v. Secretary of State, 12 A.3d 1188 (Me. 2011).
Definition of "alcohol concentration" in Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act (UCDLA) as that which results from a breath test administered within two hours of a driver being stopped or detained did not apply in this prosecution for aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) under the Illinois Motor Carrier Safety Law (IMCSL), as the UCDLA definition of "alcohol concentration" began by noting it was limited by the definitions set forth elsewhere in vehicle code and applied only for the purposes of enforcing the UCDLA. The legislature, via the IMCSL, had adopted provisions of Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) defining "alcohol concentration," which contained no time limitation for testing.
- Illinois Bulk Carrier, Inc. v. Jackson, 908 N.E.2d 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
States that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations eliminate the distinction between independent contractors and employees so that an attempt by motor carriers to avoid liability simply by labeling a driver as an independent contractor is unavailing.
- Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Orange, 889 N.E.2d 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
Holder of commercial driver's license (CDL) who was convicted of operating a noncommercial vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement could be granted probationary driving privileges to drive noncommercial vehicles, even though he was ineligible to drive a commercial motor vehicle under state statute incorporating Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (MCSIA); MCSIA did not restrict CDL holder's right to drive noncommercial vehicles, and state law could not be more restrictive than MCSIA.
- Silverman v. Fifer, 837 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
Under preemption doctrine, federal statute precluded Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles from issuing restricted commercial driver's license based on hardship, to over-the-road truck driver whose commercial driver's license had been suspended because he had refused to take breath test for evidence of intoxication.
- Frohardt v. Bassett, 788 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
Penske rental truck that driver was operating when truck hit motorist's vehicle was not a "commercial motor vehicle" pursuant to Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and similar state statute, and thus driver was not required to possess a commercial driver's license when operating truck, since truck weighed less than minimum weight for a commercial motor vehicle, and driver was not an employee of Penske.
- Commissioner, Dept. of Revenue v. Partlow, 769 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
Driver, who had been diagnosed with epilepsy as a young teenager and had not had any seizures relating to such illness for fifteen years, was medically qualified to hold commercial driver's license under Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration regulations where driver's physician testified it was not likely that driver's condition continued to require anti-seizure medication and that the amount of medication prescribed for driver was not likely to be therapeutic. Driver's physician also testified that the risk of driver experiencing another seizure was extremely remote.
- State v. Hutton, 796 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 2011)
The Iowa Supreme Court considered a claim that a driver's consent to a chemical breath test was involuntary because the advisory "inaccurately represented the consequences of his decision to submit to the test or not." Additional language in the advisory incorrectly overstated the potential adverse consequences of taking the chemical test. Specifically, it warned the driver that his commercial driver's license (CDL) would be revoked for one year if he took the chemical test and failed it. Despite this language, the driver agreed to take the test anyway-and registered a .205 blood alcohol concentration. The Court held that the driver had no basis for arguing his consent to the test was involuntary.
- Wiebenga v. Iowa DOT, 530 N.W. 2d. 732 (Iowa 1995)
Blood alcohol test results that are inadmissible in criminal proceeding may be used as basis to disqualify driver from holding commercial driver's license, even though such results may not be used to revoke regular driver's license because a statute providing for rescission of revocation refers to statutory provisions governing revocation of regular licenses, but does not refer to provisions governing disqualification of commercial licenses. Persons who possess commercial license are held to higher standards than persons holding regular license.
- State v. Crum, 270 Kan. 870, 19 P.3d 172 (Kan. 2001)
Warrantless stop and inspection of commercial truck that was authorized to transport property for hire did not violate either federal or state constitution, even though officer stopped truck solely to conduct inspection and lacked any suspicion that there was violation of any state law because commercial trucking occurred on 24-hour basis, governing statute was entirely reasonable in not limiting when commercial vehicle could be stopped. The fact that statute failed to specify frequency of permissible stops was not in and of itself constitutional error. Further, the statute limited inspection to determining whether driver and vehicle were in compliance with applicable motor carrier laws, rules, and regulations, and place of stops, i.e., state highways and trafficways, was sufficiently limited, given public interest in safety.
- Cuthbertson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 42 Kan.App.2d 1049, 220 P.3d 379 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009)
When a person is stopped for a suspected driving under the influence (DUI) while driving a noncommercial vehicle, an officer is not required to provide notice of the effect a breath test refusal or failure will have on that person's commercial driver's license. If, however, the officer provides gratuitous information concerning the non-mandated notice, the officer must provide a correct statement of the law, and if any gratuitously provided information is incorrect, the driver must demonstrate prejudice to prove reversible error.
- State v. Bradley, 42 Kan.App.2d 104, 208 P.3d 788 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009)
Substantial compliance with the statutory requirement that driver arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) be given advisory notices before a blood alcohol test is administered is sufficient.
- Robinson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 37 Kan.App.2d 425, 154 P.3d 508 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007)
Trooper who stopped motorist, who was driving noncommercial vehicle, on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) was not required, under implied consent law, to advise the motorist that if he failed a sobriety test or if he refused testing, his commercial driver's license could be administratively suspended for one year, in contrast to 30-day suspension of noncommercial driver's license.
- Mollette v. Kentucky Personnel Bd., 997 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999)
Personnel Board upheld public employee's termination for drug use, and he appealed. The Circuit Court affirmed and he appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence supported finding that employee used marijuana in violation of employer's zero tolerance policy for holders of commercial drivers' licenses, and this, in turn, supported termination of his employment.
- Moore v. State Dept. Of Public Safety, 655 So. 2d. 644 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
Following suspension of motorist's commercial Class A driver's license for driving with excessive blood alcohol content, the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ouachita Parish, granted motorist hardship license to drive commercial vehicles, and Department of Public Safety and Corrections appealed. The Court of Appeal, held that trial court did not have authority to grant motorist hardship license for commercial vehicles while prohibiting his driving private vehicles or any vehicle for his personal use.
- Parker v. Stalder, 704 So. 2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
Driver filed petition to challenge suspension of his commercial driver's license by Department of Public Safety and Corrections. The Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, affirmed suspension. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeal, held that relevant period in statute providing for suspension of commercial driver's license for two serious traffic violations within three-year period is time between occurrence of violations, rather than time between convictions for such violations.
- Turner v. Secretary of State, 12 A.3d 1188 (Me. 2011).
The Secretary of State suspended Turner's commercial driving license for a period of three years based on its finding, pursuant to a blood-alcohol test, that Turner had operated a commercial vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.04%. Turner petitioned for judicial review, and the Superior Court vacated the Secretary of State's decision. The Secretary of State appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the police officer had sufficient probable cause to require Turner to take a blood-alcohol test where officer smelled an odor of alcohol on his breath, and he admitted that he had consumed alcohol. The Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and affirmed the license suspension.
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jaigobin, 413 Md. 191, 991 A.2d 1251 (Md. Ct. App. 2010)
Holder of CDL sought review of decision by the Motor Vehicle Administration disqualifying his CDL for one year following his acceptance of probation before judgment on charge of driving under the influence per se. Upon grant of certiorari, the Court of Appeals held that probation before judgment (PBJ) constituted a "conviction" as that term was defined in the Maryland Commercial Driver's License Act.
- Hill v. Motor Vehicle Admin, 415 Md. 231, 999 A.2d 1019 (Md. Ct. App. 2010)
A form that advised motorist of potential penalties for failing or refusing to submit to breath test clearly advised motorist that his CDL would be disqualified if he refused the test, and the form that was read to motorist during stop was not incompatible with the General Assembly's legislative intent with respect to the stricter sanctions imposed upon holders of CDLs.
- Schramm v. Foster, 341 F.Supp.2d 536 (D. Md. 2004)
Parents of minor motorist who was injured in collision, individually and as motorist's guardian, as well as motorist's passenger and his parents, brought personal injury actions against driver of tractor-trailer involved in collision, driver's employer, and company that brokered shipment being transported by driver, alleging negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, and violations of Motor Carrier Act (MCA) and federal motor carrier safety regulations. Plaintiffs and shipment broker cross-moved for summary judgment on issues of broker's liability. The court held that a principal / agent relationship did not exist between tractor-trailer driver and broker; and that the broker was not vicariously liable for any negligence by driver, even if driver was its agent. The broker could not be held liable for negligent entrustment under Maryland law. Further still, the MCA does not create private right of action for personal injuries and in any event, liability did not exist under MCA, even if private right of action existed.
- Com. v. Leboeuf, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 45, 934 N.E.2d 1285 (Mass. Ct. App. 2010)
Defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license filed a motion to suppress on grounds that officer's warrantless administrative inspection of commercial vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court reported case to the Appeals Court for resolution of an important question of law. The Appeals Court held that statute authorizing warrantless administrative safety inspections of commercial vehicles provided an adequate substitute for a warrant, and random stop of commercial vehicle for the purpose of conducting administrative safety inspection was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
- Taylor v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich.App. 333, 548 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
Statutes requiring applicants for group vehicle designations to have not suffered suspension or revocation of their driving privileges within 36 months preceding application and providing that circuit courts lacked jurisdiction to review denials of applications based on such ground constituted exercise of state's power to enhance safety, and concomitant life, health and welfare of public, in use of state's road system, and therefore retroactive application of such statutes did not violate constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
- Krenz v. Cloverleaf Cold Storage, 2005 WL 2277285 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) *Unpublished
Employer violated federal transportation-safety laws when its dispatcher told commercial driver to drive a shift without allowing him the ten preceding consecutive hours off duty. Because Employer violated federal transportation-safety laws, the court concludes that commercial driver had good cause per se to quit, that he was not required to report his complaint to his employer and give it yet another opportunity to respond to his complaint, and that he was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.
- Risk v. Eastside Beverage, 664 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
It is "employment misconduct" under statutory provisions for disqualification of unemployment benefits for an employee, during working hours, to have an alcohol concentration level over the legal limit while driving his employer's vehicle, even if he neither was convicted under any criminal driving while under the influence (DWI) statute nor lost his driver's license under the implied consent statute.
- Lumpkin v. Birdsong, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So.2d 230 (Miss. 1951)
Driver employed by railroad to drive truck to transport other employees and tools to and from work was, in respect to use of truck, operating "a private commercial carrier" by motor vehicle used in furtherance of commercial enterprise of railroading for purpose of statute in regard to operator's licenses.
- Baber v. Director of Revenue State, 317 S.W.3d 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)
Under Missouri's Commercial Driver's License Act ("CDLA"), a person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one year if "convicted" of a first violation. The CDLA defines "conviction" as "an unvacated adjudication of guilt, including pleas of guilt and nolo contendre, or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative proceeding."
- Strup v. Director of Revenue, State, 311 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2010)
Suspension of motorist's driving privilege constituted a "conviction" for driving under the influence of alcohol for the purposes of the Commercial Driver's License Act (CDLA), such as to merit disqualification of his commercial driver's privilege for a period of not less than one year.
No cases at this time.
- State v. Arterburn, 276 Neb. 47, 751 N.W.2d 157 (Neb. 2008)
Prosecution for DUI, following disqualification of defendants' commercial driver's licenses, did not violate double jeopardy because the legislature intended commercial license disqualification for DUI to be a civil sanction. Further, commercial license disqualification for DUI was not so punitive in its purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature's intent to create a civil sanction.
- Caspers Const. Co. v. Nebraska State Patrol, 700 N.W.2d 587 (Neb. 2005)
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 75-302(11) (Reissue 2003) defines "intrastate commerce" as "commerce between any place in this state and any other place in this state and not in part through any other state." "Motor carrier" is defined as "any person other than a regulated motor carrier who or which owns, controls, manages, operates, or causes to be operated any motor vehicle used to transport passengers or property over any public highway in this state." § 75-302(12).
- Polikov v. Neth, 699 N.W.2d 802 (Neb. 2005)
The power to design a pretrial diversion program is a legislative function and that therefore, in enacting code sections that address the same, the Legislature did not run afoul of the separation of powers clause.
- Strong v. Neth, 676 N.W.2d 15 (Neb. 2004)
Commercial driver's license was administratively revoked by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Licensee appealed. The District Court sustained the administrative revocation. Licensee appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Licensee filed petition for further review, which the Supreme Court granted and held: (1) licensee's forfeiture of bond in lieu of appearance in Wyoming on charge of driving under the influence constituted "conviction" under Driver License Compact, and (2) licensee's conduct in Wyoming could be used to revoke his commercial driver's license in Nebraska.
- Yelli v. Neth, 16 Neb.App. 639, 747 N.W.2d 459 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008)
The holder of a commercial driver's license is subject to administrative revocation for driving a commercial vehicle with a blood alcohol content of .04 or more. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-4, 167.02 (Reissue 2004) provides that any person aggrieved because of disqualification pursuant to a hearing under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-4.167 (Reissue 2004) may appeal to the district court of the county where the alleged violation occurred in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. If appeal is filed in a different county, a jurisdictional defect will prevent the court from hearing the appeal.
No cases at this time.
- State v. Woodman, 114 N.H. 497, 323 A.2d 921 (N.H. 1974)
State resident, whose place of business was in neighboring state, which required him to hold commercial driver's license in that state, was also required to hold driver's license issued by home state to operate a vehicle in such state, despite statute which provided that applicant for state driver's license had to surrender any other state's driver's license held.
- State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008)
States that in 1990, the New Jersey Commercial Driver License Act was enacted. And that it created an even more stringent standard to be applied to drivers of commercial vehicles which provides a penalty, in addition to any other applicable penalties, of a one to three-year commercial license suspension for commercial drivers caught driving with a BAC level of 0.04 percent or greater. The 0.04 percent BAC standard for commercial drivers was enacted both to comply with the federal standard in the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 and in recognition of the fact that significant impairment occurred well below the otherwise applicable 0.10 percent BAC levels.
- State v. Nunnally, 420 N.J.Super. 58, 18 A.3d 1044 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2011)
A driver arrested only for operation of a commercial motor vehicle by a driver with a prohibited alcohol concentration (CDL DUI) cannot be charged with general refusal based on that arrest.
- State v. Pompa, 414 N.J.Super. 219, 997 A.2d 1107 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2010)
State trooper was entitled to conduct administrative inspection of defendant's tractor trailer pursuant to closely regulated business exception to warrant requirement, given applicable federal regulations governing tractor trailers, and thus, trooper's inspection was permitted and authorized entry into tractor trailer's sleeper cabin since federal regulations extended that far. New Jersey has interest in guaranteeing safety of drivers on its roadways, and to that end, warrantless administrative inspections of tractor trailers further that interest by ensuring that largest vehicles on state roads are safe for transit and in compliance with established regulations.
- State v. Smith, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (N.M. 2004)
Stating that during its 2003 session, the state legislature passed three bills to amend Section 66-8-102, the DWI statute. On March 19, 2003, the governor signed House Bill (HB) 250, 2003 Leg., 46th Sess. (N.M.2003), 2003 N.M. Laws, ch. 51, § 10, which lowered the limit for commercial drivers' blood or breath alcohol concentration to .04, and repeated, without change, the existing penalty provisions of Section 66-8-102(G).
- Cravatta v. New York State Dept. of Transp., 77 A.D.3d 1399 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
Termination of Department of Transportation employee from his highway maintenance worker position following suspension of his commercial driver license (CDL) was not disciplinary in nature and thus was subject to neither arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement nor provision of Civil Service Law governing removal or other disciplinary action, where employee was required to maintain a CDL as a condition of his employment.
- Barnard v. N.C. Department of Transp., 671 S.E.2d 70 (Table) (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) UNPUBLISHED:
Even where a violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-37.12(a) constitutes negligence per se, a driver's violation of the statute (commercial driver's license required) cannot be a basis for liability where the record contains no evidence, and the Commission made no finding, that driver's violation of the statute was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
- State v. Reid, 559 S.E.2d 561 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
Revocation of defendant's commercial driver's license for thirty days, accompanied by a disqualification for a limited commercial driver's license, which occurred prior to trial for offense of impaired driving, was not akin to criminal punishment, and thus, defendant's later conviction for impaired driving did not constitute double jeopardy.
- Bienek v. Department of Transp., 736 N.W.2d 492 (N.D. 2007)
Department of Transportation's suspension of licensee's noncommercial driving privileges following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) was a "conviction," so as to support lifetime suspension of licensee's commercial driving privileges after his second DUI conviction, although licensee had accepted the suspension of his driving privileges prior to dismissal of the DUI charge. The word "conviction" was defined, in part, as a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in an authorized administrative tribunal, and Department's decision to suspend licensee's driving privileges was a determination made by an authorized administrative tribunal. NDCC 39-06.2-02(8), 39-06.2-10(8).
- Lentz v. Spryncznatyk, 708 N.W.2d 859 (N.D. 2006)
Statute providing for lifetime suspension of commercial driving privileges if licensee suffers a second conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) while operating a noncommercial motor vehicle was not applied retroactively, by Department of Transportation, to a licensee, for purposes of state's statutory presumption against retroactive application of legislation, though the licensee's first DUI offense had occurred before effective date of lifetime suspension provision, where the triggering offense, i.e., the second DUI conviction, occurred after the provision's effective date. NDCC 1-02-10, 39-06.2-10(8).
No cases at this time.
- Tate v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 268 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2001)
Former employee who took medication to control focal seizures was not qualified for his position operating a commercial motor vehicle (CMV), as required for his prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. Although employee could perform the essential functions of a CMV operator while taking the prescribed dosage of medication, the fact that he had to take medication to control focal seizures necessarily rendered him unable to meet a job-related requirement of the employment position established under the Department of Transportation's (DOT) standards. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 101(8), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8); 49 C.F.R. §§ 390.3(d), 391.41(b)(8).
- Mize v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 393 F.Supp.2d 1223 (W.D.Okla. 2005)
Motorist who alleged that he suffered injury by operation of a motor carrier and that motor carrier was required to be and was, in fact, insured by insurer stated a claim against insurer under Oklahoma statute which created a direct cause of action by a person injured by operation of a motor carrier against the motor carrier's insurer, provided that the motor carrier was insured. 47 Okl.St.Ann § 230.30.
- Owens v. Motor Vehicles Div., 319 Or. 259, 875 P.2d 463 (Or. 1994)
With respect to whether the accuracy of the result of a chemical breath test administered to determine the blood alcohol content of a driver, who has been arrested for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), may be challenged (impeached) if the person who administers the test is qualified to administer the test under ORS 813.160 and if the methods, procedures, and equipment used in the test comply with the requirements of ORS 813.160, the Court held that it may not.
- Kolva v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 977 A.2d 1248 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)
Following motorist's voluntary withdrawal from Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program, Department of Transportation could no longer enforce automatic one-year suspension of motorist's commercial driver's license.
- Poborski v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 964 A.2d 66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)
After the licensee was charged with DUI, he accepted an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition ("ARD") of the DUI charge. After he was notified of the suspension and disqualification, he filed a petition to be removed from the ARD program and to remand his case to the magistrate. The trial court granted the petition, after which the licensee argued that his voluntary withdrawal from the ARD program should trigger a nullification of the suspension and disqualification. The court stated that a licensee's mere acceptance into the ARD program was sufficient to trigger a license suspension. A licensee's acceptance of the ARD program, however, constituted a conscious choice of an alternative to prosecution and a knowing waiver of his rights to prove his innocence or risk conviction. It followed, then, that the trial court's grant of the licensee's petition to withdraw from the ARD program had to be read as a nullification of that knowing waiver. Therefore, while the DOT's suspension and disqualification were valid at the time they were made, the trial court's subsequent nullification of that acceptance had to be read to also nullify DOT's authority to continue any enforcement of its suspension and disqualification.
- Commonwealth of Penn. v. Dugan, 769 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)
Defendant was convicted of driving commercial motor vehicle without commercial driver's license, and he appealed. The Superior Court held that: (1) defendant who was driving pickup truck towing horse trailer was driving a commercial motor vehicle for which Class A license was required, and since defendant did not have Class A license, he was in violation of statute prohibiting driving commercial motor vehicle without commercial driver's license; and (2) the phrase "commercial motor vehicle" includes the concept of combination of motorized vehicles and towed vehicles for purposes of statute requiring the driver of a commercial motor vehicle to have a commercial driver's license.
- Shewack v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 993 A.2d 916, (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)
Offense on which licensee was convicted in Maryland was not sufficiently similar to a Pennsylvania offense so as to justify the Department of Transportation's (DOT) disqualification of licensee's commercial driver's license (CDL); the Maryland offense prohibited an individual from operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, while the Pennsylvania provision prohibits an individual from operating a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) with a suspended license.
- Com. v. Williams, 624 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
Tractor trailer cab was "commercial vehicle," for purposes of convicting driver of operating commercial vehicle while under influence of alcohol, even though cab was not hooked to trailer and driver was using cab for personal transportation when he was stopped; cab alone was still monstrous vehicle with potential to cause severe damage if part of an accident and, thus, was within class of vehicles for which legislature intended to more severely limit permissible blood alcohol content of drivers.
- Aten v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 649 A.2d 732 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)
For purposes of disqualification of commercial driver's license based on West Virginia conviction for driving commercial motor vehicle without holding a commercial driver's license, fact that comparable Pennsylvania statute provides exception from conviction for driving without license if driver produces license within 15 days, while West Virginia law does not, did not prevent the offenses from being essentially similar where the driver lacked a valid commercial driver's license at the time of the offense and was unable to produce one within 15 days to avoid disqualification, and did not demonstrate that he would not have been convicted had the offense been committed in Pennsylvania.
- Walck v. Com. Dept. of Transp. Bureau of Driver Licensing, 625 A.2d 1276 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)
Cancelling commercial driver's license was justified where abstract of driver record history indicated that operator's New Jersey license was on suspended status for driving under the influence conviction when Pennsylvania license was issued.
No cases at this time.
No cases at this time.
- State v. Snyder, 835 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)
By enacting T.C.A. § 55-50-408, the legislature made it a crime to operate a commercial motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of point zero four (.04) or more. Neither the need to prove impairment nor the rebuttable presumption contained in T.C.A. § 55-10-408 applies in such cases. The language of the statute is clear and references to the other DUI provisions in the code indicate that the legislature intended to create a higher standard of care for those who drive commercial motor vehicles. The jury instruction given in this case was correct and this issue has no merit.
- State v. Hollis, 327 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010)
Statute providing, in certain circumstances, for deferred adjudication of guilt for certain traffic offenses authorizes a county court to grant deferred adjudication on appeal to a defendant who failed to invoke procedures providing for driving safety courses in relation to offense at justice court level, but statute prohibits the granting of deferred adjudication on appeal to a defendant who committed a serious traffic violation while driving a commercial motor vehicle.
- Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres, 191 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)
Driver of tractor-trailer, who was injured when tires separated from oncoming tractor-trailer and precipitated wreck involving four tractor-trailer rigs, belonged to the class that Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), prohibiting operation of vehicles with missing nuts or bolts and requiring a motor carrier to maintain motor vehicles in safe and proper operating conditions and a driver to be satisfied that vehicle was in safe operating condition, were intended to protect, and his injury was of a type that the regulations were designed to prevent, for purposes of determining whether injured driver had a negligence per se claim based on such regulations against owner and driver of oncoming tractor-trailer.
No cases at this time.
No cases at this time.
- Smit v. Shippers' Choice of Virginia, Inc., 277 Va. 593, 674 S.E.2d 842 (Va. 2009)
Unlicensed mechanic for commercial driver training school who was teaching driver training class was "instructor" within meaning of statute and regulation that required instructor to be licensed, even though he was not receiving compensation as instructor; he was teaching or giving class on learning to operate commercial vehicle and was acting on behalf of driver training school for compensation he received as mechanic.
- Meierotto v. Com., 646 S.E.2d 1 (Va. Ct. App. 2007)
A domiciliary of another state, while residing in Virginia, can use his commercial driver's license, issued by the other state, to drive non-commercial vehicles in Virginia.
- Allen v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 169 Wash.App. 304 (2012)
Motorist sought review of decision by
Department of Licensing that suspended his personal driver's
license for 90 days and disqualified his commercial driver's
license (CDL) for one year. The Superior Court, Snohomish
County, Linda Krese, J., affirmed. Motorist sought further
review. The Court of Appeals, Cox, J., held that
implied consent warning given by arresting officer did not
misleadingly imply that the CDL disqualification would be
for same length of time as the suspension or revocation of
- Ball v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 113 Wash.App. 193 (2002)
Department of Licensing revoked licenses of driver who
offered unresponsive and unclear answers when asked if
he wanted to speak to an attorney, and failed to follow
instructions when taking a breath test, after being stopped
for driving while intoxicated. Driver appealed. The Superior
Court, Pierce County, Rosanne Buckner, J., reversed the
revocation, and Department petitioned for discretionary
review. The Court of Appeals, Armstrong, J., held that driver
refused to take the breath test, thus justifying revocation of
his driving privilege.
- Bauer v. State Employment Sec. Dept., 108 P.3d 1240 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
Court of Appeals would decline to adopt "constructive voluntary quit" or "constructive voluntary leaving" doctrine so as to preclude commercial truck driver, who was terminated after he lost his commercial driver's license following his commission of two serious traffic offenses, from obtaining unemployment benefits.
- City of Kent v. Beigh, 145 Wash.2d 33 (2001)
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, and
he moved to suppress blood test results. The Kent Municipal
Court granted motion. City petitioned for a writ of review.
The Superior Court, King County, Leroy McCullough, J.,
denied writ. The Court of Appeals, 102 Wash.App. 269, 6
P.3d 1211, affirmed. After granting city's petition for review,
the Supreme Court, Sanders, J., held that defendant was not
physically incapable of providing breath test of blood alcohol
content, and thus, police officer did not have authority under
implied consent statute to request blood test.
- City of Seattle v. St. John, 166 Wash.2d 941 (2009)
Defendant, who had been arrested for driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), challenged
blood alcohol test administered to him pursuant to a search
warrant, after defendant refused to take a voluntary blood
alcohol test. The Municipal Court held that the test was
invalid. Appeal was taken. The Superior Court, King County,
Michael J. Fox, J., reversed. Defendant appealed. Court of
Appeals certified case.
- City of Seattle v. Stalsbroten, 138 Wash.2d 227 (1999)
Drunk driving defendant, following the Municipal Court's
denial of his motion to suppress his refusal to perform
field sobriety tests (FSTs), was convicted by a jury in the
District Court, and he appealed. The Superior Court, King
County, Ricardo Martinez, J., affirmed, and defendant sought
discretionary review. The Court of Appeals, Coleman, J.,
91 Wash.App. 226, 957 P.2d 260, ruled that the refusal to
perform FSTs should have been suppressed but concluded
that the error was harmless and affirmed the conviction.
On further review, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
Durham, J., held that: (1) a refusal to perform FSTs is not
testimonial, and thus is not protected by the right against self-incrimination,
and (2) admitting evidence at trial of such a
refusal does not impermissibly compel self-incrimination.
- City of Spokane v. Wrenn, Not Reported in P.3d (1999)
- Desmon v. Washington Dept. of Licensing, 166 Wash.App. 313 (2012)
School bus driver sought review of Department
of Licensing's (DOL) cancellation of her commercial driver's
license after she failed an audit retest. The Spokane Superior
Court, Tari S. Eitzen, J., affirmed. Driver appealed to the
Holding: Upon transfer, the Court of Appeals, Korsmo, J.,
held that DOL lacked authority to cancel school bus driver's
commercial driver's license after she failed a licensing retest
that was done pursuant to an audit of a third-party tester.
- Gonzales v. State Dept. of Licensing, 112 Wash.2d 890 (1989)
Department of Licensing revoked two drivers' licenses for
refusal to submit to breathalyzer test after being arrested for
driving while intoxicated. The Superior Court, King County,
Warren Chan and Terrence A. Carroll, JJ., sustained the
revocations, and drivers appealed. In consolidated cases,
the Supreme Court, Andersen, J., held that: (1) although
implied consent warnings stating that additional alcohol
concentration tests could be obtained "at your own expense"
were inaccurate as to indigent drivers and inclusion of such
language in implied consent warning could therefore deny
indigent driver opportunity to make knowing and intelligent
decision, that language did not prejudice drivers who made
no claim of indigency and thus would not serve as ground to
invalidate revocations; (2) actual prejudice to driver would be
required to invalidate revocation of driver's license based on
refusal to take breathalyzer test after arrest for driving while
under influence of intoxicating liquor based on inaccuracy
of implied consent warning, where the action was civil and
the officer had given all of the implied consent warnings,
although he had failed to do so in a 100% accurate manner;
and (3) accurate form of implied consent warning is that
refusal to take breathalyzer test "may" be used in criminal
- Hoag v. State, Not Reported in P.3d (2001)
- Jury v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 114 Wash.App. 726 (2002)
Two drivers sought judicial review of suspension of licenses.
The Superior Court, Kittitas County, Michael Cooper, J.,
reversed, and the Department of Licensing appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that: (1) state patrol
implied-consent warnings were not misleading, and (2) police
officer's observation plus use of laser speed gun provided
probable cause to arrest.
- Leininger v. Washington State Dept. of Licensing, 120 Wash.App. 68 (2004)
State department of licensing revoked license
of driver who refused to take breath test for alcohol. The
Superior Court, Benton County, Sharon Brown, J. Pro Tem.,
reinstated driver's driving privileges. Department appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that
driver did not have right to an attorney prior to administration
of breath test.
- Lynch v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 262 P.3d 65 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011)
Implied consent warnings given to driver were not rendered inaccurate or misleading by inclusion of statement concerning potential commercial driver's license (CDL) disqualification, notwithstanding driver's claim that statement falsely implied that CDL disqualification would be for the same period as her personal driver's license suspension or revocation, namely, 90 days if she failed the breath test and one year if she refused to take the test; CDL notification referred to CDL "disqualification" as opposed to personal driver's license "suspension or revocation," correctly implying that it was a separate consequence.
- Maloney v. State, Dept. of Licensing, Not Reported in P.3d (2001)
- Martin v. State Dept. of Licensing, 175 Wash.App. 9 (2013)
Driver sought review of Department of
Licensing's suspension of his personal driver's license and
disqualification of his commercial driver's license. The
Cowlitz Superior Court, James E. Warme, J., reversed. State
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lisa Worswick, C.J., held
 implied consent warnings were not rendered inaccurate
or misleading by inclusion of statement concerning potential
 implied consent warnings that were neither inaccurate nor
misleading did not result in prejudice to driver;
 driver's due process rights were not violated when hearing
officer continued hearing after arresting officer failed to
 statute requiring continuance did not violate equal
- McCalib v. State Dept. of Licensing, Not Reported in P.3d (2003)
- Merseal v. State Dept. of Licensing, 99 Wash.App. 414 (2000)
Truck driver appealed the administrative suspension of his
commercial driver's license. The Superior Court, Adams
County, Richard Miller, J., denied the appeal. Driver
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sweeney, J., held that: (1)
deferred criminal prosecution did not divest Department of
Licensing (DOL) of authority to suspend the commercial
driver's license, and (2) statutes entitling private drivers
but not commercial drivers to an occupational permit after
suspension did not violate equal protection.
- Pattison v. State Dept. of Licensing, 112 Wash.App. 670 (2002)
Motorists on separate occasions were arrested on suspicion
of driving under the influence, had their licenses suspended
or revoked, and appealed results of administrative hearing.
After their cases were consolidated, the King County Superior
Court, Julia Garratt, Judge Pro Tem, found that implied
consent warning form used by State Patrol misstated the law,
and Department of Licensing requested discretionary review.
The Court of Appeals, Becker, C.J., held that implied consent
warning form did not misstate the law or impair a motorist's
ability to make an informed decision about taking a breath
- Shuman v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 108 Wash.App. 673 (2001)
Driver appealed revocation of his driver's license by
Department of Licensing. The Superior Court sustained the
revocation and driver obtained discretionary review. The
Court of Appeals, Kato, J., held that admission of driver's
refusal to submit to blood alcohol concentration (BAC)
verifier test would work an injustice, so as to support
bar under doctrine of collateral estoppel to admission of
such evidence, which was excluded in underlying criminal
evidentiary hearing following driver's arrest for driving under
the influence of alcohol (DWI).
- Smith v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 88 Wash.App. 875 (1997)
Motorist challenged administrative revocation of permanent
driver's license for driving while under influence of
intoxicants. The Superior Court, Clark County, Robert
Harris, J., affirmed. Motorist appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Seinfeld, P.J., held that proof of compliance with
administrative provisions on periodic testing of breath test
machine was not prerequisite to admission of test results.
- State, Dept. of Licensing v. Grewal, 108 Wash.App. 815 (2001)
Minor driver sought judicial review of revocation of driver's
license for driving while intoxicated. The Superior Court,
Whatcom County, David Nichols, J., reversed. Department of
Licensing appealed. The Court of Appeals, Webster, J., held
that: (1) police report supported revocation, and (2) driver
received adequate warnings under implied-consent statute.
- State v. Avery, 103 Wash.App. 527 (2000)
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Pierce
County, Thomas J. Larkin, J., of vehicular homicide and
failure to remain at the scene of an injury accident. Defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seinfeld, P.J., held that:
(1) arrest necessary to trigger implied consent statute need
not be for alcohol-related offense; but (2) implied consent
statute did not apply as officers did not have reasonable
grounds to believe defendant was driving under the influence
of intoxicants at time of his arrest for leaving scene of injury
accident; and (3) defendant's voluntary consent to blood test,
as opposed to breath test, was proper.
- State v. Baldwin, 109 Wash.App. 516 (2001)
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Spokane
County, Linda G. Tompkins, J., of driving under the
influence (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Schultheis, J., held that: (1) defendant did not waive his right
to challenge statute and blood test admission, although he
did not raise issue in pretrial suppression motion; (2) implied
consent statute was constitutional; (3) defendant's refusal to
take blood test was admissible at trial; (4) court was not
required to balance probative value of refusal to take the test
with prejudicial value of that refusal; and (5) state trooper had
statutory authority to request blood test.
- State v. Bartels, 112 Wash.2d 882 (1989)
State appealed from orders of the Superior Court of
Spokane and King Counties, William J. Grant and Nancy
A. Holman, JJ., which granted various defendants' motions
to suppress blood alcohol content test results. The Supreme
Court accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and
Callow, C.J., held that inclusion in implied consent warning
of erroneous statement that defendants had right to have
qualified person administer additional blood alcohol content
test "at your own expense" required suppression of test results
as to those defendants who could not afford additional test at
time of arrest.
- State v. Berger, Not Reported in P.3d (2011)
- State v. Elkins, 152 Wash.App. 871 (2009)
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial in
the Superior Court, King County, Deborah Fleck, J., of
attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, driving under
the influence (DUI), second degree assault, felony hit and run,
and bail jumping. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lau, J., held that:
 defendant who refused to submit to breath test could not
challenge implied consent warning for its failure to address
consequence applicable only to those who submit to test;
 defendant waived for appellate review her challenge
against implied consent warning for its failure to include
language indicating that she would face a mandatory jail term
for a DUI conviction after refusing a breath test; and
 implied consent warning was not rendered insufficient for
its failure to warn that defendant would face a mandatory jail
term for a conviction for DUI after refusing a breath test.
- State v. Koch, 126 Wash.App. 589 (2005)
Defendant was convicted in the District
Court of driving while under the influence of intoxicants
(DUI). Defendant appealed. The Superior Court, Pierce
County, Beverly Grant, J., reversed. State filed motion for
discretionary review. On review, the Court of Appeals, Armstrong, P.J.,
 arresting officer's warning defendant to be cooperative did
not improperly coerce him to submit to breath test, and
 State toxicologist's testimony about reliability of
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, although admitted
in violation of motion in limine, did not warrant new trial.
- State v. Mee Hui Kim, 134 Wash.App. 27 (2006)
Defendant was convicted in bench trial in
the Superior Court, King County, Douglass A. North, J., of
vehicular homicide and vehicular assault in connection with
head-on collision in which other driver died and passenger of
defendant's car was injured. She appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schindler, A.C.J., held that:
 officer had authority to obtain blood sample without
 result of blood alcohol test was admissible; and
 evidence that passenger gave defendant date-rape drug
- State v. Morales, 173 Wash.2d 560 (2012)
Defendant was convicted in the Superior
Court, Lewis County, Richard W. Buzzard, Judge Pro Tem.,
of hit and run, driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor (DUI), and vehicular assault. Defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, 154 Wash.App. 26, 225 P.3d 311, affirmed.
Defendant filed a petition for review. Following grant of petition, the Supreme Court,
Wiggins, J., held that:
 state failed to prove that defendant who was subject to
mandatory blood test due to vehicular assault charge was
actually read required warning of his right to have additional
tests administered by any qualified person of his choosing,
and, thus, results of defendant's blood test were inadmissible;
 trial court's error in admitting results of defendant's
mandatory blood test did not prejudice him with regard to hit
and run charge;
 trial court's error in admitting results of defendant's
mandatory blood test prejudiced him with respect to charges
of DUI and vehicular assault by means of DUI; and
 trial court's error in admitting results of defendant's
mandatory blood test prejudiced him with respect to charge
of vehicular assault by reckless driving.
- State v. Stymacks, Not Reported in P.3d (2000)
- State v. Templeton, 148 Wash.2d 193 (2002)
On review of consolidated cases involving trial courts'
decisions on motions to suppress breath test evidence in
prosecutions for driving under the influence (DUI), based
on officers' failure to properly advise defendants of the
right to counsel, the Court of Appeals, 107 Wash.App.
141, 27 P.3d 222, affirmed suppression of evidence. On
separate review of other consolidated cases involving the
same issue, the Court of Appeals, 108 Wash.App. 490,
28 P.3d 789, concluded that failure to properly advise
defendants was harmless and did not warrant suppression
of evidence. Review was granted and defendants' appeals
were consolidated. The Supreme Court, Ireland, J., held that:
(1) defendants' challenge did not implicate right to counsel
under Fifth or Sixth Amendments; (2) Supreme Court was
authorized to promulgate rule providing for the advisement
of the right to counsel as soon as feasible after arrest; (3)
police advisement of rights forms failed to inform defendants
of their right to consult counsel before taking breath test; but
(4) insufficiency of advisement of rights forms was harmless
given that defendants did not allege that, if warned, they
would have requested counsel before submitting to the breath
- Thompson v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 138 Wash.2d 783 (1999)
Commercial driver appealed disqualification of his
commercial license by Department of Licensing. The
Superior Court, Clark County, Barbara Johnson, J., sustained
the disqualification. Driver appealed. The Court of Appeals,
91 Wash.App. 887, 960 P.2d 475, affirmed, and driver sought
review. The Supreme Court, Talmadge, J., held that: (1)
overruling State v. Frederick, 100 Wash.2d 550, 674 P.2d
136 (1983) and Franklin v. Klundt, 50 Wash.App. 10, 746
P.2d 1228 (1987), suppression of blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) test results in prior criminal proceeding presented
collateral estoppel bar to admission of that evidence, and
(2) resolving an issue of first impression, the "knowing and
intelligent decision" rule regarding a BAC test applies in
commercial driver's license disqualification hearings.
- Tillman v. State, Dept. of Licensing, Not Reported in P.3d (2012)
- Town of Clyde Hill v. Rodriguez, 65 Wash.App. 778 (1992)
A motorist charged with driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor moved to suppress evidence of his
breath test on grounds that the implied consent warning he
received was inadequate. The Superior Court, King County,
Faith Enyeart, J., granted the suppression motion, and the
town appealed. The Court of Appeals, Agid, J., held that: (1)
language of the warning given to motorist was adequate to
indicate that motorist had the right to take additional tests,
and (2) law enforcement officers were not required to use
exact words of implied consent statute or to include statutory
reference to implied consent provision.
- Vance v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 116 Wash.App. 412 (2003)
Motorist appealed administrative hearing officer's decision
sustaining the revocation of motorist's license to drive, based
on refusal to submit to breath test. The Superior Court, King
County, Donald Haley, J., affirmed. Discretionary review was
granted. The Court of Appeals, Ellington, J., held that: (1)
traffic stop for speeding occurred as result of fresh pursuit, so
that county sheriff's deputy was authorized to stop motorist
after motorist crossed county line; (2) motorist lacked right to
counsel before deciding whether to take a breath test; and (3)
motorist's indecision regarding whether to submit to breath
test did not require state trooper to clarify motorist's implied
- Veranth v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 90 Wash.App. 1028 (1998)
Motorist sought de novo review of the Licensing
Department's revocation of his driver's license under the
implied consent law after he refused to take a breath test.
The Superior Court, King County, Marsha Pechman, J., set
aside the revocation, and the Department appealed. The Court
of Appeals held that any deficiency in the refusal report
owing to the arresting officers' use of an abbreviation was
merely technical, and thus did not deprive the Department of
jurisdiction to revoke the motorist's license.
- Miller v. Wood, 729 S.E.2d 867 (W.Va. 2012)
In determining what constitutes a conviction for purposes of applying the statutory administrative procedures for suspension and revocation of licenses for driving under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs, a person is "convicted" when the person enters a plea of guilty or is found guilty by a court or jury.
- State v. Carter, 794 N.W.2d 213 (Wis. 2010)
State failed to establish, as basis for enhancing sentence in prosecution for operating while under the influence (OWI), that two "zero tolerance" suspensions in another state resulted from a refusal to submit to chemical testing; driving record from other state did not state whether the suspensions arose from a refusal to submit to testing or from a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00. "Conviction," as used in statute relating to counting of out-of-state convictions for sentence enhancement purposes in prosecution for OWI, refers to an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal.
- In re Refusal of Nackers, 736 N.W.2d 543 (Table) (Wis.Ct. App. 2007) UNPUBLISHED
Nackers appealed an order finding his refusal to submit to chemical testing unreasonable. His contention was that the officer violated Wisconsin's implied consent law by failing to inform him that as a holder of a commercial driver's license he would be placed out-of-service for refusing to submit to testing and then later failing to issue an out of service order. Because the officer properly read Nackers the Informing the Accused form in its entirety, including the portion detailing the possibility of the issuance of an out-of-service order the order was affirmed. Further, whether the officer was required to issue an out-of-service order was not an issue for the refusal hearing.